NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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No. 5

~~3 March~~ 26 FEB. 1975

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Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
27 February 1975

Hill Panel Will Seek CIA Data

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The new Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations will ask the Rockefeller Commission for all of its secret records on the Central Intelligence Agency, committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) said yesterday.

Church said he hoped the request would be granted so that the Senate inquiry into alleged abuses of power by the CIA and other government intelligence agencies could get off "to a running start." He said he did not think it would be in the public interest to have a "protracted investigation."

A spokesman for the White House Commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller, which was established last month in response to charges of illegal domestic spying by the CIA, declined to comment on the proposal.

At a closed meeting yesterday, the Senate Committee also approved 18 staff appointments for the investigation, including that of New York trial lawyer F. A. O. (Fritz) Schwartz Jr. as chief counsel.

A member of the Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Schwarz, 39, plans to begin working full time on the inquiry within two weeks. He previously represented International Business Machines Corp. in government antitrust litigation. Church said that gave him considerable experience "in extracting evidence from government agencies."

Burke Marshall, a former assistant attorney general in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and later general counsel for IBM, was named a committee consultant and will assist in organizing the investigation. He is on the faculty at Yale law school.

Pressing for cooperation from the administration on various levels, Church will meet today at 10 a.m. with CIA Director William E. Colby, partly to seek a waiver of the pledges of silence that the agency requires of its employees. Texas Sen. John Tower, ranking Republican on the committee, is expected to attend the closed session.

Church said he plans to ask Colby about the status of a 50-page report the CIA submitted to President Ford in early January. The CIA director last week refused to supply a copy to a House Appropriations Subcommittee, saying that he was "not authorized" to release it.

A government official familiar with the Rockefeller Commission's work said all of its records are classified "top secret," including nearly 1,000 pages of testimony from past and present CIA officials and a substantial number of interviews with CIA employees. The Commission, however, reportedly has been inspecting raw files at the agency's headquarters and thus possesses very little documentary material.

Ultimately, the official added, it will be up to Mr. Ford to decide on any congressional request for the Commission's files. But he said there was no understanding with the CIA that would prevent their turnover.

Church said he and Tower also expect to ask the President to issue a directive calling on all government agencies to cooperate with the Senate inquiry. After that, Church said, the two senators will seek a similar meeting with Vice President Rockefeller to ask him for the Commission's records.

The Select House Committee on Intelligence, which also has been set up to investigate the government's "intelligence community," had a brief meeting yesterday afternoon for what Chairman Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.) called an "informal discussion" of procedural and staffing requirements. No decisions were made, Nedzi said.

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Feb. 28, 1975

Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge To Cooperate With Senate Probe

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The head of the Central Intelligence Agency agreed to cooperate with Senate investigators yesterday by lifting the pledge of secrecy that the CIA requires of all its employees.

CIA Director William E. Colby promised the waiver at a closed meeting on Capitol Hill yesterday morning with Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, and Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), the committee's ranking Republican.

Church told reporters afterwards he was satisfied that Colby plans to provide all the information the committee needs for its investigation of CIA activities, including charges that the agency engaged in illegal domestic spying on American citizens.

The CIA requires everyone it hires to sign an agreement promising not to disclose any information they might obtain concerning "intelligence sources and methods" without the agency's authorization.

Church emphasized that Colby agreed to drop the requirement only for the "purposes of this Senate inquiry." However, a similar waiver probably will be provided to a new House committee that has also been assigned to investigate the government's intelligence agencies.

Later in the day, in a luncheon speech at the National Press Club, Church voiced doubts that the White House inquiry into the CIA's activites, under a commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller, could resolve the allegations that have been made against the agency.

"The executive branch cannot, with sufficient credibility, investigate itself," Church declared. He said he hoped it would wind up its work soon "and make its records available, as a starting point, for the more comprehensive congressional investigations to come."

Promising a "muted and restrained" inquiry and not "a television extravaganza," Church said he intends at the same time to make public as much information as possible during the course of the investigation.

"Our rule of thumb," the senator said, "will be to hold public hearings whenever we can and closed hearings whenever we must." He indicated that the committee would pursue allegations of illegal or improper activities by the CIA and other agencies in public, while conducting its examination of "legitimate national security" operations largely in executive session.

The committee chairman called the investigation long overdue, pointing out that neither the CIA nor the FBI, which also will be scrutinized, have ever undergone a thorough congressional inquiry.

Promising strict precautions against news leaks, Church said any committee staffer who discloses unauthorized information "will be fired on the spot."

In response to a question, he acknowledged that there was no way to control what senators on the committee might say, but said they were all mindful of the need for restraint.

Newsweek, March 3, 1975

Periscope

THE SHRINKING CIA?

A number of senior hands in Washington's intelligence community are becoming convinced that the CIA cannot survive the current investigations in its present form. They suspect that the job of analyzing and evaluating intelligence data will be given to the State Department; that paramilitary operations, like those carried on in Indochina, will be handed over to the Pentagon, and that covert political operations are obviously out for years to come. They also sense that CIA director William Colby has erred badly by talking too openly about CIA operations, and they believe he will soon be replaced.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 February 1975

Erasing the 'C' in 'Covert': In omplete Se urity

By Ray S. Cline

WASHINGTON—At the end of 1974, Congress enacted and President Ford signed into law restrictions on the Central Intelligence Agency's overseas operations that virtually put the C.I.A. out of the business of giving covert political assistance to friendly foreign governments or political groups. The White House did not make an issue of the legislative restrictions, nor did the C.I.A.

A great many critics of United States policy in the 1950's and 1960's, especially the young ones who grew up in the era of retreat from Vietnam and of worldwide détente, have applauded United States withdrawal from the clandestine inernational political arena. They consider covert activities incompatible with international law, morality and the fundamental principles of our open society.

And yet, there lingers an uneasy, doubtful feeling about the wisdom of this move in the minds of many Washington officials, especially career public servants in the "national security establishment" and political figures who remember the dark days of Europe in the time of the Berlin airlift (1948-1949) and the military invasion of South Korea (1950).

By and large, they are not confident that "détente" with the Soviet Union has eliminated the dangers of Soviet efforts to dominate smaller nations, some of which are important to the United States security. They also doubt that it is really moral for the United States to be too high-minded to help friendly democratic governments threatened with one-party dictatorship. Covert political action is a way of aiding governments threatened by a foreign-supported take-over without sending in the marines.

The "realists" of the "national security establishment" argue that covert action ought to be taken in those relatively few cases in which world events can be turned in a direction more favorable to the United States by a crucial marginal boost from the C.I.A. for moderate constitutionalists.

Proponents of selective covert political action abroad believe that all great nations try to influence political developments in other countries when their strategic interests are affected. The Soviet Union and China both have a well-defined political philosophy of intervening in non-Communist areas to promote violent revolutionary action and overthrow existing regimes.

The "realists" say that C.I.A. support helped the Christian Democratic-centered majority in Chile stay alive and resist the minority rule of President Salvador Allende Gossens, which would have brought Chile to total ruin. They are not particularly happy that a military junta rather than a parliamentary regime has taken charge, but they believe military regimes are impermanent whereas establishment of a Communist-dominated dictatorship with Soviet support is a one-way street.

The Soviet "Brezhnev Doctrine," invoked to justify the military occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, guarantees in perpetuity the security of pro-Soviet regimes within the commonwealth of Communist nations.

Serious foreign policy experts now point out that an excellent strategic case could be made for covert aid to non-Communist groups in Portugal.

The fall of the decaying authoritarian regime there left the country with virtually no organized political structure except for the Communist underground. The armed forces are divided between conservative and revolutionary wings. The latter seems to be dominant and is generally tolerant of Communist demonstrations, political strikes and physical harassment of democratic politicians.

The advocates of covert political action say the national security of the United States is at stake, since continuing Portuguese permission for American bases in the Azores is vital to antisubmarine reconnaissance and defense systems in the Atlantic. Loss of these bases, they say, would also make impossible prolonged American military assistance to Israel in the event of another Middle East war. Finally, it is noted, the Mediterranean flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might fall apart if a Soviet-influenced Communist-dominated regime gained control of Lisbon.

If this happened, say the national security professionals, what does the United States do? Retreat to Western Hemisphere quasi-isolationism? Spend massively on economic and military aid to shore up NATO's Mediterranean flank? If necessary, send in the marines? Might it not be better to let our covert operators quietly try to assist the moderate center in Portugal to establish a working multiparty parliamentary system, countering Soviet moves to help the local Communists, who are undoubtedly a minority but an efficient political force? Among these unattractive choices, some of the old hands, argue, covert political action is the best.

Later, American options may shrink to a choice between military intervention and strategic retreat from southern Europe and the Mediterranean. To avoid this harsh dilemma, whether in the case of Portugal or some other threatened nation, the United States ought to have an option of covertly aiding constructive constitutionalists and resisting the rise to power of dictatorships hostile to American interests.

Some observers of the international scene think American strength is so great that it materially affects what happens in the world, whether the United States acts or fails to act, uses diplomatic and economic pressures, or military aid or covert assistance. There is no way to shirk this awesome position, and the vital thing is to use all American assets in a stabilizing, peace-preserving role.

Ray S. Cline, executive director of studies at The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, was from 1969 to 1973 director of the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research. He was the C.I.A. Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1962 to 1966.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 February 1975

Majority in Poll Opposes Rockefeller C.I.A. Inquiry

By a 49-to-35 majority, Americans believe President Ford was wrong to appoint Vice President Rockefeller to head a special investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Harris survey reported Thursday.

A cross-section of 1,532 adults felt that a commission independent of the White House should have the assignment, The Associated Press reported. Sixteen per cent were not sure.

The survey showed that 43 per cent of those queried thought the Rockefeller investigation would end up as a cover-up similar to that of Watergate, while 33 per cent thought the inquiry would get to the root of any C.I.A. wrongdoing. Twenty-four per cent were unsure.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1975

C.I.A. Chief Says Charges Imperil Intelligence Work

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20—William E. Colby, the director of Central Intelligence, told Congress today that "exaggerated" charges of improper conduct by the agency had "placed American intelligence in danger."

In rare public testimony on Capitol Hill, Mr. Colby said that "misrepresentations" by critics of the C.I.A., in the news media and elsewhere, had jeopardized relations with intelligence agencies in other nations, raised the specter of peril to American spies abroad and lowered morale in the C.I.A.

"The almost hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story mentioning C.I.A., or even referring to a perfectly legitimate activity of C.I.A., has raised the question whether secret intelligence operations can be conducted by the United States," Mr. Colby said.

At the same time, however, he confirmed in his testimony before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that the names of four members or former members of Congress, including "at least a couple" of unnamed opponents of the Vietnam war, had been entered in C.I.A. files.

He said that with the exception of one file on a deceased Congressman, which is still extant," the files were either inactive or destroyed in 1974. He did not identify any of the Congressmen.

Mr. Colby's appearance before the subcommittee appeared designed, both by the agency and most members of the panel, to afford the intelligence director a friendly forum to reply to published allegations that the agency had violated a legal ban on domestic activities or had engaged in other questionable practices.

The subcommittee has House jurisdiction over the C.I.A.'s secret annual budget. Normally, intelligence directors testify only behind closed doors and rarely do they even make public the texts of their prepared remarks.

Today, however, Mr. Colby read a 20-page statement and answered questions for nearly three hours as television cameras whirred and reporters and some sightseers looked on in a Capitol hearing room.

Mr. Colby said that he welcomed an examination of the purposes and conduct of the United States intelligence community by the select committees established in both the Senate and House and by a White House commission.

But he declared that "a number of responsible Americans are concerned that a degree of hysteria can develop that will result in serious damage to our country's essential intelligence work by throwing the baby out with the bath water."

Allegations Challenged

Mr. Colby specifically challenged, as either "false" or as "misrepresentations," several allegations about C.I.A. activities, including the following:

¶He said he could find no evidence to support an account published last month by The New York Times, quoting an unnamed former C.I.A. undercover agent's description of clandestine surveillance of dissident American citizens in the New York area. Mr. Colby said the reporter who wrote the article may have been "the victim of what we in the intelligence trade call a "fabricator."

¶He denied speculation by Charles W. Colson, the former counsel to President Nixon, that the C.I.A. had prior knowledge of the Watergate burglary in 1972. Mr. Colby said that Mr. Colson, recently released from a prison sentence that resulted from the Watergate scandals, had a "lack of credibility [that] should cause the charge to fall of its own weight," but that it was not supported by any Watergate investigation either.

¶He said various published accounts that police departments in the United States provided false credentials for C.I.A. agents or otherwise assisted in domestic C.I.A. involvement had "warped" the agency's "friendly liaison relationships" with police forces.

¶He said a charge that the agency was planning to spy on allied nations in contracting for studies of overseas transportation developments had stemmed from "an dangerous misunderstanding of the true nature of modern intelligence." Mr. Colby did not state that the charge originally was made by Senator Richard S. Schweiker, Republican of Pennsylvania, a member of the new Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. Colby said that shortly before The New York Times published its account of alleged C.I.A. activities, "he [the Times reporter] contacted me stating he had obtained information of great importance indicating that CI.A. had engaged in a massive domestic intelligence activity, including wiretaps, break-ins, and a variety of other actions."

"In response to his request," Mr. Colby continued, "I met with him and explained to him that he had mixed and magnified two separate subjects, I.E., the foreign counterintelligence effort properly conducted by C.I.A. and those few activities that the agency's own investigation had revealed and terminated in 1973. He obviously did not accept my explanation and, instead, alleged that C.I.A. had conducted a 'massive illegal domestic intelligence operation.'

"I am confident that the investigations of the President's commission and the select committees will verify the accuracy of my version of these events."

The Intelligence director contended that such "exaggerations and misrepresentations of C.I.A.'s activities can do irreparable harm to our national inelligence apparatus and, if carried to the extreme, could blindfold our country as it looks ahead."

Mr. Colby did not specify in much detail what risks he believed were entailed in the public discussion of the agency's conduct.

He did say, however, that "a number of the intelligence services abroad with which C.I.A. works have expressed concern over its situation and over the fate of the sensitive information they provide to us."

Mr. Colby also stated that "a number of our individual agents abroad are deeply worried that their names might be revealed, wtih resultant damage to their lives as well as their livelihoods."

He told the committee that seven of eight companies invited recently o bid on a covert — but, Mr. Colby said, proper—C.I.A. contract had refused, apparently out of concern that their businesses might be embarrassed by subsequent disclosures.

Conversely, though, Mr. Colby said that applicaions for employment with the C.I.A., normally about 600 every few weeks, had climbed to 1,700 in the first two weeks of January as an apparent consequence of public interest in the agency.

Mr. Colby stressed that he believed the intelligence community's ability to help maintain international peace "can decline if our intelligence machinery is made ineffectual through irresponsible exposure or ill-founded exaggeration."

Most members of the essentially conservative subcommittee spoke sympathetically of Mr. Colby's efforts to improve the agency and to end what the director insisted had been "mistakes" that were "few and far between."

Mr. Colby submitted to the panel a copy of testimony he had given Jan. 15 to a Senate committee, along with five pages of additional information about C.I.A. activities in the United States.

Data on Congressmen

The new information included the statement that, "over the past eight years, our counterintelligence program holdings have included files on four members of Congress."

"With the exception of one file still extant on a deceased Congressman, those files are inactive," the statement continued. "Two of them were destroyed in 1974. None contained any material that originated in C.I.A., except for one travel cable and two cables quoting press announcements of conferences."

Mr. Colby did not elaborate on the presumably still active file on the deceased member of Congress.

Mr. Colby had told the Senate last month that there never had been any surveillance of Congressmen and that, with one technical exception, no files existed containing data on members of Congress, as had been stated in a New York Times article last December.

Under questioning today, Mr. Colby said that such files were the natural consequence of intelligence gathered by the agency on conferences overseas and that names of members of Congress had been noted merely among those who took part in the meetings.

Asked by Representative Jack F. Kemp, Republican of upstae New York, if the files dealt, as the account in The Times had alleged, with "at least one avowedly antiwar member of Congress," Mr. Colby said that "at least a couple" of the members fit that description.

The rarity of the public testimony was underlined by the opening remarks of the subcommittee chairman, Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas. He noted that there would be the customary closed budget hearing tomorrow and that the open forum today was "not as usual."

Mr. Mahon praised, by name, each of the men who has served as C.I.A. director since the agency's inception in 1947. While not condoning any "mistakes" the agency might have made, Mr. Mahon said, "I do want you to know you are among people who believe in the intelligence mechanism."

The only sharp questioning from the panel came from Representative Robert N. Giaimo, a Connecticut Democrat who is also the second-senior member of the New House Select Committee on Intelligence.

"I have yet to have heard one word from anyone on your side of the table or ours," Mr. Giaimo said at one point, about whether activities of the agency might "infringe upon rights of American citizens."

Mr. Colby replied that he, too, was determined to safeguard rights of citizens and end any improper practices, but that such practices had been rare.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 February 1975

EX-C.I.A. OFFICIAL TESTIFIES 3 HOURS

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 (AP) —Accompanied by an attorney, Howard J. Osborne, the former security chief for the Central Inteddigence Agency, was questioned for more than three hours today by the Rockefeller commission about the agency's domestic surveillanve activities.

Mr. Osborn, whose office conducted an operation that Willian E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence, has said infiltrated agents into American radical groups in the late nineteen-sixties, was the first of the dozen witnesses who have appeared before the panel to be represented by an attorney.

According to knowledgeable sources, an inter-office memo dated Feb. 6, warned agency employes that they might be prosecuted for past practices and advised them to retain private counsel.

Vice President Rockefeller, the commission chairman, indicated that Mr. Osborn had not invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination.

Mr Osborn refused all comment to reporters, saying he had "never commented or talked to the press."

His lawyer, John W. Debelius, when asked who was paying his legal fee, replied, "The agency most certainly is not."

Two other former C.I.A. officers, Raymond G. Rocca and N. Scott Miler, also testified before the commission at its sixth weekly meeting. Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler served under James J. Angleton, the agency's former counterintelligence chief, who last week reportedly told the commission he had been kept in the dark about the activities of a secret unit that Mr. Colby has acknowledged kept files on 10,000 Americans.

The commission operated for most of the day at half-strength, with four of its eight members, including Mr. Rockefeller, absent. The Vice President joined the hearings in midafternoon just as Mr. Osborn was completing his testimony.

Asked for his reaction to a Harris poll indicating that a majority of Americans think the commission will cover up any wrongdoing by the agency, Mr. Rockefeller said, "I can assure anybody that we're not" conducting a whitewash.

For the first time in five weeks, former Gov. Ronald Reagan of California was present for a commission meeting. Mr. Reagan said he had read transcripts of all the sessions he had missed and that he was confident that he had "a grip" on the material.

Mr. Osborn, who headed the office of security from 1964 to 1974, is regarded as a central figure in both the Rockefeller inquiry and past investigations of C.I.A. involvement in Watergate.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1975

Excerpts From the Statement by Colby

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20— Following are excerpts from a statement by William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, at a hearing today by the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee:

Mr. Chairman, in May, 1973, Director Schlesinger issued a notice to all C.I.A. employes instructing and inviting them to report to him or to the Inspector General any matter in C.I.A.'s history which they deemed questionable under C.I.A.'s charter. This instruction has been made a matter of regulation within C.I.A. and is brought to the attention of each employe once a year.

Times Article Cited

As a result of the May, 1973, memorandum, various incidents were collected and brought to the attention of the chairman of the House and the acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committees. They were then used as the basis of a very specific series of internal instructions issued in August, 1973, directing the termination, modification, or other appropriate action with respect to such incidents in order to ensure that C.I.A. remains within its proper charter. These instructions have been carried out and are periodically reviewed to ensure continued compliance.

It appears that some version of these matters came to the attention of the New York Times reporter who wrote th article of Dec. 22, 1974. A day or two before the article appeared, he contacted me stating he had obtained information of great importance indicating that C.I.A. had engaged in a massive domestic intelligence activity, including wiretaps, break-ins and a variety of other actions.

In response to his request, I met with him and explained to him that he had mixed and magnified two separate subjects, I.E., the foreign counterintelligence effort properly conducted by C.I.A. and those few activities that the agency's own investigation had revealed and terminated in 1973.

He obviously did not accept my explanation and, instead, alleged that C.I.A. had conducted a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation." I am confident that investigations of the President's commission and the select committees will verify the accuracy of my version of these events.

I also believe that any serious review of my report to the Senate Appropriations Committee will show that I essentially denied his version rather than confirmed it as some have alleged. The sensational atmosphere surrounding intelligence, however, encouraged oversimplification and disproportionate stress on a few missteps rather than on the high quality of C.I.A.'s basic work.

Mr. Chairman, these last two months have placed American intelligence in danger. The almost hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story mentioning C.I.A., or referring even to a perfectly legitimate activity of C.I.A., has raised the question whether secret intelligence operations can be conducted by the United States.

A number of the intelligence services abroad with which C.I.A. works have expressed concern over its situation and over the fate of the sensitive information they provide to us. A number of our individual agents abroad are deeply worried that their names might be revealed with resultant danger to their lives as well as their livelihoods.

A number of Americans who have collaborated with C.I.A. as a patriotic contribution to their country are deeply concerned that their reputations will be besmirched and their businesses ruined by sensational misrepresentation of this association. And our own employes are torn between the sensational allegations of C.I.A. misdeeds and their own knowledge that they served their nation during critical times in the best way they knew how.

WASHINGTON POST
20 February 1975

Common Cause Seeks CIA Report

Associated Press

Common Cause, a citizens lobbying group, said yesterday it has asked CIA Director William E. Colby for access to the report on CIA domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens that was given President Ford in late 1974.

Mr. Ford requested the report from Colby after published reports of unlawful CIA surveillance.

WASHINGTON POST
11 FEB 1975

By Maxine Cheshire

Now You See It, Now You Don't

It could be a scene from a spy movie about the CIA: A caller looking for E. Howard Hunt's old "public relations" office, a block from the White House, gets off the fifth-floor elevator these days and finds a blank wall.

There is not even a door where the public relations firm of Robert Mullen & Co. once rented space.

The company, identified as a CIA cover operation whose ties to the Watergate scandals are still being scrutinized, quietly went out of business months ago.

That was shortly before a report on Mullen & Co.'s CIA involvements was released by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.).

Among other things, the Mullen firm was under contract to provide a corporate cover for CIA operatives in Singapore, Amsterdam and elsewhere.

Baker's report also claimed that the CIA helped former agent Hunt get a job with Mullen and the company's president, Robert F. Bennett, knew in advance of the Watergate break-in as a White House operation.

Bennett, the son of Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-Utah), has moved to Los Angeles to become the public relations director for billionaire Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation. Bennett handled Hughes' account previously at Mullen.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 February 1975

The Right Focus on the C.I.A.

IN THE NATION

By Tom Wicker

Official documents just published by the State Department disclose that in 1948, President Harry Truman—then facing dim re-election prospects himself—approved a secret recommendation that the United States "make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power" to prevent a Communist election victory in Italy.

Published records do not as yet detail to what extent that recommendation was carried out, or what role might have been played by the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency. But Mr. Truman's order of a quarter-century ago finds an unpleasant echo in the word Richard Helms, the director of the C.I.A. in 1970, says was passed to him that year by the Nixon Administration—that the overthrow of the Government of Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile was "a thing that they were interested in having done."

Mr. Allende, a Marxist, already had been elected, although not by a majority, and was awaiting confirmation by the Chilean Congress, so in that respect the Nixon policy was far more drastic than Mr. Truman's. The latter President, moreover, might reasonably be considered to have had more justification, in the era of Stalin, for his concern about Italy than Mr. Nixon had, in the era of détente, for his opposition to Mr. Allende.

The net effect, in both cases, still was official Government sanction for United States intervention in the internal affairs of another nation, to be undertaken clandestinely and for the purpose of containing or rolling back Communism. And however different the circumstances in which the two interventions were approved, they underscore the enormous difficulties of the task now being undertaken by the special Senate committee appointed to investigate the operations of the American intelligence community.

The Truman documents show that the seeds of the investigation lie deep in the origins of the Cold War. But in the mere eight months allotted to its operations, the Senate committee cannot possibly rummage back through the history of the past thirty years to examine every covert operation undertaken abroad—even if the records were clear and easily obtained, which they aren't, and even if circumstances had not so greatly changed. It would be difficult even to cover such ground back to, say, 1960; and the task is made infinitely more complicated because the committee also is investigating the F.B.I. and numerous other Federal agencies concerned with intelligence (Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee says there are nineteen such agencies altogether).

The committee is charged with looking into the operations of these agencies at home and abroad, but the concerns that led most directly to its establishment were domestic—disclosures that the C.I.A., in apparent violation of its charter, had been conducting surveillances of, and keeping records on, American citizens. It would be natural, therefore, if the committee were to place its major emphasis on uncovering and preventing unlawful activities threatening the rights of American citizens, rather than in investigating covert operations abroad; the latter, in any case, present delicate problems of international relations that the committee will be reluctant to rais.

Statements by Senator Frank Church, the chairman, and Senator John Tower, the senior minority member, suggest that the committee will place its major focus on domestic violations. It can hardly be argued that that is not a vital subjct of investigation and, in the case of the F.B.I., the primary one. Senator Church, moreover, is privately determined to examine the record of covert operations abroad in sufficient depth to develop guidelines and policies to control them in the future.

Still, the danger seems clear that in demanding so much of this single committee in so short a time, and even with the best efforts of its members and staff, the Senate may get far less than it or the nation expects. The question of domestic violations of law by the C.I.A. is already being studied, for example, by President Ford's so-called "blue ribbon" commission under Vice President Rockefeller; and while the makeup of that panel does not inspire confidence that it will conduct a searching inquiry, over-concentration on the same area by the Senate committee is bound to cause much duplication of effort.

Yet, the wording of the Rockefeller commission's charter so tightly limits it to investigating C.I.A. domestic operations as to foster the belief that the Administration has good reason to fear any probing by the commission of the C.I.A.'s covert operations abroad. Indications mount that those operations—as in Chile—have been extensive and unsavory, to a degree undreamed of by most Americans.

The record of these operations should be subjected at last to the most searching scrutiny—not that the past can be redeemed but that the future may be guarded. If Senator Church and his committee find themselves unable to single out covert operations to the extent necessary, they should have no hesitation in recommending further investigation, and for as long as it may take, of this dark chapter in American history.

WASHINGTON STAR
15 February 1975

CIA Issues Prosecution Warning

By Jim Squires
Chicago Tribune

The Central Intelligence Agency has warned employes they may be prosecuted for past "agency practices" and reminded them of their "constitutional rights to remain silent" if questioned by the Justice Department.

In an interoffice memorandum, the agency said it "hopes no one will be charged with a criminal offense." But the memo advises employes to retain "private counsel" and implies that in case of prosecution they will be on their own.

The two-page directive, dated Feb. 6, was signed by David H. Blee, deputy director of the agency's clandestine operations div. since the agency came under fire for illegal domestic activities.

MANY EMPLOYES of the clandestine services, the so-called "dirty tricks" sections of the agency, have interpreted the memorandum as another sign that CIA Director William S. Colby is unwilling to back employes who now might face prosecution for carrying out the orders of their superiors.

Others interpreted it simply as a warning to the clandestine operators to keep their mouths shut.

CIA sources said the long-standing feud between the agency's clandestine employes and the "overt" side (intelligence gathering and analysis) has intensified sion, which has been accused of carrying out illegal domestic spying.

NOW THAT the clandestine side is in trouble, the weight of the director (Colby) has come down on the overt side," said one source. "It has become very clear that management is no longer with us."

The Blee memo implied but did not specifically state that the agency would not help employes accused of crimes. "It is understood that the agency will supply attorneys in civil matters," said one agency source. "But if it is a criminal offense, each employe must get his own lawyer."

The Blee memo, sent to supervisory personnel, suggested that all employes are "warned" that the Justice Department is reviewing past agency practices to see if they conflict with criminal statutes" and that "they may be asked to volunteer information."

THE JUSTICE Department has been reviewing previous CIA activities for the last few weeks to determine if any agency employes should be prosecuted.

The probe centers on two areas of CIA operations, the agency's counter-intelligence division and the office of security, which is charged with protecting agency secrets.

Colby has acknowledged publicly that both sections of the agency carried out some questionable domestic activities, including surveillance and infiltration of groups of anti-war dissidents and illegal entry.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 February 1975

U.S. CITIZENS USED BY F.B.I. ABROAD

Bureau Confirms Practice—Authorities Say It Does Not Violate the Law

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15—The Federal Bureau of Investigation periodically dispatches American citizens on intelligence-gathering missions outside the United States, according to a 42-year-old Florida man who says he and others have been used for that purpose.

The man, Joseph A. Burton, who for more than two years, beginning in May, 1972, posed as a Marxist in order to infiltrate revolutionary groups here and abroad, told The New York Times that he had made "about 10" sorties into Canada at the F.B.I.'s direction.

Another undercover operative, a woman with whom Mr. Burton occasionally worked, confirmed in a separate interview that she had made a month-long visit to China nearly four years ago in connection with her work for the bureau.

The F.B.I., according to a former high official there, has "no right to run [intelligence] operations in a foreign country—that's the C.I.A.'s jurisdiction."

But neither he, nor legal authorities in and out of the Government who were asked about the practice, could point to any statute prohibiting the bureau from gathering intelligence overseas.

James Murphy, a spokesman at F.B.I. headquarters here, confirmed in a telephone interview that the bureau has in the past sent American citizens abroad for intelligence purposes, but he declined to discuss specific cases.

Mr. Burton, an auctioneer and antiques dealer who lives in Tampa, Fla., told The Times that he ended his relationship with the F.B.I. last summer after becoming concerned about the legality of some of the tasks he had undertaken, including the Canadian ventures.

He said that, last month, his doubts led him to write to Clarence M. Kelley, director of the bureau, seeking assurances that his work outside the United States was "legal and proper."

He has received no reply to that letter or to an earlier one. F.B.I. officials will not say whether a reply is forthcoming.

Apart from his concern that he may have violated the law, Mr. Burton's account of his activities, and that of his fellow operative, provide an insight into a little-known aspect of the F.B.I.'s operations at a time when the agency is coming under increasingly stringent scrutiny.

Last month, the Senate set up a select committee to examine intelligence-gathering by Federal agencies, including the F.B.I. and the Central Intelligence Agency, whose occasionally overlapping jurisdictions have created some difficulties in the past.

Talk of Albania

Although his forays outside the United States were confined to Canada, Mr. Burton said, "There was some talk of my going to Europe and also going to Albania. The bureau would have let me go to Albania. They wanted me to go."

He was in the process of securing an invitation to visit the tiny Communist country, he said, when he decided to break off his relationship with the bureau.

Mr. Burton said he was once asked by an F.B.I. superior whether he would "like to go to Mexico, walk into the Chinese embassy and say that you've got this organization in Tampa and that you want to work with the Chinese."

Mr. Burton then headed a sham "revolutionary" group in Tampa, called the "Red Star Cadre," that, he said, had been set up as a front for his F.B.I. work. He said he told the inquiring agent that he would not "insult the Chinese by trying to pull something that stupid on them."

During the Canadian trips, he recalled, his instructions were to develop contacts with members of the Canadian Communist party's pro-Chinese wing, and to report to the F.B.I. on their activities, including any signs that the organization was passing funds from China to Maoist groups in the United States.

On two of the trips, he said, he was accompanied by an American woman who had adopted a similar radical pose in the New Orleans area, and who told him that she had visited China to gather political intelligence for the bureau.

The woman, a 36-year-old housewife and mother, confirmed in an interview in the Southwestern city where she now lives that she spent four weeks in China in 1971 with one of the first groups of Americans allowed into that country after President Nixon's announcement that he would visit there.

When first asked about that trip, the woman said, "It's better not to discuss any F.B.I. operations outside the country."

But after being assured anonymity, she conceded that she had entered China "before Nixon" as part of a "delegation made up of American radicals," and had made "four or five" trips into Canada as well.

The woman asked that she not be identified for fear of reprisals from the left against her or her husband, with whom she had worked in penetrating leftist political organizations in Louisiana and elsewhere.

'A Detail Specialist'

The reports she submitted to the F.B.I. upon her return, she said, were filled not only with information about her traveling companions, but also with her observations of Canton, Shanghai and Peking, the Chinese capital, where, she said she had been introduced to Premier Chou En-lai.

"I was concerned about everything," she replied when asked what sort of information she supplied to the bureau. "I was a detail specialist."

Asked whether she now entertained any misgivings about her work, her voice trembled as she said, "I spent a month in China, wondering if I was ever going to go home again: wondering if they were ever going to find out what I was doing.

"I feel like I've put my life on the line for a good cause, and I don't feel like that all ought to go down the drain because someone wants to make a sensational story."

The former F.B.I. intelligence official said he had read the woman's reports on China, but could not recall whether any of the information had been shared with the C.I.A.

Hoover's Strategy for 'Glory'

On more than one occasion when the F.B.I. sent a covert operative abroad, the official said, J. Edgar Hoover, then director of the bureau, would "instruct us not to advise" the C.I.A. of the intelligence that was produced.

"He wanted to outscoop the C.I.A.," the man said. "He wanted the F.B.I. to come back with valuable information which he would give to the President over his signature, so he would get the glory."

Added the official: "He was wrong."

When first asked about Mr. Burton's activities, officials of the bureau here said that all queries should be addressed to Nick F. Stames, the special agent in charge of the F.B.I.'s Tampa field office, under whom Mr. Burton had worked.

Mr. Stames, who last week was notified that he was being transferred to the bureau's Washington field office, said repeatedly in a recent interview that he would not respond in any way to Mr. Burton's disclosures or charges beyond the following statement:

"Joseph A. Burton volunteered his services to the Tampa F.B.I. office in May, 1972, and was able to establish contact with several Marxist-Leninist groups.

"He was paid for his service in providing information and expenses incurred in connection with its acquisition.

"During his periods of assistanct to the F.B.I. Burton was instructed not to engage in any illegal activities and we have no information indicating he did engage in illegal activities.

"Burton's services were discontinued in July, 1974, at his own request, as he indicated he desired to provide security for his family and because he was no longer willing to be associated with the Communist revolutionary movement."

The former F.B.I. official said that the bureau maintains agents in a number of foreign capitals who serve as "legal attachés" and who have their offices inside American embassies. But he said that their role was officially limited to performing a "liaison" function with foreign policy agencies and that they were barred from "positive," or active, gathering of intelligence.

Not Special Agents

Mr. Murphy, the spokesman for the bureau here, said that the F.B.I. was "not operational outside the country," and, without confirming that either Mr. Burton or the woman had ever traveled abroad, he pointed out that neither was a special agent of the F.B.I.

Asked how he would describe the pair, Mr. Murphy replied that they were considered "paid informants."

A spokesman for the C.I.A., which is charged by law with the gathering of intelligence outside the United States, said his agency would have no comment on any reports concerning the F.B.I.'s external intelligence operations.

Told of the bureau's description of him as an "informant," Mr. Burton bristled.

"What information did I sell them?" he demanded. "When they called me and told me to go to Canada, was I selling them information? When they asked me to set up 'Red Star,' was I selling them information?

"If the bureau asked me to go to Canada or Pennsylvania or anywhere," he went on, "at first they would say, 'Do you want to go?' After a while they just said, 'You're going to Canada.'"

Full-Time Help

Both Mr. Burton and the couple from New Orleans pointed out repeatedly that they had worked virtually full time for the F.B.I.

Mr. Burton produced a letter from Mr. Stames showing that, in addition to travel and other expenses, he was paid $2,823 for his work for the bureau during the first seven months of last year.

The New Orleans couple said that during their service as undercover intelligence operatives they received an average of "about $16,000" a year from the bureau.

Told of Mr. Murphy's explanation that, because he had not graduated from the F.B.I. Academy as a special agent he was officially considered an "informant," Mr. Burton laughed and replied:

"The only thing I didn't learn [by not attending the academy] is how to pick up a phone and say, 'This is not your F.B.I. We didn't do it, no, we don't know them, thank you for not calling us.'

"That and the karate course, I think, are the only two things I missed."

Dismissing an informant as "somebody who asks, 'How

much will you give me for some information,'" Mr. Burton emphasized that he received instructions from and made reports to his F.B.I. superiors on a daily basis, and that he was directed both here and abroad to act "in other than a passive role."

As his first Canadian assignment, he recalled, he was instructed to attend a conference of the Canadian Communist party's pro-Chinese wing, an organization of which he said he eventually became a voting member and to which he periodically donated funds supplied by the F.B.I.

Without seeming to do so, Mr. Burton said, he had been able to cause a "rift" among some of the leftist organizations represented at the conference. Upon his return to Tampa, he said, the bureau "congratulated" him on his success.

Displaying anger at what he deemed attempts by bureau officials to play down the importance of his activities, Mr. Burton asserted that last July, just before he broke with the bureau, he was told by an agent:

"If you want to do a book on your association with the bureau someday after this has all settled down, we would be more than happy to help you, and we will supply you with a publisher."

Mr. Burton said he declined the offer, saying that, "By the time you cut out everything I want to put in, there wouldn't be any book."

NEW YORK TIMES
28 February 1975

House Unit Votes to Block 2 C.I.A.-Inquiry Resolutions

WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 (UPI) —The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 19 to 9 today to bury in committee two resolutions calling for investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with the coup that toppled the late Chilean President, Salvadore Allende Gosseus.

Chairman Thomas E. Morgan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, said the resolutions by Representative Michael J. Harrington, Democrat of Massachusetts, were unnecessary because other committees of Congress were going to investigate the matter.

White House lawyers and the State Department's Congressional liaison official both urged the committee not to approve the Harrington resolutions.

WASHINGTON STAR
21 February 1975

Colby Says CIA Operations Jeopardized by 'Excitement'

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The head of the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday protested that American intelligence operations have been jeopardized by "the almost hysterical excitement" over CIA missteps.

Testifying before a House Appropriations subcommittee for nearly three hours, William E. Colby complained that allegations of legal or improper domestic spywork by the CIA have been blown out of all proportion and have placed its legitimate activities in danger.

At the same time, the CIA director submitted a series of what he called "minor changes" in a report that he gave the Senate Appropriations Committee last month.

Continuing investigations, Colby said, showed that the agency's counterintelligence files over the past eight years "have included files on four members of Congress."

He said under questioning that "at least a couple" of these unidentified members of Congress turned up in counterintelligence dossiers because of their anti-Vietnam war activities, but denied that any of them had been under "active surveillance."

In his report to the Senate last month, Colby had said that only one former member of Congress had appeared in the CIA's counterintelligence program files.

Colby strongly defended his beleaguered agency and maintained that its missteps were "few and far between . . . and in no way justify the public outcry which has been raised against CIA."

Flanked by two aides at the public hearing, which will be followed by a closed session today, Colby said the furor has touched off chagrin among cooperating intelligence agencies abroad, fears among a number of individual CIA agents that their lives might be jeopardized by public disclosures, and concern among Americans who have collaborated with the CIA that their businesses might be ruined by "sensational misrepresentation" of their work with the agency.

Within the CIA, Colby said, "the morale, to be perfectly honest, right now is bad." Just a couple of weeks ago, he added, the agency asked eight firms to bid on a CIA contract, and seven of them declined, probably because they did not want to be associated with the trouble the CIA is in today."

The CIA's domestic activities are under investigation by a special presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller. The agency also faces broader inquiries, along with the rest of the nation's intelligence community, from select Senate and House investigating committees that have been created in the past month.

Addressing himself to some specific allegations, Colby denied a report in The New York Times quoting an anonymous ex-CIA agent as declaring that he and other agents had taken part in telephone wiretaps and break-ins in the New York City area.

The slim, gray-haired CIA director said the agency had been unable to identify any such ex-employee and as a result suspected that the Times reporter, Seymour Hersh, was "the victim of what we in the intelligence trade call a fabricator."

Colby also denied what he described as charges that the CIA manages a $200 million-a-year corporate empire "which could circumvent the will of Congress." He acknowledged that the agency maintains "certain corporate support structures" as a cover for its operations, but insisted that they are meticulously managed and audited by CIA officials.

The CIA director declined, however, to discuss at the public session reports that the agency worked with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the early 1960s to bug apartments in various metropolitan areas as "sex traps for foreign diplomats."

"I won't say sex and intelligence never got together," Colby told Rep. Bill D. Burlison (D-Mo.), but "I'd really like to talk about the relationship with the BNDD privately if I could."

Under questioning by Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.) Colby also refused to give the subcommittee a copy of the 50-page report on the CIA's domestic activities that was submitted to President Ford a few weeks ago.

Colby said the report contained "essentially" the same facts he was giving the subcommittee in summary fashion. But as for the report to Mr. Ford, he said, "I am not authorized to release that." Colby refused to elaborate on the reasons.

In his report to the Senate Appropriations Committee last month, Colby said it was for the first time that CIA officers had occasionally spied on American journalists and political dissenters, opened the mail of private citizens, planted informers inside domestic groups and assembled the agency's own secret files on more than 10,000 Americans.

In the updated report submitted yesterday, he also said the agency conducted telephone wiretaps on 27 persons, including foreigners, in the United States between 1951 and 1965, when the practice was stopped—instead of 21 individuals as previously reported.

But he denied again that any of these activities amounted to a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation" in violation of its charter prohibiting such activities.

Rep. George H. Mahon (D-Tex.) interrupted: "You denied the allegation that it was a massive effort, but you didn't deny something happened."

Colby replied that the CIA had conducted what it considered a legitimate counterintelligence effort "directed at possible foreign links to American dissidents . . . in response to presidential concern over this possibility."

The CIA director also suggested that the files on the four unidentified members of Congress had been rather innocuous and occasioned largely by their attendance at anti-war meetings in foreign countries which the CIA monitored.

"They were not under surveillance by the CIA in any case," Colby said, and then added, "They were not under active surveillance." He said two of the files were destroyed in 1974 and none contained any material that originated in the CIA except for one travel cable and two cables quoting press announcements of forthcoming conferences.

Except for one counter intelligence file "still extant on a deceased congressman," the CIA director reported that the remaining dossiers have been shipped to a CIA records center and thus classified as "inactive."

Despite the poor morale at the agency, Colby did acknowledge one silver lining that he attributed to recent publicity. Normally, he said, the CIA gets some 600 job inquiries every couple of weeks, but in the first two weeks of January there were 1,700 of them.

"We're getting a very high quality of recruits these days," he said.

NEWSWEEK
17 FEB 1975
INVESTIGATIONS:

The FBI's Turn

When the furor over "domestic spying" first broke several weeks ago, the Central Intelligence Agency was in the eye of the storm. Of late, however, the resulting inquiries into the U.S. intelligence establishment have broadened out—in Congress and in the press—bringing the Federal Bureau of Investigation into some heavy weather of its own. Unlike the CIA, the FBI is empowered by law to conduct surveillance and other intelligence-gathering operations in the U.S. But a recent spate of seamy revelations has raised questions about the bureau's tactics and the way it has used—and abused—the information it gathers.

Under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI stooped to some squalid stratagems. In the mid-1960s, NEWSWEEK learned, the FBI planted electronic "bugs" in two houses of prostitution in the Washington area. "There was a national-security rationale," explained a highly placed source. "The bureau hoped to obtain tapes of foreign diplomats in compromising situations, to be used possibly in blackmailing them into working for the U.S." But sometimes the bugs also picked up congressmen and other important Americans. Hoover, according to NEWSWEEK's source, passed such information to Lyndon Johnson, who enjoyed placing a stack of FBI dossiers conspicuously on his desk while subjecting vulnerable congressmen to some political arm-twisting.

'Club': Hoover could play the same ambiguous game. In the mid-'60s, the FBI discovered that an Eastern congressman was among the victims of a ring of blackmailers preying on homosexuals. Hoover, NEWSWEEK learned, personally assured the legislator that he would be spared any publicity. Hoover extended the same courtesy to other congressmen the FBI had found in compromising situations. Such promises of protection were no doubt comforting, and indeed it was the FBI's job to shield people from blackmail. But the mere fact that the agency had such information could have been, as Rep. John M. Slack of West Virginia put it, "a way of getting a congressman under a club."

Among the more serious charges of FBI abuse focused on a fifteen-year "counterintelligence" program (COINTELPRO), which was aimed at both political fringes and at black and white extremist groups. Before the program was terminated in 1971, the bureau had, by its own reckoning, mounted 2,370 separate "operations"—digging up or simply fabricating derogatory information about their subjects and then leaking it to "friendly news media" or other recipients in order to get the subjects fired, evicted from apartments, denied credit or otherwise harassed. In one such case, according to court papers filed on behalf of several members of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party who are suing the FBI, agents visited a Florida shipbuilding concern and told an official there that one of his employees, SWP sympathizer Ernest Able, was a Communist. The company fired Able, allegedly citing the FBI visit as a reason for dismissal.

COINTELPRO's tactics were as various as its targets—ranging from "dirty tricks" to what Massachusetts Rep. Robert Drinan last week described as downright "lawlessness." In the late 1960s, a former government official told NEWSWEEK, the FBI hired a prostitute with venereal disease to seduce several New Left leaders in California in the naïve belief that contracting VD would discredit them with potential campus followers (she purportedly met with at least some success).

Deal? Many of the recent disclosures about the FBI and the CIA come from once-secret Congressional testimony. Two such stories have surfaced about FBI bugging of Martin Luther King's telephone and bedroom. The New York Times reported that LBJ ordered—and Hoover approved—an FBI check of five of Spiro Agnew's phone calls during the 1968 campaign to determine whether the Republicans were trying to make their own deal with the South Vietnamese. That story was gleaned from testimony before the Senate Watergate committee in 1973. Similarly, the Times's Seymour Hersh discovered a 1973 allegation before the House Armed Services Committee that former CIA director Richard Helms had withheld from the Department of Justice letters written by Watergate break-in conspirator James McCord, who warned that Nixon campaign officials were planning to pin the burglary on the CIA.

Such stories may be only the start of a deluge. All told, five official committees are or will soon be investigating various aspects of U.S. intelligence: Vice President Nelson Rockefeller's commission on the CIA, select committees in the House and Senate and two House subcommittees. An expansion of the Freedom of Information Act, enacted over President Ford's veto, will take effect next week and will make the files of all government agencies more accessible. The FBI and CIA will get a taste of the same treatment they seem to have given some citizens: invasion of privacy.

—JAMES R. GAINES with ANTHONY MARRO and STEPHAN LESHER in Washington

Oliphant © 1975 Denver Post

'Of course I brought them with me—how do you think I got here?'

WALL STREET JOURNAL
21 FEB 1975

COLBY SAID CHARGES against the CIA are exaggerated and could harm it.

The Central Intelligence Agency director told a House subcommittee that "the almost hysterical excitement that surrounds any news story mentioning CIA . . . has raised the question whether secret intelligence operations can be conducted by the U.S." Colby said agents abroad fear their names will be disclosed, endangering their lives. Although the CIA has made "a few missteps," he said, operations against antiwar dissidents focused on possible foreign ties and were "neither massive, illegal nor domestic."

Colby withheld for closed hearings his discussion of reported CIA sex traps to gain data from foreigners. But he commented: "I won't say that sex and intelligence never got together."

Colby corrected testimony he gave the Senate earlier, saying the agency had files on four members of Congress, not one, and has done four break-ins in the U.S., not three. He denied any CIA involvement in Watergate after contacts with the Watergate burglars prior to the break-in.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, Feb. 11, 1975

The Hornets' Nest at Langley

By ROBERT KEATLEY

WASHINGTON — By now the United States must have the world's most-publicized secret spy service.

The Central Intelligence Agency's deeds and misdeeds are spread through the daily press. Its ex-employes publish books and articles—some telling all, others loyally covering up some things for "the company." As usual, assorted foreigners still blame it for causing trouble by exploiting such varied folks as Cambodian Buddhist monks, Ustashi terrorists, Panamanian students and the entire Austrian army.

More importantly, an eager Congress and a reluctant Executive Branch are into the act. Several congressional committees threaten to strip away CIA secrecy in search of alleged illegal domestic and unwise foreign activities. Meantime, a new Vice President, until recently an official overseer of the intelligence game, heads a presidential commission appointed to do much the same. And Nelson Rockefeller already concedes "violations or abuses" of the CIA charter did occur.

All this produces hard times at Langley, Virginia. That's where the CIA has its headquarters and most of its staff. And that's where William Colby, as director of Central Intelligence, manages—nominally, at least—the entire American intelligence community, including the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and other organizations. Agency morale is down and there's gloom about the future. A kind of "what-did-we-do-to-deserve-this?" atmosphere pervades.

Despite the repercussions, though, there's wide agreement that scrutiny is overdue. CIA (and other) ventures into forbidden domestic police work may not be as "massive" as alleged, but transgressions did occur. More than one President called on his secretive snoops to investigate, and even harass, political foes. Meantime, newer members of Congress complain that committees charged with overseeing intelligence operations were negligent, and they're out to change that. They complain the old boys on Capitol Hill deliberately went too easy on the old boys in the spy trade; where the money went, and why, Congress didn't want to know.

For example, the late Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana for years was one of five Senate watchdogs. Yet when questioned once on the floor about secret financing of war in Laos, he made it clear he hadn't been told much.

"I did not know anything about it. . . . I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it," he said. According to many critics, that was typical of the rather casual supervision of intelligence operations by Congress.

But no more. Many legislators now demand accountability, and the Executive Branch realizes it must be provided. The CIA itself concedes times change, and it must be more open. "The employes of the agency and I are wholly committed to being responsive," Mr. Colby recently told a Senate committee.

Another Casualty of Vietnam

In part, this change reflects a broad disenchantment with many aspects of foreign affairs. The origins of that may lie in Vietnam. For years, Congress acquiesced in war there and financed it regularly. But today's legislators, determined to prevent a rerun of that conflict anywhere, search suspiciously for signs of new American involvement in unsavory foreign climes. This produces laws which inhibit and dismay Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who believes Congress is meddling mischievously in his affairs. And it makes the CIA—which has often conducted clandestine "dirty tricks" in foreign countries—a prime target for congressional wrath and suspicion.

"It's all part of the general attack on foreign policy," complains an agency hand.

Yet this shouldn't be surprising. This is the age of official detente, and many Americans think it's time to scrap Cold War leftovers. They no longer feel they're fighting world communism, rushing into every perceived breach with guns and money. This creates more dispute about what the government does abroad (as at home, thanks to Watergate). Because of its supporting role in foreign policy, plus domestic misdeeds, the CIA and other intelligence agencies no longer get their reverential treatment of old.

But the many investigations under way do raise troublesome questions. Issues involved include those of what should be the size, mission and control system for the intelligence community. There also are lesser questions of who should be in charge, and what are the possible long-term adverse effects of the investigations on morale and efficiency.

The CIA has attracted a swarm of critics, but is it possible to have international arms control without good intelligence capabilities?

For example, there's dispute about how Congress should oversee intelligence activities in the future. Capitol Hill's conservatives might prefer the old way of knowing little; the new activists, however, want to know all. But if they learn all, will they also tell all—to the detriment of national security?

Keeping some secrets is essential to the intelligence trade. Thus some administration officials worry about how to reconcile congressional desire to keep informed with their claimed need to classify certain information. An agreement on supervisory procedures, as well as a trust which doesn't now exist, will be needed.

Congress is also looking at the size and diversity of the intelligence community, which may include bits of some 60 government agencies. It seems likely a smaller, less overlapping structure will emerge, probably with tighter controls within the Executive Branch as well as more stringent congressional oversight. Mr. Colby officially manages all intelligence activities already, for example, but officials say he doesn't really control the Pentagon's DIA, among other agencies. New legislation could tighten the command and control system.

Meantime, Mr. Colby has given Congress an additional problem. He says there are "good" secrets (the names of agents, for example) and "bad" secrets (information which would embarrass the government but wouldn't damage security if revealed). While he promises to be more talkative than his predecessors, he also wants new laws to keep ex-employes from talking too much. He says their revelations can injure the national interest.

"To improve this situation," he told Congress, "we have proposed legislation, and I invite this committee to support the strengthening of controls over intelligence secrets." Already, the idea—which hasn't been detailed yet—has been denounced as an unconstitutional effort at prior restraint of free speech. Meantime, some agency hands oppose it on tactical grounds; they think Mr. Colby is compounding CIA problems unnecessarily by seeking such controversial laws now.

And that raises another issue: Should Mr. Colby keep his job?

He isn't universally admired within his own shop, and there is sniping at him from outside. Mr. Kissinger, it is rumored, believes the CIA boss told Congress too much, making possible various press leaks which got it into trouble. Others say Mr. Colby is a bad manager of the huge intelligence community. Some of his employes think their boss should have a broader background in analytical work, which is the CIA's main activity (Mr. Colby's sometimes daring career has mostly involved clandestine operations). Meantime, others believe a new chief is needed to restore credibility. They don't necessarily criticize Mr. Colby; they merely contend that an impressive outsider must be recruited if intelligence work is to regain public respect.

Another job in jeopardy is that of Richard Helms, CIA director while much of its dirty work occurred and now Ambassador to Iran. There are indications Mr. Helms placed his personal concept of the national interest above the need to tell Congress the truth; that could get him fired.

A Mammoth Reappraisal

More basically, the whole concept of clandestine operations is in trouble. Though officials claim it has done the country much good, the public knows mainly about operations which have gone wrong—the Cuban invasion and assorted Indochina operations, for instance. Mr. Colby argues that the capability to pull jobs in foreign countries must be retained as a useful foreign policy tool; others say clandestine actions no longer make sense, if they ever did.

Even some former spies doubt the wisdom of keeping a clandestine division on the payroll for emergency use. Like most bureaucracies, it might create work to justify its existence, causing trouble overseas. One old hand suggests that keeping such a unit in reserve is ludicrous; it would probably never be used anyway because it lacked appropriate skills. Therefore, Congress must decide whether to retain the capability which has produced the stuff of countless spy novels, or to give it up.

There's also doubt about the future effectiveness of other intelligence branches. Some employes wonder if they can attract new blood once the civilian job market nears normality. "We don't all run about with submachine guns in our briefcases," laments a retired operative, but he fears that image may keep bright recruits away. If so, the CIA's main work could suffer. That is the analysis function, which seeks to make sense of random bits of information, most gathered by open means, so policymakers can reach decisions with some knowledge of what they're doing.

One concerned official is Fred C. Ikle, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He says an effective CIA is needed to help prepare for strategic arms control talks with the Russians, and to monitor the results.

"I am worried," he said recently, "that

in our zeal to expose improprieties of the past, we might damage beyond repair the ability of intelligence organizations to do their job in the future. If that happened, arms control would come to a dead end. . . . We cannot have arms control without good intelligence capabilities."

Those are future possibilities. Already, it's said, the intelligence dispute is having immediate effects on operations. Foreign intelligence services are supposed to be reluctant about passing along information for fear confidences won't be kept. With CIA morale down, some employes seek other work. Bureaucratic ways spread within the agency, annoying some and delaying clandestine assignments of others (a good thing, say critics). An outsider can't judge the validity of such complaints, but they raise issues the investigators must consider as they probe and poke into the intelligence community.

What will come of it all is uncertain. But more adverse publicity for the American spy trade seems unavoidable. A smaller, more centrally controlled community also seems likely. But as the many investigators delve into the intelligence business, many officials hope they will keep in mind the difference between doing it over and doing it in.

Mr. Keatley, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, covers foreign affairs.

LONDON TIMES
3 February 1975

Deportation sought of alleged CIA man

By Stewart Tendler

A Labour MP is to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to deport Mr Cord Meyer, the American diplomat named recently as the leader of the Central Intelligence Agency in Britain. Mr Thomas Litterick, MP for Birmingham, Selly Oak, also wants government action on CIA work in Britain.

He has tabled questions to Mr Callaghan and to Mr Jenkins, the Home Secretary, for answer this week. Mr Jenkins will be asked if he is satisfied with security arrangements and about CIA activity.

"The main business of the CIA is disruption and subversion", Mr Litterick said yesterday. "The CIA has been entertained by British governments in this country for 20 years." Britain had helped it because the CIA was an agency of a friendly state but the CIA did not recognize any state as friendly, "not even the United States".

Mr Litterick said information about the activities of the agency had come to light recently through books and statements in Washington. He had no inside source of information.

Mr Meyer was named in an American magazine *Counterspy* last week as "a labour specialist on temporary assignment to oversee the British situation".

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
25 FEB 1975

The CIA's public relations

William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has taken on a tough public-relations job. He is trying to reenlist public support for the agency at a time when people have been jolted by charges that it illegally spied on American citizens. He is also trying to persuade Congress to be generous with its appropriation for the agency, just after admitting that the names of four past or present members of Congress had been entered in CIA files.

In a rare public appearance at Capitol Hill Thursday, Mr. Colby warned the House defense appropriations subcommittee that there is some question whether the CIA can keep doing its job. He acknowledged that the agency had been guilty of "some small missteps," but said that "exaggerated" news reports and "hysterical" reaction to them were threatening to cripple the nation's intelligence system.

Mr. Colby probably lost some points with the House panel in one respect: He cited four mistakes that he said the CIA had found in his earlier testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. In each case, the new information on the CIA's "missteps" made them seem slightly more serious than the previous report had done. It developed, for instance, that the agency had been keeping files on four congressmen, not one, and had tapped the phones of 27 persons—not 21—between 1947 and 1965. One wonders if further investigation would uncover still more serious errors.

Mr. Colby's principal point, however, is unchanged: that the CIA should not be penalized for its past mistakes to the point of losing its effectiveness in the future.

The point seems to us valid. It needs to be weighed, however, against the equally valid worries of those who do not want the CIA's intelligence-gathering skills turned against American citizens, as tho our own government had secretly declared war against dissenters.

Trying to balance these opposing concerns, we come up with the following conclusions:

The CIA has a job to do that is important to all of us—namely, finding out what foreign governments and movements are up to so that our own planners may take their intentions into account. To do this it has developed specialized skills which are by nature extralegal, and are consequently very hard to control by law. The problem, put bluntly but realistically, is to set rules for the CIA which will enable it to skirt the laws of other governments while adhering faithfully to the laws of our own.

We know of no way to do this except the way that has in fact been used: to expose, fully and mercilessly, CIA transgressions against the rights of American citizens. If this has caused problems for the CIA, the solution is plain enough. It is to stop doing the things that cause it embarrassment and concentrate exclusively on the job it's supposed to do.

We have no interest whatever in making it less risky to commit criminal acts or to tamper with the rights of American citizens. Foreign intelligence agencies and secret police are often as willing to trespass on the rights and privacy of their own citizens as they are on those of foreigners, and the citizens of many foreign countries take this imposition as a matter of course. The American people will not accept it, and should not. Mr. Colby must understand this if he and the CIA are to succeed in their public relations effort.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 February 1975

COUNTERSPY EFFORT BY C.I.A. IS REPORTED

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 (UPI) —The Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated the American antiwar movement in an effort to get its own men, masquerading as radicals, recruited by Soviet intelligence, a former deputy C.I.A. director said today.

Describing the double-agent gambit as "an error in judgment," Ray S. Cline said the agency had done it because President Johnson and Nixon were "absolutely obsessed" with the belief that the Russians were manipulating the Vietnam protests.

never able to establish a "Russian connection" within the American dissident movement. It is now under investigation itself, to determine whether it broke the law by spying on Americans.

Mr. Cline, a C.I.A. employe for 27 years and a deputy director from 1962 to 1966, disclosed details of the inflitration operations in an interview that enlarged on information already made public by William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. Cline said the counterspy operation—in which one intelligence agency puts out an agent as "bait" to be recruited by a rival agency, and to work within it as a double agent—appeared at the time to be "a classical counterespionage operation." Now, he said, he considers it "an error in judgment."

WASHINGTON POST
23 February 1975

The CIA and the Guilt of Intelligence

INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary. By Philip Agee. Penguin Books, London. 640 pp. 95 pence

By PATRICK BRESLIN

With this review of Philip Agee's CIA diary, *Inside the Company*, Book World is departing from its usual practice of reviewing only books available in the United States. We are doing so because of the unusual interest the book generated when it appeared in London January 2, and because of its relevance to the current investigation of the aims and methods of the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of copyright restrictions, the book cannot be bought at stores in this country, although it will be available in an American edition later this year. It is now available in England and Canada in Penguin editions selling for 95 pence and $2.95, respectively. For more on this subject, see Joyce Illig's Book Business column on page two.

WHEN VICTOR MARCHETTI wrote *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, the Central Intelligence Agency censored 339 passages and a judge upheld 168 of the deletions. The book was published last year with intriguing blanks where material deemed too sensitive had been.

There are no blanks in Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. This densely detailed expose names every CIA officer, every agent, every operation that Agee encountered during 12 years with "The Company" in Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico and Washington.

Among CIA agents or collaborators, Agee lists the current president of Mexico and his two predecessors, a former president of Uruguay, a former vice president of Ecuador, U.S. and Latin American labor leaders, ranking Communist Party members, and scores of other politicians, high military and police officials, and journalists. There is grist for a hundred Latin American Watergates in these pages.

Agee tells of CIA interventions in elections in Guyana, Brazil, and Chile. In the Dominican Republic, he says, the assassination of Trujillo was carried out by CIA agents using weapons sent through the diplomatic pouch. He relates almost hilarious instances of incompetence. In Buenos Aires, the officer in charge of operations against the Soviet Embassy couldn't find it while driving his Washington superiors around the city. To facilitate breaking into automobiles, one eager beaver in Ecuador cluttered the CIA office with 200 pounds of car keys. One finally understands why the Watergate bunglers were caught.

In his book, Marchetti sought to reform the CIA, to argue that it had strayed from its purpose, to criticize bitingly but constructively. Agee's aim is different; he wants the entire operation dismantled.

The CIA managed to delay the Marchetti book, and then to censor it. Agee side-stepped the CIA by publishing in England through Penguin Books. His book is available since last month in most of the English-speaking world except the U. S. On its paperback cover is a picture of the bugged typewriter Agee thinks the CIA planted on him while he was writing. A hardcover edition is expected to be published here within the next few months.

Inside the Company, more than an expose, is a unique chronicle of the 1960s, that decade of disillusion. Like so many young men, Agee emerged from college in the late 1950s, vaguely dissatisfied, unenthusiastic about going into a business career, facing two dreary, wasted years in the army. But at Notre Dame, he had learned patriotism, and that the enemy was communism. One of his proudest moments came as chairman of the exercises in which the school's patriotism award went to then Strategic Air Command chief General Curtis Lemay. Agee recalled with respect rather than irony Lemay's Strangelovian cadences: "If we maintain our faith in God, our love of freedom, and superior global air power..."

The U. S. was the bastion of democracy, with the energy, the wisdom, and the responsibility to make other nations in its image. But time had to be bought. The communist menace had to be held back long enough to give democracy a chance in the poor nations around the globe.

Bored with the prospects facing him at home, seeking something meaningful, hoping to avoid the draft, Agee joined the CIA in 1957. Four years later he might have joined the Peace Corps. The motivation would have been the same.

After a stint as an Air Force officer (for cover) and CIA training, Agee arrived in Quito, Ecuador in late 1960. During the glory years of the Alliance for Progress and the New Frontier, he fought the holy war against communism by bribing politicians and journalists, forging documents, tapping telephones, and reading other people's mail. He learned that a bought and paid for senator in Ecuador was worth $700 a month, raised to $1,000 when he became vice president.

CIA goals in Ecuador during those years were to disrupt the Left and to contribute to the isolation of Cuba by forcing Ecuador to break relations. In pursuit of these goals, every political group was penetrated and corrupted, riots and demonstrations in which people were injured were encouraged and supported. Two civilian governments fell but relations with Cuba were finally broken. Agee left in 1963 confident that the necessary social and democratic reforms could now take place: "CIA operations promote stability through assisting local governments to build up their security forces... and by putting down the extreme left... Through these programmes we buy time for friendly governments to effect the reforms that will eliminate the injustices on which communism thrives."

But what if the friendly governments are not really interested in reforms? What if improving the security forces actually lessens the chance of reforms? Agee's next station was Montevideo, Uruguay. He was there for three years, and would learn that "these Uruguayan politicians are interested in other things than land reform," that Uruguay was the "model of corruption and incapacity."

Nevertheless, CIA doctrine said strengthen the security forces first. Agee would complain that the main problem with local military intelligence was "the Uruguayan military tradition of keeping aloof from politics." There was a silver lining though—the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, "a rabid anti-communist whose ideas border on fascist-style repression," would some day, Agee hoped, be chief of intelligence. Meanwhile, another CIA officer kept close to a "very wealthy fascist-oriented lawyer and rancher ... active in trying to persuade military leaders to intervene in political affairs."

What the CIA did in Uruguay, according to Agee, was prop up a corrupt, decaying government by making it capable of crushing a widespread and growing movement for radical reform. In the pursuit of "democracy" the CIA pushed the military into politics. Uruguay today is run by the military through a civilian figurehead president, Congress is closed, there is no free press, and there are no reforms.

It was in Uruguay that Agee started wondering about what he was doing. One morning he sat in the office of the chief of police. From the floor above came the screams of someone being tortured. As the screams increased in intensity, the chief turned up the volume of the soccer game on the radio. Agee learned later that the torture victim was a communist whose name he had turned over to the police a few days earlier. "Hearing the voice ... made me feel terrified and helpless. All I wanted to do was to get away from the voice and away from the police headquarters. Why didn't (we) say anything? ... We just sat there embarrassed and shocked. I'm going to be hearing that voice for a long time."

But it was a faraway event which seems to have disturbed him more. Lyndon Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Re-

PATRICK BRESLIN was in the Peace Corps in Colombia and has worked and studied in other Latin American countries, including Chile for most of 1972-1973.

public in 1965 was an overreaction Agee couldn't accept. "It can't be that I'm against intervention as such," he mused, "because everything I do is in one way or another intervention in the affairs of other countries. Partly, I suppose, it's the immense scale of this invasion that shocks." Agee and his fellow CIA officers thought Johnson's explanation for the invasion—that 58 trained communists were about to take over in Santo Domingo—so absurd they adopted it: "'Fifty-eight trained communists' is our new station password and the answer is 'Ten thousand marines.'"

The invasion led Agee to question all CIA efforts in Latin America. Counterinsurgency seemed to have stemmed the communist threat. But where were the reforms? "The more I think about the Dominican invasion the more I wonder whether the politicians in Washington really want to see reforms in Latin America." Agee began to think about leaving the Company.

In 1966 he was transferred to desk duties in Washington. The paper work was dull and he jumped at a chance to go to Mexico the next year under the cover of an embassy attache working on the 1968 Olympic Games. Rather than controlling agents and running operations, his job in Mexico was to meet people and make contacts. It provided him with a way of establishing distance from The Company. By the time the Olympics were over, Agee had ended his CIA career. He resigned with the conviction that he had become a "servant of the capitalism I rejected" as a university student. "I became one of its secret policemen. The CIA, after all, is nothing more than the secret police of American capitalism, plugging up leaks in the political dam night and day so that shareholders of U.S. companies operating in poor countries can continue enjoying the rip-off."

In the next couple of years, Agee decided to write this reconstructed diary to tell everything he knew. Not only would he expose the CIA; he would work against it: "I have also decided to seek ways of getting useful information on the CIA to revolutionary organizations that could use it to defend themselves better."

He spent the last three years writing the book in Europe, making research trips to Cuba, and dodging the CIA. At one point he lived on money advanced by a woman he believes was a CIA agent trying to gain his confidence. His training in deceit served him well during those years.

The appearance of Agee's book now, as several committees in Washington are beginning to investigate the CIA, poses an interesting challenge. Until recently, our elected representatives have generally managed to stay in the dark about what the CIA does. Until recently, former CIA Director Richard Helms's plea that "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men" was enough. With the revelations of domestic spying, it no longer is, and everyone concerned is loudly and righteously opposed to CIA activities at home.

Agee has provided the most complete description yet of what the CIA does abroad. In entry after numbing entry, U.S. foreign policy in Latin America is pictured as a web of deceit, hypocrisy, and corruption. Now that we can no longer plead ignorance of the webs our spiders spin, will we continue to tolerate CIA wctivities abroad? □

The Washington Merry-Go-Round — THE WASHINGTON POST — Thursday, Feb. 27, 1975

CIA Weighing Action Against Agee

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Top CIA officials are debating whether to bring legal action against Philip Agee, whose book about his life in the CIA has caused havoc.

Agee listed everyone who had worked with him in the CIA in Latin America. He also added names provided, he said, by "a small group of Mexican comrades who I trained to follow the comings and goings of CIA people before I left Mexico City."

It has cost the CIA "several million dollars," according to inside sources, to transfer the agents who had been fingered and to protect its operations in Latin America.

The CIA, however, couldn't protect all the local people whom Agee listed as CIA "collaborators." Among them were many who had only routine dealings with the CIA in such legitimate activities as drug control, anti-hijacking techniques and anti-terrorist operations.

A number of them have been harassed with threatening phone calls. One reported that his daughter's life had been threatened and the wall in front of his home had been defaced.

In Uruguay, a taxi driver whose name appeared in Agee's book stopped at a traffic light. Another car pulled alongside him, and an assailant emptied a pistol at the taxi. The driver miraculously escaped injury.

In Ecuador, an engineer on Agee's list appeared at the U.S. embassy to plead for protection.

CIA officials doubt that they can bring legal charges against Agee as long as he stays out of the country, our sources say. Agee told us by transatlantic telephone that he hopes to return home but that he will wait until he gets the green light from his legal adviser.

He is represented by Melvin Wulf, an American Civil Liberties Union attorney, who said he will withhold his advice until he talks to the Justice Department and learns its intentions.

"The only action they could bring against Agee," Wulf told us, "would be an espionage charge, and that would be a fruitless prosecution."

Indeed, this may be precisely what the CIA has in mind. Our own CIA sources say Agee has been kept under surveillance and that he has been spotted in the company of Cuban intelligence agents in Paris and London.

Agee doesn't deny this. "I have seen them in Paris and London," he acknowledged to us. "I go straight to the Cuban embassy. Whether they were Cuban intelligence officers or not, I don't really care."

He added meaningfully: "I support the Cuban revolution." He emphasized, that he had never been debriefed by either the Soviet KGB or Cuban intelligence. But on his own initiative, he told us, he had gone to insurgent leaders and had informed them of his CIA activities against them.

"I am for the liberation movements," he said.

One source showed us documentation, which suggests but doesn't prove that Agee is under Cuban discipline. A press release, which Agee issued in London on Oct. 3, 1974, appears to have been written by the Cubans. Our source showed us language peculiarities, which indicate it was translated from colloquial Cuban Spanish.

This is denied by Agee. "I wrote that," he declared, "right on my own typewriter in Cornwall (England)." But he acknowledged that it had been duplicated for the press in the offices of a left-wing Latin American publication in London.

Our CIA sources also believe that Agee pulled his punches on Mexico's President Luis Echeverria after receiving instructions from Havana.

On Oct. 3, Agee denounced the Mexican press for omitting his account of a "close relationship" that he claimed existed between a CIA official and Echeverria.

"Mexican comrades have told me," said Agee, "that the reference to Echeverria's relationship with (the CIA man) was probably omitted by official censorship order, in itself not uncommon there, in order to save embarrassment to the incumbent." Agee carefully added that Echeverria "may have broken with the CIA when he became president."

A subsequent Agee interview, linking Echeverria with the CIA, was published in the December issue of the Colombian magazine "Alternativa."

Fidel Castro, eager to continue his good relations with Echeverria, sent a member of the Cuban politburo, Carlos Rafel Rodriguez, on a secret, one-day visit to Mexico City on Dec. 18 to placate the Mexican president, according to our CIA sources.

Not long afterward, Agee got together with the interviewer, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, a left-wing, Nobel Prize writer, in Spain, say our sources. Both men issued statements exonerating Echeverria.

Agee denied to us that he received any instructions from Havana to soften his attack on the Mexican president.

WASHINGTON POST
23 FEB 1975



By JOYCE ILLIG

Shaft for Straight Arrow

CONFLICT over the United States publication rights to *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, the former CIA agent's book reviewed in this issue of Book World, may deflect Straight Arrow's plans to publish the book here in May. An oral agreement was made last October between Straight Arrow and Penguin, the book's London publisher, but no contract was signed. Now, the oral agreement is being bypassed and new arrangements made for American publication of the book.

The first signs of trouble appeared about two weeks ago when Philip Agee, the author, visited Canada to promote the publication of his book there. Diane Cleaver, managing editor of Straight Arrow, went to Canada to discuss final details of the contract with him; then, during the discussion, Penguin released North American rights to the author and Agee decided that he should get an agent.

"I said that would be fine," said Cleaver, "and I gave him some names. They didn't include Scott Meredith. The next thing I knew, Meredith was handling the book and offering it to other publishers."

The outstanding problem in the October agreement was over the mass paperback rights, which Straight Arrow claimed and Penguin denied had been included in the deal. "That's when the problem started," according to Cleaver. "We would never have made an agreement at that time, when we were the only publisher willing to publish it, that did not include mass market paperback rights." Straight Arrow was not interested in making an offer to Meredith for hardcover rights alone.

Cleaver said they had an agreement to pay Agee a $12,000 advance, offered a 60-40 split on the paperback and had a set advertising and promotion budget. (Originally, Penguin accepted an advance offer of $8000, according to Cleaver. Then when negotiations started, Straight Arrow decided to "make a concession" and go to $12,000).

"There has never been any question that we would publish until the agent came on the scene," said Cleaver, "and then I thought what would happen would be that the agent would negotiate with us for some satisfying thing for Agee so that he wouldn't feel that he wasn't getting the right exposure."

Meanwhile, the Scott Meredith Literary Agency, which had been offering the hardcover and paperback rights separately to such New York publishers as Doubleday, Praeger, New American Library and Bantam, was expected to close a deal for simultaneous hard and softcover publication by the end of the week.

The book is listed in the Straight Arrow catalogue, and salesmen for Simon & Schuster, Straight Arrow's distributors, have been selling it and orders are coming in. "We're all scheduled to go and could have the book out in eight weeks," said Cleaver. "We're taking a firm stand that we have a right to publish considering a commitment since last October."

[Penguin Books Canada Ltd. reports a large number of requests for the book from congressional staff members in Washington, and an order of 3000 copies from the Harvard Coop which could not be filled. The Canadian distributor is expecting a shipment of 15,000 copies from England this week and has ordered 10,000 copies of the third printing, which will be available in March. The first Penguin printing of 25,000 copies was quickly sold out in England and in Canada, where 11,500 copies have been sold since the end of January with back orders for 7500 more.]

Lack of Forsyth

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY Jr. is in the Swiss Alps writing what he calls "my first novel and almost certainly my last." Buckley goes to Rougemont, a small village near Gstaad, to ski and write his books. So far he has finished about 140 pages about a CIA agent who was recruited in his senior year at Yale. He began to plan "a Frederick Forsyth type thriller" a few months ago in New York in discussions with Sam Vaughan, president of Doubleday.

After serving in the army, Buckley's protagonist is given a very mysterious mission in London, "details of which are unspecifiable at this point," according to the author. Buckley had intended to finish his novel with the Bay of Pigs but said, "I'm having a little trouble trying to figure how to stretch it out that long because I'm only in 1952. So I might have to get a sort of foreshortened grip on the resolution."

Buckley's own background in intelligence should provide solid material for his fiction. According to Gary Wills, a former associate, he is an ex-CIA agent and his association with E. Howard Hunt is well known.

JOYCE ILLIG writes regularly on the publishing scene for Book World.

BALTIMORE SUN
25 FEB 1975

Ugly but Necessary Mechanism

William L. Colby's opinion that CIA transgressions "in no way justify the public outcry which has been raised" can and should be dismissed as just that—his opinion. It is an opinion tinted by a career of loyalty to the agency; the Rockefeller Commission and the House and Senate select committees will come to their own opinions on precisely the same subject after their investigations.

Mr Colby's plea for a responsible and systematic approach to the three parallel investigations cannot and should not be similarly dismissed. The lingering pain from the Watergate trauma should not lead the nation to conclude that government agencies operate at all times as the White House did under Richard Nixon. Nothing has appeared yet to suggest that the investigators will find in Mr. Colby either the cavalier disregard for truth or the arrogant contempt for Congress and public that characterized the Nixonian guard. On his record thus far, Mr. Colby, whatever his opinions, has been relatively forthcoming when questioned by congressmen. At times, he has even told them more than they thought they were asking. His performance has been in sharp contrast with that of his predecessor, Richard Helms, whose distorted priorities have forced him into a series of embarrassing changes of testimony under congressional questioning. Mr. Colby seems to realize that only through co-operation with Congress and the Rockefeller Commission can he re-establish public confidence in his agency.

While these investigations go on, he will have the job of running and maintaining an agency that is, by the nature of its assignment, a delicate and difficult mechanism. It is also, to many Americans, an ugly mechanism, a reminder that persons and nations are less civil and less civilized than they like to think they are. Free societies need to take a skeptical look at such agencies from time to time, and the look now getting under way in America is surely long overdue. The investigators must not flinch from their job of determining the extent to which the rights of citizens may have fallen victim to operations of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. But what is most important now about these investigations is that they are in fact getting under way under a mandate to dig deeply into the serious questions that have been raised. While they proceed, it is worth remembering that much of the CIA's work, distasteful as it may be, happens to reflect realities that show no sign of disappearing soon from international life. The persons charged with that work deserve a sympathetic hearing when they ask that their agency be studied professionally and dispassionately.

WASHINGTON POST
24 February 1975

Joseph Alsop

The KGB's 'Safe House'

Joseph Alsop, who until the first of the year wrote a syndicated column that appeared on the opposite page three times a week, is now writing a syndicated monthly column. This is the second of Mr. Alsop's new columns.

Thus far only one fact of real importance has emerged from the rumpus about domestic surveillance by the CIA and FBI. This country, in fact, turns out to be shockingly vulnerable to the Soviet Union's ruthless, omnipresent KGB because of a shockingly incompetent and ill-advised counter-intelligence system.

As an illustration, consider the truly bizarre ukase issued by the late J. Edgar Hoover toward the end of the 1960s. By order, the director of the FBI provided a gigantic, gloriously convenient "safe house" for the KGB's all too numerous agents and any other spies happening to be in Washington.

A "safe house," of course, is the intelligence community's lable for a place where foreign agents can meet their local contacts in perfect security to make payoffs or to transmit orders or to pick up information. Just to add an extra touch of fantasy, the Hoover-provided safe house was no less than the second center of the U.S. government, the huge U.S. Capitol with all its grounds and dependencies.

Under the terms of the Hoover ukase, the Capitol complex was put strictly off-limits for all the FBI's counterintelligence men. Yet the FBI has a legal monopoly on all counter-inteiligence within the territorial limits of the United States. Hence Hoover's ukase meant that known Soviet spies, who were known to be about to make an American contact known to be dangerous, could still be sure of doing so with perfect impunity—provided they just named a rendezvous in the off-limits part of Capitol Hill.

All this seemed downright incredible to me when it was first reported by Ron Kessler of The Washington Post. My own check has fully sustained Kessler's story, however. There is only one significant point that remains in some doubt. It is no more than 95 per cent certain that the Hoover ukase remains in full force and that the Capitol, therefore, continues to be a KGB safe house. That 95 per cent certainty is too close for comfort, one must add.

Furthermore, I think I know why Hoover issued his ukase. For background, you must first understand that the KGB maintains an enormous number of spies in this country. As a measure, remember that we are priority No. 1, whereas Great Britain is no more than priority No. 4. Yet when the KGB grew over-bold in Britain, the Foreign Office had to expell 105 well-authenticated KGB men.

Second, you must understand that with such ample human resources, the KGB has long given a lot of its men part-time or full-time assignments on Capitol Hill. By the mid-1960s, there were somewhere between 20 and 30 KGB men dealing with the U.S. Congress or with the countless staff people the Congress and its committees employ.

This does *not* mean that KGB were constantly seeing senators and representatives. On the contary, they were known to concentrate rather heavily on the lawmakers' personal staffs and also on the committee staffs.

But this is almost a distinction without a difference. Nowadays, in truth, domineering and able staff members largely control the thoughts and acts of all too many lawmakers, especially in the Senate. Great numbers of left of center staff members on the Senate side of the Capitol also constitute a quasi-independent power bloc. They all work together, all protect one another and often join to extend their bloc's power by planting friends and allies in new senatorial offices.

I myself believe that this unknown, unseen power bloc is an unhealthy new political growth. Yet I must hasten to add that it was *not* and is *not* necessarily improper for these people —or indeed for anyone else on Capitol Hill—to see the KGB men who have swarmed there for so long. The KGB men, of course, were all masquerading, and still are masquerading, as Tass correspondents, embassy secretaries, trade experts and so on.

Particularly on the left of the political spectrum, however, the FBI watch that J. Edgar Hoover staffed with his ukase showed an astonishing number of KGB contacts on Capitol Hill. It would have looked remarkably bad if anyone had made a public issue of them. Furthermore, President Johnson was tempted to do just that toward the end of his second term; and President Nixon actively wished to do just that in 1969.

It was about then that the Hoover ukase was issued. I feel sure, therefore, the aim was to suspend the FBI's former careful watch on the Capitol in order to be protected from Congress if the White House went too far in its revelations.

So there you have it—a horrifying story which is pretty likely to be going on this minute. The story is horrifying, of course, because foreign espionage is a damnably serious business, even in a free society like ours.

It is so serious, in turn, because it is dangerous to have a government, a press, an academic world and the ranks of science all bristling with people like Kim Philbey; Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean. I hope and think this is not our situation; but this is certainly the situation the KGB has been going all out to produce ever since the United States became the unique giant power in our half of the world.

If you reflect upon this story, you find that its main lesson is the singularly unprofessional character of the FBI approach to counterintelligence—at any rate under the leadership of the aging J. Edgar Hoover. Nor is this at all surprising. To have truly professional counterintelligence you have to know the story from the beginning, which is in Moscow in the case of the KGB.

The CIA, of course, is supposed to know all about Moscow. But another appalling revelation of the current CIA-FBI rumpus is the bloody bitterness of the FBI-CIA feud. The two agencies never worked together until new liaison arrangements were made by new leaders a year ago. This kind of crippling non-cooperation can too easily recur, too.

Again, the rumpus has glaringly revealed the recurring dominance of domestic politics in the FBI counter-intelligence work, at any rate in the Hoover era. It was politics that caused the former FBI director to create the KGB safe house. It was politics, too, that caused him to ignore President Johnson's order to have a look at the peace movement's foreign links, thereby spurring Johnson to call in the CIA.

In short, the foolish may credit the argument that the CIA-FBI rumpus has uncovered a grave threat to our civil liberties. But more sensible people will instead perceive an open invitation to the KGB.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
11 February 1975

Helms may have to leave Iran

From HELLA PICK

Washington, February 10

The Administration may soon have little alternative but to put Richard Helms on prolonged leave of absence as US Ambassador to Iran: or it may even have to find a replacement for him.

The Administration is determined to avoid any acknowledgment that Mr Helms may have acted improperly in his previous post as director of the CIA. But it may be able to hide its embarrassment behind the fact that Mr Helms will be in such frequent demand for the various investigations into the CIA's conduct that he cannot devote himself as fully as he should to his ambassadorship.

Mr Helms is in growing trouble. And his troubles may engulf other members of the Nixon Administration, including Dr Kissinger. Lawyers are today weighing up the question of whether Mr Helms committed perjury in his testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee two years ago, when he incorrectly said "No" in reply to a question whether the CIA was involved in attempts to overthrow the Allende Government in Chile.

The Committee has now published testimony by Helms in which he admitted CIA involvement, and also volunteered the information that "there was no doubt" that the Nixon Administration wanted the Allende regime overthrown.

This may spell more trouble for Dr Kissinger, who heads the so-called Forty Committee, which is supposed to supervise and direct the CIA's subversive activities overseas.

NEW YORK REVIEW
20 FEB 1975

A New Solution for the CIA

I. F. Stone

Stalin did establish one useful precedent. He made it a practice to bump off whoever served as head of his secret police. He never let anybody stay in the job too long. As a successful dictator, Stalin seems to have felt that anybody who had collected so many secrets would be a No. 1 menace to security if he ever went sour. Stalin thought it safer not to wait.

I think we ought to take Stalin's example one step further. I think we ought to get rid of the CIA altogether, lock, stock, and burglar's kit.

We know from recent revelations how J. Edgar Hoover in his lifetime tenure as FBI chief collected dossiers on the sexual and drinking habits of congressmen and high officials. The mere rumor that such secrets were in his files made Hoover the most feared man in the capital, the untouchable of US politics. A similar character could build up a similar empire of fear in and through the CIA.

Those who think it enough to establish new oversight committees should remember that there have been CIA committees in Congress since the agency's formation and they have invariably overlooked the abuses they were supposed to oversee. As for forbidding the agency to engage in "dirty tricks," how enforce such a restriction against an agency so secretive, so far-flung, and so habituated to doing-in political leaders of whom it disapproves? It is hard enough to keep a tight rein on public agencies right here in Washington. How to control, sometimes 10,000 miles away, the kind of adventurers, screwballs, and intriguers an agency like the CIA naturally attracts?

The US government is inundated daily by tidal waves of intelligence. We have a mysterious electronic NSA which taps and tapes all the communications systems of the world; its huge "ears" in Pakistan and Turkey record the slightest Kremlin sneeze. Even in remotest Siberia, no *babushka* can milk her cow without being caught on candid camera from US satellites on eternal patrol.

In the Pentagon are separate intelligence branches of the army, air force, and navy, each with its own military attachés abroad, and over all of them is a defense intelligence agency, a *DIA*. The State Department has its own intelligence and research division; the Foreign Service is its eyes and ears abroad. The departments of Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture have attachés of their own in many US embassies. Businessmen and Washington correspondents who use their publicly available studies on countries and commodities know how much more reliable they are than the spooks.

The Treasury has its narcotics and other agents. Internal Revenue, Customs, and the Post Office have their own gumshoe men. There is the FBI and there is the Secret Service. Nobody seems to know how much all this costs or how many are employed. Congress does know that CIA expenditures hidden in certain crevices of the budget add up to several billions of dollars. The exact amount is unknown.

Originally we were told when the CIA was established by Truman in 1947 that it was necessary—as its name implied—to "centralize" all these intelligence activities and summarize for the White House the information flowing in from them. We were not told, and perhaps Truman never intended, that the CIA would soon be engaged in James Bond melodrama around the world, making and unmaking governments not to our liking, and in the process sentencing other nations' leaders like Mossaddeq of Iran and Allende of Chile to death. Watergate has already shown us that to practice such crime-as-politics abroad is to invite its application sooner or later to politics at home.

As an intelligence service the CIA has been a bust. The Bay of Pigs and the Vietnam war are only the most dramatic demonstrations that public officials would have been better informed—and adopted wiser policies—if they had simply read the newspapers and put all that "classified" information in the wastebasket. The CIA has made the US look like the world's biggest Mafia while helping to trap it into one serious mistake after another. Never have so many billions been squandered on so much misinformation. In its twenty-seven years of existence—even at $2 billion a year—this giddy operation must have cost upward of $50 billion. Why not get rid of it before it can do more damage?

Even when, occasionally, the CIA analyses were accurate they have gone into the bureaucratic wastebaskets because they conflicted with what officials higher up wanted to hear. One example is the sour reports about the Vietnam war which turned up in the Pentagon Papers. Another example (see the exclusive in *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 23, 1975) was the studies showing there was "no evidence to suggest" that the anti-Vietnam war movement was instigated from abroad. The Nixon White House nonetheless ordered the agency to go ahead and compile a list of 10,000—no less—peaceniks suspected of being foreign agents.

A government, like an individual, hates to hear what it doesn't want to believe. This is why no intelligence agency in any society ever really understands—or can afford to let itself understand—what is going on. The bigger the intelligence agency the more powerfully its sheer inertial weight reinforces the misconceptions of the ruling class it serves. Hence the paradox: the more "intelligence" a government buys the less intelligently it operates. The CIA will go down in the books as a vain attempt to change history by institutionalizing assassination. It deserves a dose of its own favorite medicine. □

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 3, 1975

In spite of the Central Intelligence Agency's top-level co-operation with investigations into its operations, one official offered this comment: "Before Congress tears away the secrecy of the intelligence community, it had better decide first why the secrecy was established in the beginning. The chief of the KGB in Moscow must be rolling on the floor of the Kremlin with laughter."

THE INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
FEBRUARY, 1975

Behind the CIA purge

An American Correspondent writes:

With the left wing American press launching a massive attack against the CIA for "domestic spying", which has resulted in the recent resignations of four leading officials, a deliberate smokescreen or deception operation has been set into motion to deceive the public as to the true situation inside the upper hierarchy of the Central Intelligence Agency. The belated news media attack has been carefully managed by the liberal element to exploit the Watergate fiasco and tighten the grip of Director of Central Intelligence, William Egan Colby, over various CIA officials who do not agree with him and the official Kissinger policy of détente with the Soviet Union.

In a managed stage-play sequence, similar to a Charlie McCarthy-Edgar Bergen act, the *New York Times* belatedly gave the cue for a general attack when left wing reporter Seymour Hersh "broke" the story of illegal CIA activities. According to plan, the resulting press furore "prompted" President Ford to request a report on the situation from CIA director, Colby, which did indeed corroborate the fact that the CIA engaged in domestic surveillance activities in violation of its charter—something known for years by most Americans and previously reported by *Intelligence Digest* (November 1972, "Crises in Western Intelligence Agencies"). Using this Pavlovian reaction, Colby then ordered the resignations of four top officials in the CIA'S Counter-intelligence Division. These were James J. Angleton, division chief; Raymond Rocca, assistant chief; Newton S. Miler, chief of operations; and William J. Hood, executive officer. What the managed press failed to report was that these "resignations" were in fact a purge by Colby which resulted from a long-standing difference in policy over détente with Russia. Angleton and his top subordinates disagreed totally with Colby over the interpretation of CIA intelligence from behind the Soviet bloc. This intelligence does not support the contentions of Secretary of State Kissinger.

The power behind President Ford

This latest purge by Colby reflects the attitude of Kissinger as expressed through President Ford. The so-called Ford-Kissinger policy is nothing more than an extension of the Nixon-Kissinger policy. In reality, this should be termed the Rockefeller-Kissinger policy—as it actually has been from the beginning when Kissinger was brought into the Nixon administration. At any rate, an already weak CIA has been further weakened and will be weakened again in the future when, amid the glare of publicity, four Congressional committees begin further inquiry into covert CIA operations. In line with the Kissinger policy, Colby and the liberal faction in the CIA seek to continue the purge of the anti-Communist element, particularly those connected with the overthrow of the Allende Marxists in Chile.

It is difficult for the human mind to grasp the full extent of the power wielded by Vice-President Nelson A. Rockefeller, his family and his collaborators. A recent report, submitted to Congress by two University of California professors, revealed that 15 members of the Rockefeller family are directors of 40 corporations which have total assets of 70 billion dollars. The boards on which the Rockefellers serve have interlocking directorates with 91 major US corporations controlling combined assets of 640 billion dollars. This is indicative of the gigantic Rockefeller power behind the purse-strings of America. It is real power—the power of the Almighty Dollar! It is now being brought to bear against the CIA faction opposing the dangerous course of détente.

CIA evaluations for 1975

Regardless of the opinions of President Ford, Vice-President Rockefeller, and Secretary of State Kissinger, several CIA intelligence analysts are forecasting a determined political offensive by Moscow in 1975 to exploit the Western World's economic and political weaknesses and to strengthen and further the international Communist revolutionary movement. Soviet military strength will continue to grow, especially its Strategic Rocket Force which already has throw-weight superiority over the West. The Soviet military clique is steadily gaining more power and influence in the Kremlin. The CIA analysts believe that détente may slip into disaster for America and the West.

Kissinger policy projections

There are definite indications that the Kissinger policy will call for the transfer of full sovereignty over the Panama Canal to the left wing government of Panama by the end of 1975—contrary to the opinions of many American military and business leaders who desire to retain it under US control for at least another decade. The Kissinger policy also allows for joint US-Soviet intervention in the Middle East should the situation become "grave".

This, of course, would be a gigantic step and would call for US seizure of select oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and possibly even Iran. Russia would occupy select regions in Syria, Egypt and Iraq and would secure control over the Suez Canal. There could even be a joint Soviet-American occupation of Iran. Such events are very remote—but within the realm of strategic planners. It must be clearly pointed out, however, that any joint intervention in the Middle East will be primarily to the advantage of Russia since that nation alone has the present force to carry out such an operation effectively. It is also expected that Kissinger, with the full consent of Rockefeller, will urge diplomatic recognition of Communist Cuba before the end of 1975. American forces are gradually being withdrawn from Taiwan and full diplomatic relations may be extended to Peking later this year. These are all potential fruits of détente—a hazy pipe dream which has necessitated the further silencing of opposition in the CIA and elsewhere.

WASHINGTON POST
23 February 1975

WALTER SCOTT'S Personality Parade

Q. *It is my understanding that several years ago the CIA planted an agent named Tracy Barnes in the office of Kingman Brewster, president of Yale, to spy on student activities. Is that so? Has another CIA agent succeeded Barnes? What happened to Barnes?—H. T., New Haven, Conn.*

A. Tracy Barnes, veteran CIA agent, suffered two coronary attacks and died in Saunderstown, R.I., in 1971 at age 60. Prior to that he was involved with Richard Bissell of the CIA in the planning of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. When that operation failed, the CIA assigned Barnes and an associate, Wally Lampshire, to set up a new department, the Domestic Operations Division at 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, D.C. with the objective of infiltrating and obtaining intelligence from various foreign groups in the United States. In 1967, the CIA offered Barnes early retirement which he accepted. He then returned to his alma mater, Yale, where he worked as a special assistant to Kingman Brewster, specializing in alumni and community relations. At no time did he spy on Yale students or their activities.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
16 FEB 1975

CIA and Watergate: Multiple-choice truth

By Jim Squires

WASHINGTON—Spun in the gold thread of rumor mills and the silver yarn of phantom spiders, the tales spread like steam from the sewers and sounds from the keyholes.

They are born both of fact spoken by the innocent who want to help and fiction whispered by the guilty who seek to confuse.

These often-told, frequently embellished, and as yet unproven stories are nourished in the tortured brains of reporters, politicians, and conspiracy freaks who believe the full story of the scandal which felled a President has yet to surface.

FEW HAVE ever appeared in print as fact, or for that matter, ever will. But they have taken on lives of their own and their newsworthiness is hardly a gauge of money and manpower spent in pursuit of them.

As simple as homemade sin or bizarre enough to test the wildest imagination, these tales almost always center around "it"—"it" being what "they" were trying to cover up with all that lying, and "they" being whoever was lying at the time.

With the investigations into the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], the spookiest of all spooky things in Washington, has come a whole new rash of clues, leads, and tips—all of which, of course, lead to "it."

The principal characters in most of them are former President Richard Nixon, who bears the ultimate responsibility for keeping "it" secret; Richard Helms, former CIA director and now U. S. ambassador to Iran, whose accounts of his own participation are as plentiful as Mother Goose nursery rhymes, and ex-CIA man E. Howard Hunt, whose failure to get anyone to believe him may make him one of the most mysterious characters in American history.

One of the hottest "new" scenarios is an old one. The real reason the White House tried so hard to cover up the Watergate burglary is:

The Hunt Connection—A close personal relationship developed between Hunt and Nixon when Hunt was the CIA political liaison in the planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion and Nixon was heading the National Security Council as Vice President in 1960.

SUPPORTING evidence if plentiful. In a conversation five days after the Watergate break-in, H. R. Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, tells the President that the CIA and Helms will cooperate in coverup efforts because "it tracks back to the Bay of Pigs and . . . the whole Hunt problem."

At least one Watergate-connected lawyer has a piece of brush for this fire. His client, he discreetly tells associates, lied about the CIA because Nixon was more afraid of the "Hunt problem" than any other.

And there are numerous witnesses who were involved in the Bay of Pigs affair who say they are sure Hunt briefed the then-Vice President Nixon several times. Some say he also briefed President John F. Kennedy, who was let in on the planned invasion—to Nixon's dismay, shortly before the 1960 Presidential election.

But the connection runs into trouble when: [1] Nixon denies it; [2] Hunt denies it, and [3] nobody who was connected with the Bay of Pigs operation can say they remember seeing Hunt and Nixon in the same meeting.

The list of "ifs" is endless. Some are epic.

In the same conversation which spawned The Hunt Connection, there are indications that CIA Director Helms was more than willing to go along with the coverup. But he didn't, or at least he says he didn't.

The Helms Connection—There are as many theories about Helms, complete with supporting evidence, as there are differing sworn accounts by CIA officials.

One line being pursued by some fairly credible investigators is that Helms indeed was willing to go along. This is supported by sworn testimony that Helms ordered other CIA officials to withhold evidence from the FBI and indications that he committed perjury on more than one occasion.

Even more damning is evidence that the agency was being kept informed of Hunt's activities in the White House, both by Hunt and by another member of the Watergate break-in crew, Eugenio Martinez, who was still on a CIA retainer.

After all, didn't Helms once approve a $20,000 loan from agency funds for Hunt and didn't he help Hunt get a job with Robert R. Mullen & Co., a public relations firm in Washington that served as a CIA cover?

But if all that is true, why was Helms fired by Nixon? Why didn't the CIA ultimately take responsibility for the break-in? Wasn't it CIA resistance that helped uncover attempts to obstruct justice?

One high-ranking CIA official, who was in a position to know, offers this explanation: Helms was fired for refusing to claim the Watergate burglary team and to use secret CIA funds to buy their silence.

"RICHARD HELMS is the slowest-talking man in Washington," says the official. "He would automatically do everything he could to make the White House believe he was cooperating and at the same time figure out a way not to do it. But when he got the call from the President asking him to use the money, there was nothing left to do but refuse. That call is what they're trying to cover up."

That's "it," all right. Helms became "Deep Throat" for Washington Post reporters Carl Berstein and Bob Woodward, feeding information to the newspaper personally or thru Robert Bennet, a Mullen company official in the pay of the CIA.

Did the CIA official hear the call? No. Did Helms tell him about it? No.

"Hell, no," says an associate. "All Helms was trying to do was protect the agency. What Helms was really afraid of is what is happening now. Investigations of the CIA uncovering violations of its charter. What the CIA feared most is that everyone would find out it was carrying out domestic spying."

The CIA has obviously been trying to cover up something. What is "it"?

The Mafia Connection—"What you will ultimately pin on the CIA if you follow this trail," assures an old CIA enemy, "is Murder One. The New York Times thinks there were four of 'em. Got names and everything. Mafia's been taking contracts from the CIA."

Well, who's been killed? Fifty voices whisper in unison: "John Kennedy. Robert F. Kennedy. Martin Luther King, and don't forget the shooting of George Wallace. Didn't Tony Ulasewicz investigate Arthur Bremer? Wallace himself thinks C.R.E.E.P. is responsible."

What about The Hoover Connection? They say, J. Edgar Hoover knew everything about the CIA. When he died poison was found in his toothpaste and he "was carried out in a blanket and kept hidden until the funeral" by the Cubans.

The Cuban Connection—Hunt was the government's political contact with the Cubans. The Cubans were training in New Orleans to attack Castro. Lee Harvey Oswald trained with those Cubans. There, the CIA trained the killer of John Kennedy.

That's "it."

"No, it isn't," corrects a CIA man who trained Cubans. "You don't understand the agency [CIA]. You're taking the golden apple just like Helms wants you to."

The Golden Apple Connection? According to the Golden Apple, Helms was willing to do anything to protect the agency even if it meant felling a President.

"The Watergate burglary and all this domestic spying business is exactly what they want Congress to look at," the Golden Apple says. "Then Congress won't look at the fact that the CIA is really one big illegal clandestine operation. Everything they do abroad is patently illegal and if anyone stops long

enough to examine the law, that will be the end of the CIA."

The Iranian Connection says our influence in the Middle East is now the most crucial goal of the nation's foreign policy. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the most vital to the U. S. role. The CIA is the dominant force in both countries.

"It trains the palace guard in both countries," says the proponent of the Iranian Connection. "Whoever protects the king controls the country and Helms is the most effective single force alive in Iran. He installed the shah. Why do you think he hasn't been indicted?"

Well, what about Henry Kissinger? Doesn't he control foreign policy?

The Kissinger Connection—as the top national security adviser and secretary of State, Kissinger is in a position to control the clandestine CIA operations. The CIA sins are his. That is "it." That is what "they" have been protecting.

"NO," SAYS a former Kissinger staff member. "Henry has been locked in mortal combat with the CIA. He has been used by them for their own ends. He'll be out in six months because he'll be useless to them."

Who is "them." Who's running this whole business? Who's responsible? Kissinger is Helm's boss. Isn't he?

"I'm not sure," says a retired Pentagon official who professes the Kissinger theory. "I'm convinced the CIA is a computer, a human computer. Do you know what I mean?"

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
24 FEB 1975

With critics nipping at their heels, the senior officers of the Central Intelligence Agency are finally—and grudgingly—going along with Director William Colby's view that the Agency must be less secretive. Previously, any kind of "open door" policy was unthinkable. Now it is seen as needed if CIA is going to survive its troubles.

Some diplomats are spreading the undiplomatic view that Richard Helms's testimony before Congress on CIA activities while he was the Agency's Director have proved so embarrassing both at home and abroad that he should be asked to resign as U. S. Ambassador to Iran.

Word from a State Department official: "The Communists are about to take over Portugal and we can't even consider any form of covert action that might help prevent it—not in the present political climate."

NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1975

The C.I.A. And Its Critics

By Tom Wicker

Every time the Pentagon wants more money, it starts talking about the dangers of war. And every time any so-called "national security" agency finds itself being criticized, it replies that the national security is being endangered.

Director William E. Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency has taken to that classic bureaucratic pattern, claiming that "exaggerated" charges against the C.I.A. have resulted in "almost hysterical excitement" that has "placed American intelligence in danger." But who's hysterical? Mr. Colby sounds nearer to it than anyone else.

In fact, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who will chair the special Senate committee to investigate the "intelligence community," said in a statement following Mr. Colby's—though not specifically in response to it—that he was "surprised in recent days at the hysteria of those who are fearful that this committee is out to wreck these agencies." So should anyone be surprised who knows Mr. Church's moderate temperament, the responsible makeup of his committee,

IN THE NATION

the fact that its senior Republican member is the conservative, military-oriented John Tower of Texas, and that another member is that stanch defender of national security, Barry Goldwater of Arizona? Some wrecking crew!

Who's being hysterical might also be judged by the fact that Mr. Colby was not forced to call a news conference or to issue a press release to get his fears for the national security on the record. The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, which "oversees" the C.I.A. budget to the extent that anyone does, provided him a hospitable forum and three hours in which to state his views openly—something C.I.A. directors rarely do except when they want to sell the public on the great job they say the C.I.A. is doing. The subcommittee did not, predictably, provide searching cross-examination.

Nevertheless, since Mr. Colby was clearly trying to suggest that the C.I.A. is being maligned and the nation endangered by irresponsible criticism, certain responses have to be made—aside from that excellent piece of country wisdom that "bit dogs bark loudest." For one thing, the oldest bureaucratic defense known to man is to try to shift the focus of attention from the substance of charges to those who make them—to convince the public that the critics are the problem, rather than the thing being criticized.

Even before that friendly House subcommittee, for example, Mr. Colby conceded that the C.I.A. at one time or another had kept files on four members of Congress, some of them "anti-war." How do we know there were not others? For that matter, how does *he* know? And just recently, in an interview with Barbara Walters on "Today," Charles Colson made a strong case that the C.I.A. knew in advance of the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Saying that was "beyond dispute," Mr. Colson continued:

"They processed the so-called 'casing' photos, they provided all the equipment . . . it's very clear to me that they knew about that and actively participated in it and assisted it, provided the means for it, helped with the operation from beginning to end . . . some of the memos I saw certainly went as high as Mr. Helms." (Richard Helms was director of the C.I.A. in 1971, when the break-in took place.)

Mr. Colby has questioned Mr. Colson's credibility, which is indeed questionable—but more so than that of the C.I.A., whose way of life is secrecy and undercover operation? More so than that of Mr. Helms, whose testimony on several points has been misleading or incomplete? The point is that a multiplicity of such allegations of plainly illicit activities—not just by the C.I.A. but by the F.B.I. too—have come to public attention. The substance of those allegations needs to be examined and verified; and if any of them can indeed be verified, perhaps others must be sought. In the course of doing that, questions of the credibility and responsibility of those who make the allegations will answer themselves.

One does not need to take Mr. Jeb Magruder, for example, as a pillar of credibility to be struck by his remark in a lecture this week that had it not been for the Watergate exposures, the Nixon Administration would have become a "perpetual Presidency." By 1976, he said, according to the Associated Press, "we would have been in the position to elect whomever we wanted to elect. Once you learn to use the levers of power it becomes easy." Were the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. such "levers of power"? Could they ever be?

Mr. Colby does not seem to understand that the question really is not the difficulties presently being caused for the C.I.A. The question is about what Representative Lucien Nedzi of Michigan has called "the appropriate role of secret institutions in a free, democratic society." The C.I.A. is not a value in itself, to be protected or fostered at whatever expense to such a society. It exists only to serve that society, and it does not do so if it undermines, threatens or ignores the rights of that society's citizens, no matter what "national security" justification it tries to plead.

LONDON TIMES
30 January 1975

Magazine names CIA chiefs abroad

From Fred Emery
Washington, Jan 29

On the eve of the new Senate committee's investigation of American intelligence a radical periodical in Washington has published the names of the supposed Central Intelligence Agency chiefs in 101 cities round the world.

The quarterly, *Counterspy*, claims that it is doing no more than to make Americans aware of what host countries already know.

More luridly, Mr Philip Agee, the former CIA officer who has vowed to undo the CIA in the cause of world revolution, writes in his first article printed in America that the "key is secrecy and when it is peeled away there, standing naked and exposed for all to see, is the CIA secret policeman".

Mr Agee's book *Inside the Company* was recently published in Britain.

A CIA spokesman today sighed: "There is very little we can do about it, except neither to confirm or deny."

An informed agency source suggested that the list was out of date: the magazine claimed it was accurate as of last June and contained as many staff "working under diplomatic cover as we were able to locate".

The list is interesting for some omissions: apparently there is no CIA station chief in Peking, or he is still unknown. Likewise no one is listed for either Tirana, or Ottawa. And their men in Havana and Jerusalem are unknown.

But their man in Moscow is there and many others in East Europe, as well as in Nato countries and the Third World.

For London the well-known Mr Cord Meyer is listed but it is stated that he is due to be transferred in June. According to *Counterspy*, he was a "labour specialist on temporary assignment to oversee the British situation".

Mr Agee claims that the quoting of names in his book has caused hasty replacements.

Senator Frank Church, the newly elected chairman of the Senate select committee to investigate the CIA and all other intelligence agencies, has spoken of the need to avert disruption of the CIA as an intelligence body.

However he has also spoken of the threats various abuses have posed at home. He stated today: "There's a terrible threat to freedom implicit in a federal police that is operating secretly and outside the law and conducting investigation and surveillance over lawful activities of American citizens."

Mr Church's committee—as well as the House judiciary committee—will have before it the example of an Arizona professor who lost his university job.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
9 FEB 1975

Jim Squires

Who do you trust to spy on spies?

WASHINGTON—Henry Kissinger is pouting again because Congress keeps making foreign policy and Jerry Ford's eyes are sad and bleary from reading his own economic predictions.

But the real problem in this town, and the only one that's really any fun, belongs to the new Senate select committee appointed to investigate the misbehavior of the nation's spies.

Consider the dilemma. Who will do the investigating?

IN THE PAST, if a congressional committee wanted to investigate the White House, it could round up few ex-FBI agents or former members of the Central Intelligence Agency and say, "Go get 'em."

If the FBI was the target, then CIA agents would gladly do the job. If the CIA needed investigating, ex-FBI agents could always be trusted with the task.

But the new intelligence committee is charged with investigating both the FBI and the CIA and anybody else who might have been spying when they shouldn't have been.

At first the committee thought of borrowing a few investigators from another federal law enforcement agency, for instance, the Drug Enforcement Administration which carries out fancy cloak and dagger operations all over the world. Oops! Not them.

Fifty-three of DEA's top agents are ex-CIA men. Everybody knows that only ex-priests and former Mouseketeers have stronger loyalties to their past.

Then someone suggested that if detente is really all its cracked up to be, the Soviets would let Congress borrow a few of its spies. They seem to know what's going on in the FBI and the CIA anyway. But alas, a lot of Soviet KGB agents really are CIA or FBI agents and simply cannot be trusted.

When in need of manpower, official Washington usually looks to the military. But not for spies. The Pentagon's top investigator for the last several years is a former FBI agent. Besides he has been accused of trying to use information he gathered in his last big case to blackmail his way back to a top FBI job.

Some of the best sleuths in town are newsmen. So, why not arm them with subpena power and turn them loose? Okay, which ones? Some journalists are ex-CIA agents. Other journalists are current CIA agents. And most journalists can't tell a CIA agent from Mary Poppins.

The committee has looked around for a few good ex-cops. But the best ones have all become big city mayors and the worst ones are in jail. Almost all the rest were either hired by the Republicans in 1972 or have already been retained by the Democrats for 1976.

Sen. Howard Baker [R., Tenn.], the only Watergate committee veteran on the new panel, has suggested rounding up some of the Watergate committee's old gumshoes. But there's a problem there, too. Some of the hot topics of interest in the new investigation are things the Watergate committee probers passed over lightly and saved for their books.

BY WEEK's end the new committee had only one staffer, but it was still hopeful.

This problem is not entirely new. It was the same one faced by the Nixon administration back in 1971 when it was trying to find out who was leaking government secrets and couldn't trust a single one of the regular government spies to do the job.

A check with old hands from the Nixon White House had turned up one promising lead. It seems that Charles [Chuck] Colson, you remember him, has this friend, E. Howard somebody or the other, who has a lot of other friends who do jobs like this. They are all experienced and looking for work.

WASHINGTON STAR NEWS
19 FEB 1975

Fonda Mail Read

The federal government acknowledged yesterday that the Central Intelligence Agency intercepted the mail sent from abroad to anti-war activist Jane Fonda in the early 1970s.

Justice Department officials said the "mail cover" placed on the actress would be explained, possibly later this week, in a brief filed in Los Angeles federal district court.

Miss Fonda is suing the government for $2.8 million damages, charging there was a conspiracy by the government to harass her for her anti-war work. The long list of defendants includes former President Richard M. Nixon.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1 FEB 1975

Covering Intelligence

On Sunday, December 22, 1974, *The New York Times* led its front page with a 4000-word article by Seymour Hersh that began: "The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States, according to well-placed government sources." In his next paragraph Hersh added that "intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were maintained by a special unit of the CIA. . . ."

No series of news stories since Watergate has had so quick an impact on government, while generating so much discussion among journalists, as the Hersh pieces that began that Sunday and continued to appear over the next three weeks. The way the stories were written, their placement in the paper by the *Times'* editors, the response by the executive and legislative branches and the impact on other newsmen all tell a lot about the state of post-Watergate journalism.

Because of the way the first story was written, many newsmen, including me, doubted whether Hersh really could document the serious charges implied by his dramatic lead paragraph. In the six columns of type that followed, Hersh did present a plausible story of how James Schlesinger looked into the alleged domestic activities after taking over as CIA Director from Richard Helms in early 1973. He also reported the concern felt by current CIA Director William Colby, who succeeded Schlesinger. What Hersh didn't do, however, was to name any individuals or organizations that had been subject to surveillance or infiltration as part of the "massive" program.

Investigative reporting is a highly competitive field. When one newspaper publishes an exclusive story its competitors are likely to concentrate initially on comments from those who dispute the published allegations. That process happened to some degree here. But no flat denials were made by the CIA or the White House. Hersh had covered those bases. Hersh noted in his first story that CIA Director Colby "had been informed the previous week of the inquiry by *The Times.*" How much Colby had been told of what Hersh knew or planned to write is hard to say but one later paragraph of the story offers a clue: "When confronted with the *Times'* information about the CIA's domestic operations earlier this week, high-ranking American intelligence officials [I take this to mean Colby or an aide] confirmed its basic accuracy but cautioned against drawing 'unwarranted conclusions.'" It is hard to believe the *Times* would have published the story it did without such an assurance from someone at the top of the CIA

What the *Times* and Hersh did to follow up that first story reinforced the impression that they had solid but unpublishable evidence. At the same time, however, they created additional doubts among newsmen that the story was as firm as portrayed. The next day no new facts or allegations were printed. Instead the Monday, December 23 *Times* led with a call from Sen. William Proxmire for Helms' resignation as US ambassador to Iran and Proxmire's demand for "an investigation by the Justice Department of alleged domestic spying by the CIA." The Proxmire story was the first of several to run during the next week that were generated by calls from Hersh seeking comments on his initial story. Hersh, in fact, had called a Proxmire aide in Washington the day his first story came out, soliciting a statement.

Monday's *Times* also carried an article that tended to blur criticism of Hersh's piece. In a separate front-page story from Colorado where President Ford was skiing, *Times* White House correspondent John Herbers reported Colby had called the chief executive and "assured him 'nothing comparable' to what was described in the article was going on *now*." In *The Washington Post* that same morning, Mr. Ford was quoted as telling newsmen that Colby assured him "nothing comparable to what was stated in the article was going on over there, . . ." a statement that could apply to the past as well as the present. The President also said he told Colby he "would not tolerate any such activities under this administration," the remark that apparently justified the *Times'* second page-one story.

On Tuesday the *Times* did some more questionable editing. Helms was reported to have denied categorically that the CIA had conducted "illegal" domestic spying when he was director. But directly following that statement, Hersh wrote that James Angleton, the agency official who had run the counterintelligence office and who was now retiring "agreed with some of the allegations that were published Sunday by *The New York Times.*" Angleton's quote, which had been given to United Press International — not to Hersh — was that there was "something to it," meaning Hersh's first story. What Angleton had also told UPI — and what was left out of the *Times* — was that the published story had been exaggerated.

Hersh thereafter quoted Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House CIA oversight committee as saying on television, "there's been an overstepping of bounds" by the CIA. Only much later, in the jump of his story did Hersh complete Nedzi's statement: "There was some 'overstepping of bounds,' Mr. Nedzi said, 'but it certainly wasn't of the dimension that we're led to believe . . . of what has appeared in the newspapers.'"

In subsequent days Hersh front-page stories continued to appear in the *Times*, some of them containing relevant but hardly fresh or important information.

Hersh's aggressive searching for additional information did turn up one new source — a former CIA agent who talked of carrying out domestic surveillance in New York city. It was the only new information on alleged CIA activities Hersh was to bring forward prior to the CIA's official statement. Nevertheless the impact of the original Hersh article plus his constant search for publishable comment brought important reactions. The President, for one thing, created the blue-ribbon Rockefeller panel to investigate the CIA.

On January 15 Colby appeared before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee and gave the CIA's detailed response to the Hersh allegations. He specifically denied a "massive illegal domestic operation," and the facts he presented supported his denial. The CIA had put together files on 10,000 civilians between 1967 to 1974, but 6000 of the names came originally from the FBI for overseas checks. Colby confirmed that 10 agents had infiltrated dissident groups in 1967-68 as part of a program to protect agency facilities in

Washington, and another 12 or so were placed in groups in the 1970s so they could travel abroad to gather information on radical activities overseas. He also said that in 1971 and 1972 newsmen thought to be getting leaks of classified information were tailed. Hersh's charges had not been fully corroborated, but he had come close.

Where was the rest of the press? During the early Watergate days the press had held back. Reporters stood aloof from the CIA story too, in part because it seemed not to be a developing story, except for the moves to investigate the original charges. One other possible motive needs to be examined, and it has for me a personal side. While I was assembling material for this piece on the press and CIA, Sy Hersh, who is a friend, suggested that perhaps I am too close to the subject to write about it. That may be true. I have strong feelings about investigative reporting and the responsibilities accompanying it. I also have past ties with the CIA. In 1959 I unwittingly was part of a CIA-sponsored delegation that attended the Vienna World Communist Youth Festival and a year later, with a CIA-paid-for plane ticket, I flew to India to attend a Youth Congress Party meeting as the American representative carrying greetings from President-elect Kennedy. In between those two events I was offered but turned down a job with the CIA. On two occasions in the 1960s when I ran congressional investigations for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I had to deal directly with a number of CIA personnel, including Richard Helms.

I stipulate my association not as a *mea culpa* for what follows. I'm doing it because to understand the press coverage of the CIA, the FBI and other intelligence agencies, the public should realize that over the past 20 years, for many newsmen, these organizations were most often sources of information for stories, and not stories in themselves. For foreign correspondents, in country after country, CIA station chiefs were often the best men around to give an estimate of local conditions. Reporters almost never attempted to find out what the CIA was up to. In Washington there are other newsmen, editors and columnists who, like me, have past connections to the CIA or its officials.

These connections do not mean that reporters never have written critically about intelligence. My articles about the CIA and Watergate — and former Director Helms' questionable role in that affair — speak for themselves. With the Hersh story, however, I remained cautious, believing that the CIA had been drawn into domestic activities, but not convinced that these involvements were either massive or illegal.

Other journalists have taken different tacks. For example *The Washington Post*'s editorial page editor Philip Geyelin worked briefly for the CIA more than 20 years ago. He, too, has been uneasy about the Hersh articles. When the Rockefeller commission was appointed, the *Post* editorialized that the panel's makeup was sufficient to a task that did not involve treating "a gaping wound in the nation's side. . . ." Because of the *Post*'s editorial line, rumors quickly circulated that Geyelin's CIA bias was showing. When the *Post* later ran a story about a 1950s CIA mail cover on then AFL President George Meany intended to make sure that agency funds were going to the correct trade union people, Hersh called Geyelin to see if he were the source of the story. He said he wasn't.

What are we to draw from all this? First that the post-Watergate press is more openly critical of itself — in its questioning of colleagues and in writing frankly and critically of how it operates. Second that the grey *New York Times* has decided to undertake what I consider advocacy journalism in its news columns. *Times* managing editor A. M. Rosenthal denies that. He firmly told me the first Hersh story was not played "in order to bring about an investigation," and those stories that followed were only carried on page one because they were intrinsically interesting or important." The way Rosenthal sees it, an editor who sets out in a series of articles to influence events "becomes a participant," and he is opposed to that.

I believe Rosenthal is wrong. Like it or not, he and his counterpart in *The Washington Post* are participants. Their front-page story selections set an agenda for government. The Hersh story makes the point. It was vulnerable to criticism. The White House, CIA or congressmen could have nailed the overstatements and tried to ride out the storm. There was, however, enough truth in the Hersh piece and credibility in the *Times*' presentation to force serious, quick action which, one hopes, will be of a positive sort.

Walter Pincus

NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1975

AFRICANS DRAFTING A PROTEST ON DAVIS

Special to The New York Times

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, Feb. 20—Foreign ministers of 43 African countries were preparing a resolution here today to express their opposition to the appointment of Nathaniel Davis as the United States Under Secretary of State for African affairs.

Africans have expressed wariness about Mr. Davis's assignment to Chile during the time a rightist coup overthrew the regime of President Salvador Allende Gossens. They suspect that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the overthrow and that Mr. Davis might have been involved in the coup.

The resolution is to be made public at the final meeting of the 24th session of the ministerial conference of the Organization of African Unity tomorrow, a delegate said today.

The delegate, from a black African country, said "we do feel strongly about this—it seems to us a deliberate affront to our interests by the American Government."

He said this was the first time the organization, formed in 1963, had attempted to influence American foreign policy.

The resolution would follow the objections to Mr. Davis that have been expressed by Representive Charles C. Diggs Jr., chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa.

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COMMENTARY

ALAN SMITH: The Rockefeller Commission is but one of several panels set up to probe the CIA and other U.S. Intelligence Agencies. The other committees, either in operation or gearing up, are on Capitol Hill.

And their possible impact on national security is the concern tonight of syndicated columnist and Metromedia commentator Robert Novak.

ROBERT NOVAK: The many congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency have just begun and already there's two obvious and profound effects on the CIA. First of all, the Agency's covert operations, the so-called dirty tricks around the world are absolutely dead. The real question that they -- there could be a very useful CIA dirty trick operation in Portugal today where there's a tremendous danger of a Communist takeover. And a communist takeover would move the U.S. with strategic bases in the Azores Islands.

Secondly, the undercover agents for the CIA all over the world are going in to their CIA superiors and telling them, I quit. In other words, they're unwilling to risk their lives when there's a chance of them being blown out of the water.

Now, this is just the begining of these congressional investigations. The Agency's going to be criticized, uncovered and taken apart in the weeks to come. And so I think there's a good chance without the covert operations and without the undercover agents, and the CIA turning into a bunch of clerks sitting out in Langley reading foreign newspapers and foreign magazines. And I think it's about time for Congress to ask itself this question: has detente extended far enough that this is kind of CIA that the congressmen really want.

SMITH: Bob, I believe it's Senator Russell Long who has some reservations about the ability of some members of the Senate committee to keep their mouths shut about what they hear in these closed sessions. Do you feel Senator Long's concern is warranted?

NOVAK: Absolutely. I think that this is the greatest danger to the CIA. The officials are worried about it because congressmen are notoriously incapable of keeping a secret.

SMITH: Syndicated columnist Robert Novak.

Data on Oswald Apparently Withheld From Key Warren Investigation Aides

By BEN A. FRANKLIN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22—J. Edgar Hoover sent a memorandum to the State Department in 1960 raising the possibility that an imposter might be using the credentials of an American defector named Lee Harvey Oswald, who was then in the Soviet Union.

This memo from the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and two subsequent State Department memos related to it were apparently not shown to investigators of the Warren Commission, which examined the assassination of President Kennedy and determined that Oswald, acting alone, was the assassin.

The late Mr. Hoover's warning of the "possibility" that an imposter could be using Oswald's identification data, in the Soviet Union or elsewhere, came more than two years before the murder of the American President in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. The imposter theory was rejected, by implication but not directly, in the published report of the Warren Commission, and its significance could not be determined.

The body of the man who the commission concluded had shot the President—and who was shot to death by Jack Ruby two days later—was identified by his mother and other relatives and also by fingerprints and other physical features as that of Lee Harvey Oswald.

But the apparent withholding of information from the commission supported a theory of some critics of the commission's final report that the panel had come to its conclusion regarding Oswald without having had all the facts.

A spokesman for the F. B. I. said, in response to questions, that "we can definitely state, without hesitation, that a copy of the Hoover memo was shown to a member of the Warren Commission staff in the presence of an F. B. I. agent." However, the spokesman said that he could not identify the commission staff member to whom the memo reportedly had been shown. Neither J. Lee Rankin, the former general counsel of the commission, nor any of his former staff aides who were most involved in investigating Oswald's background said they could remember seeing it.

However, Howard P. Willens, now a private lawyer here, himself in an interview today as the commission lawyer who hed reviewed the F.B.I. file. Mr. Willens, who was then commission's special liaison officer to the Justice Department, said today that "while I do not think that anyone can state now with the necessary precision whether or not he saw the Hoover memo, it is my best recollection that I did, in fact, see that memo."

"I do not want to be in a public debate with my old colleagues," Mr. Willens said, "but I know that tehere was discussion of this among other on the staff concerned with the activities of Oswald abroad. I am concerned with continued public references to the notion that the commission overlooked obvious facts."

Suggests Reopening Inquiry

Shown the F.B.I. memos and the two State Department documents—discovered in the National Archives here by a private resercher—W. David Slawson, a lawyer who checked out rumors about Oswald for the commission in 1964, said he thought the assassination inquiry should be reopened.

Mr. Swanson, who is now a law professor at the University of Southern California, said he and other investigators had never been shown the memos.

"We were the rumor runner-downers, and we certainly should have seen this material, as we did a great deal of other stuff that we showed to be unfounded," he said.

"It may be more significant that we did not see it, in terms of a possible cover-up and the reasons for it, than if we had seen it," he continued. "I mean, I don't know where the imposter notion would have led us—perhaps nowhere, like a lot of other leads. But the point is we didn't know about it. And why not?"

At the State Department, a spokesman said there would be no comment because all former officials who might have knowledge of the Oswald file had died or retired.

Mr. Slawson said in an interview that the investigation should be reopened also "because the interposition of an imposter, if that happened, is a political act."

"And after all, this [the assassination] was not just another murder," he said. "It was, by definition, a political murder."

Two other commission staff members shared with Mr. Slawson the responsibility for checking out rumors. Neither recalled specifically having seen the memos, but they tended to discount any thought of a renewed investigation.

One of them, Dr. Alfred Goldberg, who wrote the gossip-puncturing "Speculations and Rumors" section of the commission's report, said in an interview:

"I don't have any recollection of having seen that [Hoover] memorandum. As a matter of fact, I am fairly certain I didn't.

"While I think we might have done more had we seen it—we might have engaged in more research, we might have looked for more, wemi ght have asked for more from the State Department and the F.B.I.—in terms of the outcome, I don't believe it would have made any difference."

William T. Coleman Jr., who was Mr. Slawson's immediate superior at the commission, and who was nominated last month by President Ford to be Secretary of Transportation, was asked during an interview whether he had seen the memos.

"It's been 10 years," he said, "and I don't remember one way or the other."

He recalled, however, that his duties "required me to see everything that Oswald had done as a defector to the Soviet Union."

Mr. Hoover's memo was dated June 3, 1960. Its contents suggest that the F.B.I. director raised the possibility of an imposter because of certain facts the memo recounts.

It cited a Foreign Service dispatch concerning Oswald's declaration in Moscow on Oct. 31, 1959, that he would renounce his citizenship and noted that he had surrendered his passport.

It also cited a report of an F.B.I. agent in Dallas of May 12, 1960, which said that Oswald's mother, Marguerite C. Oswald, "stated subject had taken his birth certificate with him when he left home."

The agent's report indicated that Mrs. Oswald was apprehensive about her son's safety because she had written him three letters and they had all been returned to her undelivered.

Mr. Hoover concluded: "Since there is a possibility that an imposter is using Oswald's birth certificate, any current information the Department of State may have concerning subject will be appreciated."

Two internal State Department memos transmitted Mr. Hoover's warning. One, dated June 10, 1960, went to the department's Soviet desk. The other, dated March 31, 1961, was sent from one section of the Passport Office to another.

Concern on Passport

The latter memo indicated concern that a revalidated passport to be issued to Oswald in preparation for his return to the United States in June, 1962, not be mailed to him through the Soviet postal system but be delivered to him "only on a personal basis" at the Embassy in Moscow. Officials there could then be satisfied that they were dealing with the real Oswald.

The Warren Commission subsequently developed that in July, 1961, Oswald's passport was handed back to the man who Moscow Embassy officials were satisfied was the same Oswald they had first met in 1959, when he angrily announced his intention to renounce his ciintention to renounce his citizenship. The State Department had ruled by then that he had not actually given up his citizenship.

None of these documents—not the Hoover memo or either of the State Department memos—was in the department's Oswald file as it was given to the Warren Commission in 1964, according to Mr. Slawson.

After the commission published its report, thousands of pages of unpublished commission records were declassified by the State Department and placed on public file in the National Archives.

Among them J. G. Harris, a 45-year-old New Yorker who has spent nearly a decade in Kennedy assassination research, found the Hoover and State Department memos.

How the memos came to be missing from the State Department's Oswald file given to the commission but included in the same file the Archives remains unclear.

Mr. Slawson, citing recent disclosures about domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, said:

"It conceivably could have been something related to the C.I.A. I can only speculate now, but a general C.I.A. effort to take out anything that reflected on them may have covered this up." Mr. Slawson added that he had been "impressed at the time with the intelligence and honesty of the C.I.A. people I dealt with."

A C.I.A. spokesman denying that the agency had ever had any connection with Oswald, said the agency had no record of ever having seen the Hoover memo and had not engaged in a cover-up.

A former State Department official who was familiar with the Oswald file suggested that Mr. Hoover himself might have ordered his memo removed from the file before it was sent to the commission, to avoid embarrassing the bureau.

The former official, Richard A. Frank, now a lawyer here with the Center for Law and Social Policy, said in an interview that as the department's assistant legal adviser in 1963-64 he had been unaware of the Hoover memo, although he had a major responsibility for assembling the Oswald records to be sent to the commission.

He said it seemed possible that the memo "was so unsupportable by anything the F.B.I. had on Oswald that, when the Oswald file suddenly became the object of a most intensive search and review, Mr. Hoover and his friends in the security operation at State simply made it disappear."

A former senior F.B.I. official who worked on the assassination inquiry said in an interview that he could not recall such a memo as part of the case file.

At the C.I.A. a spokesman said there would be no comment on Mr. Slawson's suggestion of a cover-up. The State Department had no comment either.

Abram Chayes, the department's legal adviser in 1964, who assured the commission in testimony then that "very aggressive efforts" had been a made to collect and transmit the full Oswald file, was interviewed by telephone in Moscow, where he was attending a legal conference.

He said he had no memory of any imposter memo in the State Department files.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Wednesday, Feb. 19, 1975

As of Today, Getting Federal Documents Will Be a Lot Easier

* * *

To the Bureaucracy's Dismay, New Rules Make It Harder To Keep Information Secret

By ARLEN J. LARGE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Uncle Sam will be hearing from Clarence Ditlow today.

Mr. Ditlow, one of Ralph Nader's troopers, pestered the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 1973 for copies of its correspondence with Detroit on auto-safety defects. Invoking the Freedom of Information Act, Mr. Ditlow took the bureaucrats to court. He lost.

Now Congress has changed that law, and the changes become effective today. So Mr. Ditlow is renewing his request for the documents, and he expects to win this time.

Gradually and grudgingly, the government is opening up. Watergate gave secrecy a bad name. Congress keeps thinking of new ways to compel the Executive Branch to operate more openly. On Capitol Hill itself, more committees are writing laws in rooms open to lobbyists, the press and the visiting high-school class from Hoboken. The Senate later this year probably will allow its floor sessions to be televised, possibly putting Senators in competition with afternoon soap operas.

The broadening of the 1966 Freedom of Information Act is part of the trend. Congress wants the public to have access to more kinds of documents currently locked in government files.

Among the possible beneficiaries is William Taylor, director of the Center for National Policy Review at Catholic University here. He has been trying to see reports on the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's enforcement of desegregation in Northern schools, but he has also been losing in court. Now he is asking a federal judge here to reverse the decision in light of the amended law.

Courtroom tactics aside, Mr. Taylor hopes that the bureaucracy will show more enthusiasm for complying with the information law. "We're all going to be interested in seeing whether there's going to be a change in the spirit of administering it" he says.

Bureaucratic Resistance

The history of the original 1966 law shows that the open-government spirit was wanting in many agencies. "The bureaucracy did not want his law," writes Harold Relyea, a Library of Congress analyst, in a current article. He says this resistance has resulted in "excessive processing fees, response delays and pleas of ignorance when petitioned for documents in terms other than an exact title."

The law laid down the general rule that documents are to be made public unless they are covered by any of nine specific exemptions, such as defense secrets, medical files, trade secrets, internal policy memos and investigatory records. To the surprise of the law's sponsors, it hasn't been used much by the press. But public-interest law firms and trade associations have invoked it repeatedly. A frustrated official at the Justice Department hotly threatened to use it against fellow bureaucrats to get a copy of the FBI phone book. Some document-seeking members of Congress have taken the government to court, mostly without success.

Several lost court cases and the bureaucracy's stalling tactics prompted Congress last year to tighten up. The coverage of two of the exemptions was narrowed, agencies were given deadlines to respond to requests, excessive copying fees were banned, and future winners of court cases were authorized to have lawyers' fees paid by the government. President Ford vetoed the bill at the alarmed behest of the whole Executive Branch, but the veto was overridden.

The Clock Watchers

With these provisions becoming effective today, officialdom is looking to its defenses. The new law gives an agency 10 working days to make its first response to a freedom-of-information request, and some officials are preparing to fight for every minute. They have decreed that the clock doesn't start running until the letter reaches the right desk; time spent lost in the mail room doesn't count. To play the game, applicants are asked to write "freedom-of-information request" on the outside envelope. In a memo of advice to other agencies, the Justice Department has warned that "an efficient system of date stamping for incoming matter is essential."

Many agencies expect a surge of requests starting today because of the two substantive changes that Congress made in the law. Courts had ruled that the exemption for investigatory files covered such things as Mr. Ditlow's auto-safety documents and Mr. Taylor's HEW reports. Congress sought to restrict this protection to actual cops-and-robbers categories of investigations, and even some of these may become narrowly available if there isn't any invasion of personal privacy.

Hence, the FBI is getting ready to show an individual what's in his own file, after screening out anything that would identify an informant. An applicant will be asked to go to great lengths to prove his identity, including possible submission to fingerprinting.

Other investigatory records that are likely to be requested under the new law include data from President Kennedy's autopsy and the Justice Department's file on the Kent State investigations.

The new law overturns a Supreme Court ruling that forbade federal judges to inspect classified documents in testing whether they are covered by the exception for defense secrets. Now, a judge will have authority to order the secrecy stamp removed from all or part of a document if he decides that the classification was improper.

That is expected to attract requests to see CIA Director William Colby's recent report to the President of his agency's domestic spying activities. Morton Halperin, a former National Security Council staffer, plans to invoke the new law to obtain previously unpublished chapters of the Pentagon Papers as well as official U.S. forecasts of Soviet strategic-weapons strength.

"To some extent, the national mood has changed," says Mr. Halperin, who now works for the Center for National Security Studies here. "There's a general feeling in Congress, in courts and among the public that a lot of things stamped secret aren't really classified."

Philip and Sue Long, a Bellevue, Wash., couple who successfully used the old law to obtain tax-audit guidelines from the Internal Revenue Service, think that the new definition of investigatory files could force the IRS to give up more material. Mrs. Long says it would be useful for taxpayers dickering with the IRS over disputed sums to see how similar cases were settled, but these records have been classed as investigatory files. She thinks that the new definition might open them up "but it depends on how the courts go."

The new rule allowing judges to order the government to pay lawyers' fees of successful seekers for documents will "dramatically" increase the number of court challenges, predicts Mark Lynch, another Nader associate. Mr. Lynch observes that so far the number of lawyers specializing in freedom-of-information cases has been relatively small and that they have generally drawn a careful bead on government secrecy abuses. With more lawyers moving into the field, he expects "we're probably going to have some pretty harebrained cases."

The Advisory Committees

Congress also has been trying to require more openness in the work of the 1,118 advisory committees of outside specialists that give policy coaching to federal agencies. Pressed by Democratic Sen. Lee Metcalf of Montana, Congress in 1972 sought to require advisory committees to publicize their meetings in advance and to open them to the public. The law says a meeting can be closed only if the subject matter discussed falls into one of those nine exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act.

The Defense Department promptly closed the doors on meetings of its advisory committee on women in the armed forces, contending that the talk would deal with the same subjects covered in internal policy memos. A federal judge ruled that this wasn't a valid reason, complaining sharply that "the penchant for unjustified government secrecy repeatedly evidenced in cases under the Freedom of Information Act seems to be present here."

Despite this and similar court rulings, critics of the advisory committees say there is still too much secrecy and not enough advance notice of the meetings. Chester Warner, a self-described "open-government nut," last year was the official monitor of advisory-committee practices in the White House Office of Management and Budget. A check of committee meetings in December showed that about 45% were closed, he reports. After a dispute with OMB higher-ups about the makeup of an Interior Department advisory committee on oil, Mr. Warner quit last month.

Congress Opens Up

These congressional open-government laws ironically don't apply to Congress itself; the Freedom of Information Act couldn't be legally invoked to get an early committee draft of a bill, for example. But the point is increasingly moot because more bill-drafting sessions of congressional committees are being held with open doors.

Pending in the Senate Rules Committee is a proposal backed by influential members of both parties allowing floor sessions of the full Senate to be televised. Cameras of any kind currently are taboo in that chamber. The TV cameras would be run by the Senate, but commercial networks would be allowed to tap into the Capitol's closed-circuit system.

The motive primarily is a political reaction to the low public esteem in which Congress is held. Republican Sen. J. Glenn Beall of Maryland says he hopes that "this increased familiarity with the processes of government will boost confidence in Congress while making Senators more accountable to their constituents."

Florida's Senators especially make a big point of demanding "government in the sunshine." Democrat Lawton Chiles is the leading crusader for open committee meetings, while his freshman colleague, Richard Stone, goes even further. Sen. Stone refuses to attend the still-secret caucuses of Senate Democrats, and, in the ultimate symbol of open government, he has taken his office door off its hinges.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 FEB 1975

The New Rules On Freedom Of Information

By MARTIN ARNOLD

Next week, on the 19th, over the objections of President Ford, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Pentagon, the State Department and, in fact, probably over the objections of almost every ranking member of the Federal bureaucracy, 17 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act go into effect.

The results could be important, particularly for journalists who under the old act usually did not press their legitimate demands for Government information simply because the process took so much time.

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press in Washington estimates that there were only a half a dozen or so major press attempts to get information through the provisions of the old act. It was put to perhaps its most spectacular use by N.B.C.-T.V.'s Carl Stern. He broke the story of the Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelligence group that infiltrated the New Left. It took the persistent Mr. Stern 20 months of litigation.

Under the prodding of consumer groups, such as Ralph Nader's, and of the media, the original Freedom of Information Act was passed in 1966 and signed by President Johnson. Then, as now, it was opposed by nearly every department and agency in the Federal Government, but most particularly by those involved in criminal investigations and in gathering foreign and domestic intelligence.

The 1966 act permitted private persons to file complaints in Federal District Courts to force Government agencies to produce information they were withholding. Exempt from the act were medical reports, an agency's internal rules and regulations, confidential trade secrets, and foreign policy and national defense information that had been classified secret by Presidential Executive Order.

That bill simply didn't work. The process was not only lengthy but so costly that unless a citizen was wealthy or had the financial aid of an interested group, he could go broke trying to get information out of the bureaucracy.

Finally, the law put the burden on the citizen and his surrogate, the reporter. The effect was that of an implicit rejection of the philosophical point that the government is, after all, *us*, not *them*, and the information belongs to *us* not *them*. Why should people have to struggle so hard to get information? The question was brought home to many through the Watergate disclosures and the more recent disclosures of apparently illegal spying on citizens by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ironically, the act also effectively restricted not only the rights of the people, but those of the legislative branch. Senator Howard Baker Jr., the Tennessee Republican, has said recently that he and his colleagues on the Watergate Committee were unable to get the C.I.A. to declassify its files on persons who had knowledge about Watergate.

Few claim that the new amendments will lead to more disclosures with the impact of Watergate. But the new amendments, designed to make it easier, quicker and less costly to get Government information, are in a sense a product of the atmosphere of Watergate. They passed Congress overwhelmingly, and were vetoed by President Ford on Oct. 17, 1974. About a month later, Congress overrode the President's veto, again overwhelmingly.

The exemptions in the original act still stand. But one of the amendments gives a Federal judge the authority to review in private classified foreign policy and national defense information, at the behest of a petitioner, to determine whether it should, in fact, be classified.

Another key amendment sets a strict timetable for the Government's response to a request for information. In general, an agency will have no more than 10 days to make the information available or to deny it, with 20 additional working days to decide on appeals.

That amendment was objected to by the President, as was a third that award court costs to an individual who successfully brings suit to force the disclosure of information or documents. There is even a form of punishment for officials who withhold them.

The punishment clause could be the one that really speeds up the flow of information from the Government to the people. A successful litigant can get the Civil Service Commission to suspend without pay for 60 days a bureaucrat who arbitrarily withheld information.

Based on past experience, no one really expects the Government to live easily with the new amendments. But under the new act information will be more accessible to the public even if it takes a year or so of constant law suits to get the bureaucracy to begin to cooperate.

Still, among the press, the feeling is that in the new amendments Congress did a good job of balancing one of the inner tensions of a democratic society: the people's right to know vs. the Government's need to protect legitimate secrets. Surely, most Federal judges will be just as sensitive to national security, and probably just as sophisticated in deciding those issues, as are the Cabinet officers and their Undersecretaries who control the many thousands of Navy ensigns and Air Force lieutenants who have the authority to stamp documents classified, and the many more thousands of Government clerks who now casually turn down citizens' requests for information.

Martin Arnold is a New York Times reporter who specializes in press affairs.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
15 February 1975

CIA Did Open Mail, Fonda Lawyer Says

BY KENNETH REICH
Times Political Writer

An attorney for actress Jane Fonda said Friday he has been informed by the U.S. Justice Department that the Central Intelligence Agency is now ready to admit in a paper to be filed in U.S. District Court here that it opened mail arriving for Miss Fonda from abroad.

Leonard Weinglass, the attorney, said he had been told by Ed Christianbury, a Justice Department attorney in Washington, that the CIA would drop its denial, made in a court filing six months ago, that it had involved itself in investigating Miss Fonda.

"This is the first time in a legal proceeding that the CIA has admitted taking action against an individual in the United States," Weinglass declared.

"It's rather curious that they first make a flat denial and then, after the Rockefeller Commission makes a few interviews, the government comes in and withdraws the denial."

The Rockefeller Commission is investigating allegations of illegal domestic activites by the CIA.

Attempts to reach Christianbury for comment were unavailing. A woman identifying herself as his secretary indicated he declined to return calls.

Miss Fonda has a suit pending in U.S. Dist. Judge Malcolm M. Lucas' court here asking the courts to enjoin a variety of government agencies from engaging in surveillance of her activities and asking for monetary damages exceeding $2 million.

The actress, long active in the antiwar movement, remains politically involved in a number of dissident causes.

Weinglass said Miss Fonda's original complaint, filed in 1973, had named the director of the CIA. The CIA, along with other government agencies, subsequently admitted keeping files on her, but it denied it had actually initiated the collection of any information.

However, Weinglass, said, Christianbury telephoned him this week to say that the CIA denial was in error.

"Christianbury acknowledged that they had opened mail coming in to Jane Fonda from overseas," Weinglass said. "That would have been in violation of the law."

GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1975

Robert Karen

Fighting the Tide of Torture

In the winter of 1945 in northern Italy, the Gestapo picked up a young Italian resistance worker and tortured her for 45 days. Convinced that giving them information of any kind would make her immediately dispensable, she never talked and in the end was made to type her own death sentence. However, on the day she was to be executed, two men in Gestapo uniforms took her away for some "final questioning." Inexplicably, they left her at a hospital and in two years she was fully recovered.

Today, almost 30 years later, Ginetta Sagan has become one of the major organizers for Amnesty International, the London-based group that "adopts" and fights for the release of political prisoners the world over. Founded in 1961 by a British lawyer, Peter Beneson, Amnesty has 38,000 members in 32 countries and claims responsibility for the release of more than 10,000 political prisoners.

Mr. Karen, former press secretary to New York City Councilman Carter Burden, is now a free-lance writer. This article is adapted from a piece which appeared originally in The Nation.

Sagan became involved with Amnesty International 1967, when the Greek junta took power; it was the first time since the war that repression and torture again touched her life. "I had a lot of friends who were in jail because so many of them had studied in France when I was there. My former professor there had just met Christos Sartzetakis, who is the judge portrayed in the movie Z. They were sending me file after file of prisoners and horrible, horrible stories of torture. I remember one in particular, the dean of a university who was 80 years old and given the *falanga*—tying a person to a table and beating the soles of the feet until they are swollen. So painful, dreadfully painful."

In 1971 Sagan prevailed upon Melina Mercouri and Joan Baez to come to Berkeley for a concert to benefit the Greek relief fund. A crowd of 10,000 attended and Sagan has since proved that direct action to salvage individual lives can generate the kind of personal commitment that seemed to have faded with the anti-war movement. In the three years since that first Berkeley concert, Amnesty's West Coast membership (concentrated in California and Texas) has shot up from 52 to almost 52,000.

Today the San Francisco office at 3618 Sacramento Street has four full-time staff members, including Sagan and Kit Bricca, formerly with the Farm Workers. The region now accounts for about half of Amnesty's 100 U.S. groups, and the leadership understandably believes that similar organizing elsewhere in the country would produce comparable results. Recently Amnesty hired Joel Carlson, a South African civil rights lawyer who was forced to leave his country in 1971, to be full-time national coordinator, an investment which it hopes will lead to the creation of regional offices in Chicago, Denver, Atlanta and some place in Texas.

All this activity for human rights would be a cause for celebration were it not for the historical events which have helped to generate it. In the short time since Ginetta Sagan began organizing for Amnesty, there has been a marked increase in political repression and a severe upswing in the use of torture. In the last few months, Amnesty papers on Chile and North Korea and a worldwide survey called "Report on Torture" have revealed that not only is freedom of speech and association endangered by state action but torture, remarkably similar to the kind the Gestapo practiced in Italy and throughout occupied Europe, seems to be spreading in epidemic proportions across the continents.

"When talking with the victims of torture today, I have a sense of *deja vu*," says Sagan. "The same thing—interrogation, beating, fear, insult, degradation. They really want to destroy you as a human being, to reduce you to the level of a groveling animal."

The data Amnesty has gathered over the past 10 years on the detention policies of some 62 nations indicate that torture is a perennial form of political oppression.

It would be impossible to enumerate all the methods now in use. Old standbys from near drowning and suffocation to pulling out the fingernails are still prominent. But "Report on Torture" also enumerates modern developments. The omnipresent electric shock is probably the key contribution of advanced technology. Psychological and manipulative techniques, such as sensory deprivation, isolation, exhaustion, degradation and threats (of permanent injury, disease, economic retaliation, or harm to one's family) are more widely and sometimes more cleverly applied. Sagan relates that in Brazil and the Soviet Union the secret police have been known to torture people while showing slides of members of their families, creating an association of family with pain.

Perhaps the most important new weapons available to modern torture are the scores of drugs which terrify and melt the will of their victims. None of these drugs can force anyone to reveal what he has the courage to withhold; most, if the victim survives, will have no lasting physiological effects, though the emotional damage is frequently severe and permanent; and virtually all have some legitimate medical use. But the fears of the victim, the threatening atmosphere and the extremely unpleasant physical sensations make these medicines a potent form of terror.

While a sadist is the most likely candidate for a career in interrogation, recent clinical tests seem to demonstrate that many people, normally indisposed to cruelty, will nonetheless administer pain if told to do so by someone in authority. That is a crucial point when one considers the scores of doctors and nurses—some of whom are presumably not sadists—who, in the ultimate perversion of their professional roles, show up at secret police villas to act as consultants and practitioners of the black mechanics of interrogation. "Torture could not take place without the cooperation of physicians," says Sagan. "It is the doctor who examines the prisoner before interrogation, it is the doctor who says how far they can go, it is the doctor who treats the victim of torture and who remains silent."

It must be understood that torture is a very *inefficient* means of gathering information and for the most part is not used for that purpose. That fact is reflected in the black humor of South Vietnamese interrogators, who have been heard to say, "If they're not guilty, torture them until they are!" Torture is a weapon, widely perceived as a proper response to domestic or colonial insurrection, and sometimes openly advocated by counter-insurgency strategists. All told, according to the Amnesty report, at least 30 nations use torture as an administrative routine and have given free rein to men and women who achieve personal gratification from the destruction of other human beings. These torture states share information, educate torture trainees from less developed police states, and have even produced films on the subject (one found in the secret police headquarters in Portugal was made in part to instruct prison doctors).

Unfortunately, many victims of torture, including Sagan, have been unwilling to discuss their ordeals. Torture victims are often deeply ashamed of what has been done to them and what they have been made to do. Many have lasting and often disastrous emotional disorders.

"I wasn't able to talk about it for many years because of the humiliation and the degradation that they forced on me," says Sagan. "That is why I feel strongly that the Amnesty project of help to care for the victims of torture and to rehabilitate them psychologically is an urgent and crucial one. I wouldn't want anyone to go through years without being able to share, to talk, and to be assured that we are human beings still. It is hard for any person to think himself still human after they strap you to a table, after they insult you, and after they force on you these unspeakable, *unspeakable*, unspeakable, unspeakable actions."

Sex, degradation and power form a special weave in the torturer's mentality. An obsession with excrement and urine and forcing prisoners to smear themselves is common. So is rape and demeaning sexual positions.

What Amnesty offers the political prisoner and the victim of torture is the promise that his case will not be forgotten. Its basic organizational unit, the "group," is responsible for three

prisoners of conscience—one from the Eastern bloc, one from the West, and one from a nonaligned nation. This careful policy of neutrality has been a key to Amnesty's success, and with political oppression so widespread, the meticulous nonpartisanship is unfortunately easy to maintain.

Letters on behalf of adopted prisoners are sent to the United Nations and other international bodies, to the press, and to the responsible government. Amnesty International sends observers to trials of those accused of political crimes and, when possible, visits prisons and interviews prisoners and ex-prisoners.

Its success is a testament to the power of public opinion. And yet, within and without the responsible state, public opinion is a difficult weapon to mobilize. "I can understand the fear," says Sagan. "Anything that threatens the status quo or the fragility of our day-to-day existence is better pushed back into the unconscious. It is much more comfortable to go on with our daily lives without worrying about the man in Czechoslovakia who has been picked up, who has lost his job, who is being held some place incommunicado. But the only way to break the power of the secret police is if enough people speak up."

Can it happen here? Amnesty does have 30 prisoners of conscience in the United States, most of them members of ethnic minorities who were caught in situations where racial and/or political prejudice was evident in the arrest, conviction or sentencing. It has also described numerous instances of police and prison brutality. But regarding torture, it has concluded: "It would be incorrect to suggest that there is an administrative practice of torture by the law-enforcement authorities of the United States within their own domestic jurisdiction."

Still, there is reason to be concerned about the U.S. position. As a major supplier of funds and hardware for foreign military and secret police, the country bears a responsibility for how these resources are used. Our government has never officially condemned the practice of torture in Brazil, although there is no disputing its prevalence, and there is a persistent suspicion, bluntly portrayed in the movie "State of Siege," that the United States provides the training for many of Latin America's novice interrogators. To bring the issue even closer to home there have been widespread reports, abundantly documented by the confessions of repentant GIs, of direct involvement of American troops in the torture of Vietnamese.

The very personal quality of caring which Amnesty offers is evident in the title of a new quarterly magazine, Matchbox, which is being published by the West Coast office. The name derives from an incident during Sagan's imprisonment by the Gestapo. A few nights after she had been forced to watch a comrade tortured to death, one of her jailers began cursing her and then kicked open the door to her cell and threw in a loaf of bread. "I was hungry, I wanted to eat, but at the same time the thought crossed my mind that perhaps it was poisoned. But when I picked it up and started eating, I chewed on something hard. It was a little matchbox. There were matches inside and a piece of paper saying: *'Coraggio. Lavoriamo per te.'* Take courage, we are working for you."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
18 February 1975

Weatherman links traced to Cuba, Hanoi

Washington

Leaders of the militant Weatherman group were trained in Cuba and in North Vietnam in guerrilla warfare tactics, including use of sophisticated military weapons, according to congressional testimony released here.

The allegation of a connection between the radical organization and the Cubans and North Vietnamese was made in a report released by the Senate internal-security subcommittee which interivewed a former member of the Weatherman underground.

The witness, Larry Grathwohl, a onetime informer for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, also told the panel that one member of the Weatherman group, Naomi Jaffe, had told him that in addition to Cuba she had been in North Vietnam, where she had been trained to use an anti-aircraft gun.

Mr. Grathwohl said the the Weatherman leaders told him that the Cubans and the Vietnamese were more concerned with propaganda and keeping the radical movement alive in the United States than with actively promoting a revolution.

Eastern Europe

New Statesman 14 February 1975

Dev Murarka

The Plight of Russia's Dissidents

The fragmentation and destruction of a small world is never an ennobling sight. When this happens due to avoidable mistakes, it is all the more tragic. That this has been happening to the world of Soviet dissidence has been obvious for the past couple of years. Now the process is accelerating and the last fortnight has revealed, as never before, the serious plight and agony in which the Soviet dissidents now find themselves. The situation is leading to self-questioning and doubts about the whole approach to dissidence which came to be adopted during the past decade. More significantly, some of the dissidents themselves are now questioning the motives of a noisy claque of dissidentologists who have operated in their name abroad and who bear no small responsibility for their destruction.

The central issue before dissidents now is whether they continue to believe and work on the basis that reforms and change can be thrust down the throats of the Soviet leaders by the American Congress and Administration and Western press propaganda, or whether they themselves have to do something as well beside issuing statements to the Western press at the drop of a hat. The American Trade Bill episode is only the latest in a chain of experiences which have convinced many of them that far from bringing deliverance, the Western linkage has brought them ruin.

It may indeed prove to be the most important of all fall-outs from the rejection of the Trade Bill, with its emigration clause, by the Soviet authorities. Surprisingly, this aspect of the tangled story of the Trade Bill seems to have received the least attention. The pundits have been far too busy agonising about whether the American monopolies would be able to make huge profits out of trade with the Soviet Union or not. Is it not amazing, come to think of it, that the original purpose of the Jackson amendment has been thoroughly lost sight of that only its intended beneficiaries, now its victims, the dissidents, remember it at all?

That it has become a serious problem for the dissidents was made clear in a courageous statement by the dissident historian Roy Medvedev, who roundly denounced the antics of Senator Henry Jackson. His acid critique of Jackson called on the American public to judge the motives of their politicians and decide to what degree the dramatic fate of the Soviet Jews really disturbed Senator Jackson and to what extent he made use of the tragedy of tens of thousands of Jews in the Soviet Union to aid his personal career and his *doubtful political speculations*'. He accused the Senator of being motivated by a desire to impose humiliating conditions upon the Soviet regime, thus ruining a compromise which had been made possible over a long period and with much difficulty.

The essence of Medvedev's argument is that any advance in political reforms in the Soviet Union can only come through a dialogue with the Soviet authorities and not through external pressure, which only backfires in the end and halts any meaningful breakthroughs. At the core is Medvedev's belief that the Soviet leaders and bureaucracy are not a monolithic bloc impervious to progress and standing firm against change. In his view, they are approachable and susceptible to persuasion in the matter of changes. Medvedev himself recognises that it is an extremely slow process and the changes may come too slowly for some. But, he seems to ask, is there any viable alternative to it? Besides, in his view, there are different sections of the leadership and the bureaucracy which can provide an internal pressure group against the no-changers. But to put visible, overwhelming outside pressure closes all ranks and makes change much more difficult. Whether the thesis is entirely correct or not, and many dissidents disagree with it now and have disagreed with it in the past, the significant fact is that more dissidents and sympathisers are now listening to Medvedev's ideas and some are even admitting that he has proved to be right.

Medvedev's thesis is not a new one. Nearly two years ago, he warned of the harm done to the dissident cause by its connections with the Western press and some of its backers abroad. At the time, he refrained from questioning the motives of such supporters. But his frontal attack on Jackson's motives is intended to have a wider implication since it is not only Jackson who has waxed eloquent and fat on the Jewish and dissident theme. Dissidentology, in fact, has become a well-established minor and self-supporting industry in the West, with little relevance or benefit to the dissident cause, as distinct from individual dissidents. Medvedev himself will be the last one to deny that publicity abroad has some merit.

However, he also feels strongly that its merit is increasingly outweighed by the disadvantages it brings, the worst being the discredit it brings to the dissident cause in the eyes of the Soviet common people, who are often unable to distinguish between such publicity and collaboration with foreign enemies. This is the crucial dissident dilemma now. How can the dissidents hope to make changes if they have no support or credibility with the public at home? Some of them now go even further and ask themselves: what have we really done to rally support, leave aside deserving it? Indeed, it is becoming a new source of strong resentment for many of them that some of their potential leaders have been destroyed through being turned into sacred cows by the Western dissidentologists. To be sure, they are very profitable cows for the dissidentologists themselves, but it brings no profit to the dissidents here and much pain and humiliation. It is also resented that through their extensive control and influence over the publicity media the dissidentologists prevent any balanced picture of the problems of dissidence being presented, those attempting to do so being silenced by ridicule, abuse, slander and other means. Thus a gross misrepresentation of the dissident reality is taking place, in which some established figures are proclaimed heroes, others are made out to be fools, knaves or non-existent because the armchair revolutionaries in Washington, Paris or London know the dissidents' problems better than the dissidents themselves.

It is significant, too, that this time only a feeble rejoinder to Medvedev's statement has come from Dr Andrei Sakharov, the other distinguished dissident still in Moscow. Two years ago Medvedev had warned that to involve the American Administration in legislation about emigration or other internal Soviet issues, as Dr Sakharov and his associates were urging, would prove to be disastrous. Indeed, Mr Sakharov even called upon the American senator to make these conditions tougher. Now even Dr Sakharov has avoided any praise for Senator Jackson and merely declared that the Congress and the US President should continue on their path of 'principled politics'.

Many dissidents are also coming round to think that the whole emphasis put on emigration in recent years is fundamentally wrong. Ultimately, emigration is a denial of and escape from dissidence, not its affirmation.

A well-known dissident, mathematician and professor, Igor Shaferevich, who is a contributor to a Solzhenitsyn anthology of dissident writings, has implied that such emigration on the part of dissidents was a sign of weakness, their inability to withstand pressure and suffering. Naturally, such a charge is resented and it has brought a stinging reply from Yuli Daniel, still here, and a close friend of Andrei Sinyavsky, the literary critic, who has emigrated to Paris. Daniel argued that those writers and artists who have left for the West 'can work for the future and in the future their works will come back to the fatherland'. This may be so, but in the eyes of many dissidents remaining behind the emigrants are becoming irrelevant to their struggle none the less.

Such dissensions, tearing the fabric of dissidence apart, are, unfortunately, likely to grow even more as the movement weakens and falls apart. There is no sign of any new source of vitality yet. If the dissidents do survive, it would be only through self-renewal and a more realistic reappraisal of their means as well as goals. Such change will not be painless and im-

mediate results will be practically invisible. But unless it can be done the dissidents, instead of the state, will wither away. Equally, somehow they will have to discard the cross of dissidentologists which is proving fatally heavy for the health of dissidence to bear.

Moscow

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 February 1975

Jane Fonda speaks frankly in Moscow

By Dev Murarka
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Jane Fonda, the political activist actress, is in the Soviet Union making a film. And those who have been following her career are watching to see how she will react to her stay here.

Miss Fonda is taking part in the first Soviet-American co-production of a film based on the classic tale by Maurice Maeterlinck "The Blue Bird." She plays the princess of night.

Most encounters between radical chics and life as it is in the Soviet Union have been mutually bruising because free-wheeling radicalism makes the Soviets uncomfortable. They are bewildered by non-conformist behavior amidst them, though it is admired from a distance.

For the time being, however, Miss Fonda's views, as she explained them in an interview published Feb. 19 in the Literaturnaya Gazeta, fit in with the Soviet perceptions on such matters.

Her interview was given to Soviet script writer Alexei Kapler who adapted the story for the film. (Mr. Kapler is remembered by many as the man who was sent to a prison camp as a British spy because Stalin's daughter Svetlana fell in love with him. Svetlana now lives in the United States.)

The political undertone of the interview was apparent. "I'm not easily scared," Miss Fonda retorted in response to a question about strong feelings aroused in certain American circles because of her activities against the Vietnam war.

As usual Miss Fonda was elegantly caustic in her comments upon most subjects, ranging from Hollywood to new-wave films. She spared no one, though she took the opportunity to express her thanks "for the assistance which the Soviet people are sending to Vietnam." However, she bluntly pointed out — underlining the political motives behind the fuss being made about her here — that "in the Soviet Union people know more about me as a fighter against the Vietnam war than as a film actress."

She went on to say that of all her films she liked only "Klute" and "They Shoot Horses, Don't They?" which is the one film of Miss Fonda well known in the U.S.S.R. "Klute" could never pass the official prudery of the censors which stifles the arts here, particularly the stage and the screen.

But the welcome being given to Miss Fonda is more out of political admiration for her than anything else. This is evident from the comments by Mr. Kapler which precede the interview in which she is described as a "well-known American actress and political personality."

The title of the interview is "Jane Fonda — anti-star."

On Hollywood Miss Fonda said: "At present in Hollywood it is becoming increasingly difficult to make films in which it would be possible to convey something important."

Expressing her philosophy of films, Miss Fonda explained to the Soviet readers that a work of art should not be meant only for film critics and intellectuals. She went on to claim that "the country where very interesting films are being made at present is Cuba."

Ideology sits heavily on the Soviet arts, though it is done in the name of Marxism. Miss Fonda has yet to realize perhaps that while Marxist critiques of bourgeois art are illuminating, Marxist practices in the arts are with few exceptions boring.

These few exceptions are found mostly in the category of dissident or near dissident art, which is only reluctantly given recognition, as was the case with the film "Rublev." Directed by Andrei Tarkovsky, the film about Russia's most famous icon artist received international acclaim at the 1969 Cannes Film Festival.

Newsweek, March 3, 1975

THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING

A swarm of young Soviet diplomats has invaded Capitol Hill recently, but the well-schooled and intellectual Russians are making no effort to gather information. Instead they are working to build friendly ties with young Congressional staff members, those who can be expected to stay and move up into key committee posts. American intelligence chiefs are expressing concern about the development, mainly because of the fact that Soviet diplomatic personnel often double as members of Russian intelligence.

Western Europe

ATLANTIC MONTHLY
FEBRUARY 1975

AMERICA'S MEDITERRANEAN BUNGLE

Cyprus, like Israel, Czechoslovakia, and Laos, is one of those small spots on the map whose global importance far exceeds their size. Thus the ouster last July of Archbishop Makarios, the president of the island state, was an incident of international significance. The *coup d'état,* staged by surrogates of the military regime that then ruled Greece, touched off a complex crisis whose repercussions are bound to ripple beyond the Mediterranean for some time to come. Not long ago, when I suggested to an American official that the United States may have been scarred by the crisis, he replied: "The wounds have to heal before we are scarred."

The coup triggered a traumatic sequence of events. Turkey, which had long sought to control Cyprus, used the fall of Makarios as a pretext to invade the island, thereby upsetting the fragile balance between its Greek and Turkish communities and heightening the prospect of chronic religious and ethnic tensions similar to those that plague Ulster. Although Greece and Turkey narrowly averted a direct conflict, the episode exacerbated traditional animosities between them which are likely to explode over other issues, such as their rival claims to Aegean oil deposits. Dismayed by the U.S. role in the affair, the civilian Greek government that supplanted the junta withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, leaving a gap in the alliance's southern defenses, where the Soviet Union has been strengthening its forces.

Moreover, the hostility against the United States that has surfaced in both Greece and Turkey makes it unlikely that either country will cooperate in American efforts to supply Israel if another war erupts in the Middle East. In Washington, meanwhile, congressional displeasure with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's handling of the situation has diluted his authority on Capitol Hill and revealed the extent to which he and President Ford differ in their attitudes toward the legislature on foreign policy matters.

Kissinger holds a large measure of responsibility for the crisis. He deliberately chose to disregard warnings that the Greek dictatorship was plotting to topple Makarios, and, rejecting the advice of State Department and Pentagon specialists, he did nothing to minimize the impact of the coup after it had occurred. There is no doubt that he was preoccupied at the time by the impeachment proceedings then building up against President Nixon. But his refusal to bring pressure to bear on the Greek generals was mainly motivated by his reluctance to ruffle them and, in the process, court the risk of jeopardizing U.S. and NATO military installations in Greece. In that respect his conduct was consistent with the policy pursued by the United States in the area since the end of World War II.

Washington's approach to the region through the years had essentially been founded on an estimate of Greece's strategic value in the struggle against communism and in the quest for equilibrium in the Middle East. The primary American objective in Greece was the preservation of U.S. and NATO bases and other facilities there—even if this meant backing autocratic, unpopular, and inept Greek regimes. During the 1950s, therefore, American diplomatic, military, and intelligence representatives in Greece supported right-wing Greek political figures who promised to maintain the status quo. Presidents Johnson and Nixon carried forth the same line by aiding the egregious dictatorship that ran the country from 1967 until last summer. Ironically, however, this policy contributed decisively to the very instability it was supposed to prevent.

The American tendency to support Greek conservatives goes back to the days of the Communist rebellion, when security was a key consideration. The United States should logically have encouraged the development of democratic institutions after the insurgency waned in the late 1940s, but American strategists were turned in the opposite direction by two events: the Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia, and the outbreak of the Korean War. Washington hastily pushed Greece into NATO, and, along with this determination to incorporate Greece into the U.S. orbit, the United States also moved to ensure that the Greek government would respond to American dictates. In other words, the realities of Greek political life were subordinated to broader American imperatives in the Cold War.

The American who set the pattern for this approach was John Peurifoy, the U.S. ambassador in Athens during the early 1950s. A dynamic diplomat, dedicated to the notion that American intervention in Greece's internal affairs was salutary, Peurifoy behaved more like a viceroy than an emissary. Seeking a solid Greek personage to manage the government, he persuaded Marshal Alexander Papagos to form a political party. With Central Intelligence Agency operatives acting as his intermediaries, he encouraged numbers of Greek politicians to join the new movement, in several instances offering them rewards to do so. When Papagos failed to make much headway, Peurifoy bluntly threatened to curb U.S. aid unless Greece's electoral procedures were changed from a proportional to a plurality system. In the 1952 election, Papagos' party managed to gain control of Parliament even though it won fewer than half of the votes that were cast throughout the country.

Obsessed with keeping Greece on an anti-Communist track, American officials supervised their Greek counterparts or indirectly influenced their activities. An American economic expert attended meetings of the Greek Cabinet, and U.S. military advisers were attached to Greek army units, most of whose commanders had been trained in the United States. The CIA was particularly close to the Greek establishment. Its agents, many of whom were of Greek origin and spoke the language fluently, created special bonds with the Greek leaders. And Queen Frederika was fond of Allen Dulles, then the CIA director, so the agency carried unusual weight in the palace. It also exercised extraordinary authority through the Greek Central Intelligence Service (K.Y.P.), which it had organized and continued to subsidize. At one point during the 1950s, a former CIA man recalled, the agency was financing all but two of Athens' sixteen newspapers.

It would be unfair to assume that

most Greeks, at least during that period, resented American patronage. But, as they saw it, this link imposed upon the United States the obligation to further Greek interests; they would later feel disappointed, and even betrayed, when Washington abandoned them to a dictatorship or rejected their position on the sensitive Cyprus issue.

By the early 1960s, the Greek political scene was fragmenting as new forces, mirroring changes in the economic and social landscape, began to emerge. Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, who had governed for eight years and was responsible for much of the economic progress, finally clashed with the royal family and voluntarily exiled himself to Paris. Elections in 1964 swept in George Papandreou and his brilliant, erratic son, Andreas, a former American citizen who had taught economics at the University of California. The liberal Papandreous, who were enormously popular in the new climate, soon became the focal point of Greek and U.S. intrigues.

The Kennedy Administration, which believed that reform was the best defense against communism, tried to tilt toward the Papandreous. But President Kennedy's ambassador in Athens could not control the CIA and military advisers in his mission, and they continued to support their own protégés. A bitter dispute arose, for example, when Andreas Papandreou attempted to break the tight liaison between the CIA and the K.Y.P. He was afterward accused of plotting to take over the government, and although there was no hard evidence against him, King Constantine and his conservative sympathizers, helped by the CIA and American military men, used the allegations for political purposes. They spread rumors against Andreas, and by paying politicians to quit his father's party, managed to bring down the Papandreou Cabinet. But nobody else could form a durable government. The king considered setting up a right-wing regime under his own aegis, but was warned that the United States would not tolerate an unconstitutional bid for power. So new elections were scheduled for May, 1967. They never took place.

As the elections drew near, the CIA learned that the king and a group of generals were planning a *coup d'état* to forestall the Papandreous, who seemed certain to win. Anxious to "save democracy," the CIA station in Athens proposed that the elections be rigged to favor the conservatives and thereby remove the pretext for the coup. But the suggestion aroused little enthusiasm, either in the U.S. mission or in Washington. The American military advisers in Greece welcomed the rise to power of their Greek colleagues. The U.S. ambassador, Phillips Talbot, opposed the scheme on principle, and he was supported by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who feared that it might backfire. Thus the American representatives in Athens waited for the coup, while Talbot, in a series of audiences with the king, expressed the hope that it would be gentle.

To everyone's surprise, however, the king and his generals were preempted by an obscure colonel, George Papadopoulos. Talbot cabled Washington, decrying "the rape of Greek democracy," and pleaded for a denunciation of the coup by the State Department. But Rusk ruled against it, instead issuing a watery statement voicing hope that the junta "will make every effort to reestablish democratic institutions." His judgment was applauded by the Pentagon, which argued that Papadopoulos might close U.S. and NATO bases if put under pressure. As a gesture to Congress, the Johnson Administration stopped sending tanks, aircraft, and other heavy equipment to Papadopoulos, but continued to give him rifles, ammunition, jeeps, spare parts, and the other matériel he needed to maintain internal security. Washington hoped that the king might somehow restore democracy. But that dream evaporated in December, 1967, when the king failed in an abortive countercoup and went into exile.

After that, the Johnson Administration began to fantasize that Papadopoulos would return to constitutional government, and by way of placating him, resumed shipments of heavy arms to Greece. But the junta continued to rule with a firm hand. Oddly enough, in light of his later attitude, President Nixon initially adopted a tougher stance toward Papadopoulos. He reimposed the ban on deliveries of heavy military matériel, left the post of ambassador to Athens vacant, and encouraged his aides to criticize the dictatorship. In July, 1969, for example, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird vowed that the partial freeze on military aid "will be continued until progress is made toward more democratic procedures in that country."

But late in 1969, as tensions in the Middle East appeared to intensify, Nixon reassessed his policy toward Greece. He named one of his favorite diplomats, Henry Tasca, ambassador to Athens, and that move signaled a major shift in the U.S. line. Not long after arriving at his post, Tasca eliminated members of his staff considered inimical to the military regime, and he directed his subordinates to portray the junta favorably in dispatches to Washington. Visits by prominent Americans to Greece were to become a conscious ploy filled with deep significance. Despite his earlier avowal that he would not lift the military aid embargo before the rebirth of democracy, Laird appeared in Athens following the full resumption of arms shipments in September, 1970; his arrival coincided with a U.S. pronouncement that "the trend toward constitutional order is established" in Greece. And when Vice President Agnew traveled to Greece to see his family's village, it appeared that his trip was designed to assert U.S. backing for the junta.

By the summer of 1973, Tasca's illusory confidence in Papadopoulos had faded. In July, on the eve of a rigged referendum contrived to confirm the dictatorship, he warned Papadopoulos that U.S. public opinion demanded a free election. In November, when the regime collapsed, he urged Washington to bring back former Prime Minister Caramanlis. But Nixon personally ordered him to stick by General Demetrios Ioannides, the military police chief who had taken over the government, and Kissinger reportedly advised him against "interference" in Greece's internal affairs. Tasca obeyed, even though it was clear by early 1974 that Ioannides was doomed because of his own incompetence, and that his downfall would rebound against the United States. Among others, Democratic Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota foresaw this on a trip to Athens in January. "The present government cannot long endure," he wrote. "Marked by inexperience, its members appear without requisite talents for extricating the country from its political and economic chaos. . . . Damage has already occurred to American interests in Greece and more will occur before the present situation ends." The inevitable upheaval was to be initiated by the Cyprus problem.

The tiny island of Cyprus, which had gained independence from Britain in 1960, presented one of those perennial dilemmas that age statesmen prematurely. Had it been located elsewhere, its 520,000 Greek Cypriots and 120,000 Turkish Cypriots might have learned to coexist or integrate. But situated as it is, it became a source of conflict between Greece and Turkey, both of which felt compelled to protect their respective ethnic groups. Makarios, who more or less held the island together, pleased neither the Greek

junta nor the Turkish government. The Turks disliked him because they suspected, with good reason, that his long-range aim was to wipe out the Turkish Cypriot community by gradually excluding it from the island's economic development. The Greek generals detested him because, by stalling for time, he intended to postpone forever their cherished dream of aligning Cyprus with Greece in *enosis,* or union. Washington also distrusted him, for he had traveled to Moscow and Peking, and he tolerated the large but rather mild Cypriot Communist party. It was feared that he might one day allow the Soviet Union to build bases on the island. Some State Department and Pentagon elements, apparently forgetting that he permitted the CIA to operate monitoring stations on Cyprus, called him the "Castro of the Mediterranean."

But America's principal objective in regard to Cyprus was to prevent it from poisoning relations between Greece and Turkey, both members of NATO. American attempts to fulfill that goal, however, merely strained U.S. ties with its two allies. For example, an idea for partition conceived by Dean Acheson was viewed by Greece as a tricky device to give a part of the island to Turkey. Similarly, President Johnson infuriated the Turks when, by threatening to cut off their aid, he blocked their plans to invade Cyprus. Consequently, Kissinger sought to stay out of the problem. During a brief visit to Nicosia in the spring of 1974, he facetiously remarked to local reporters that, despite his diplomatic triumphs in Vietnam and the Middle East, he would never get caught in the Cyprus tangle. But if he had been reading CIA reports from Athens, as he presumably was, Kissinger must have known that a Cyprus crisis was brewing and the United States might be drawn into it.

Papadopoulos had tried at least four times to oust Makarios, and Ioannides was determined to succeed where his predecessor had failed. Soon after seizing power, he set up a branch of his junta in Cyprus under the Cypriot National Guard commander, General George Denizis, and it coordinated activities with a Greek army contingent assigned to the island. Ioannides also recruited the fanatical remnants of the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants, now known as EOKA-B, which had originally been created by the guerrilla chief George Grivas to fight the British. The assault against Makarios was timed for late April, but Ioannides delayed it because a dispute had flared up between Greece and Turkey over oil exploration rights in the Aegean Sea. By mid-spring, details of the plot were reaching Washington from the U.S. mission in Athens, and the first authoritative information on it emerged in late June, when Ioannides communicated the plan to a CIA contact in an apparent effort to sound out U.S. reaction.

The State Department immediately instructed Tasca to tell Ioannides that the United States strongly opposed the coup. The envoy declined to deliver the message personally, on the grounds that, as he later said, "it was not the ambassador's job to make diplomatic demarches to a cop." But he assured Washington that Ioannides had received the word. The State Department was unconvinced, however. Another message went out to Tasca, and the same reply came back. Still Washington doubted that Tasca, who had covered up for the junta in the past, was doing his job. At that stage, it seems to me, Kissinger might have dispatched a special emissary to Athens to discourage Ioannides more forcefully. Not only did he do nothing, but some weeks later he denied having had advance knowledge of the coup, saying that information on the affair "was not exactly lying on the street."

Makarios, who had watched the conspiracy against himself build up, now calculated that he might discourage Ioannides by making the plot public. On July 2, he wrote to Phaedon Gizikis, the figurehead president of Greece, complaining of the plot and demanding that the junta's agents on Cyprus be recalled to Greece. He published the letter a few days later, along with a plan of the coup. But his tactic misfired. On July 6, Ioannides ordered his aides to prepare for action and sent General Michael Georgitsis to Cyprus to assume command of the operation. At the same time, the government-controlled Athens press announced that the junta would discuss the Cyprus question over the following weekend. But that report was a smoke screen, contrived to create the impression that the coup was still in the blueprint stage. On July 15, while the conference was supposedly taking place, units on Cyprus loyal to Ioannides attacked the presidential palace in Nicosia. Makarios miraculously escaped to a British air base on the island, and was flown to London. In his place, Ioannides installed Nicos Sampson, a notorious thug known to have killed several British soldiers and Turkish Cypriots.

In Washington, State Department and Pentagon experts urged Kissinger to denounce the appointment of Sampson and issue a statement, like that put out by the British, asserting that the United States still recognized Makarios. The experts contended, among their other arguments, that the elevation of Sampson would be interpreted by the Turks to signify a virtual takeover of Cyprus by the Greek junta, and would prompt Turkey to invade the island. But Kissinger rebuffed their counsel, partly because he considered Makarios to be "politically dead," and partly because he feared that the alienation of Ioannides might jeopardize U.S. and NATO bases in Greece. Accordingly, a State Department spokesman dealt with the situation in an evenhanded manner. As the experts had predicted, the Turks were alarmed.

"Pray for me"

Bulent Ecevit, then head of the Turkish government, is hardly a belligerent figure. On the contrary, he is a quiet, earnest intellectual who has translated T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound; his dream is to transform Turkey into a sort of Scandinavian-like social democracy. But the nationalistic Turkish army, which had been humiliated by the Cyprus issue in the past, hovered in the wings of his government last summer. Furthermore, Ecevit is enough of a nationalist himself to have been aroused by the Greek junta's thrust on the island. So, within a day after Makarios fell, he ordered the Turkish forces to mobilize for an invasion of Cyprus. To give diplomacy a chance, however, Ecevit flew to London to consult with the British, who, along with Greece and Turkey, had guaranteed the independence of Cyprus in 1960. He presented the British foreign secretary, James Callaghan, with four proposals: that Sampson be removed; that the Greek soldiers involved in the coup be sent home; that Cyprus be given a new federal system respectful of Turkish Cypriot rights; and that negotiations to establish such a system begin immediately.

In the meantime, Kissinger had sent Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco out to calm the crisis. Sisco heard Ecevit's proposals in London. He promised to take them to the Greek junta in Athens and to deliver an answer to Ecevit later in the week. But in Athens, all that Sisco could obtain was an offer by Ioannides to replace rather than remove the Greek troops on Cyprus. When he carried this response to Ankara on the afternoon of July 19, Ecevit predictably rejected it. Sisco then went back to Athens to persuade the Greeks to do better. They refused, and he returned to Ankara that night to plead with Ecevit for

more time. Kissinger also had a dozen telephone conversations with Ecevit, but to no avail. The Turks would not be deterred unless Greece made concessions, and the Greek junta, which considered the Turkish threat a bluff, believed that Kissinger could stop Turkey just as Lyndon Johnson had. Tasca, desperate to prevent the Turkish invasion, appealed to the Pentagon to deploy the Sixth Fleet in the area. Kissinger intercepted the message and shot back a cable calling the idea "hysterical." Thus the Turks landed on Cyprus on July 20, and their performance was appalling. They sank one of their own ships, dropped their paratroopers off target, and made little progress advancing from their beachhead.

In Athens the next day, Ioannides announced that he would counterattack along the mainland Turkish border, but his commanders, aware of the odds against them, claimed to be unprepared. By now Sisco was back in Greece, trying to arrange a cease-fire in Cyprus. But Ioannides had disappeared, and Sisco dealt with Peter Arapakis, the Navy chief, who agreed to halt hostilities on July 22. The morning after, President Gizikis called in the senior commanders and a group of prominent politicians from rival parties. By evening they had agreed to bring Caramanlis back. "Pray for me," Caramanlis said to reporters as he departed from Paris.

The cease-fire on Cyprus had not ended the crisis, however. In response to U.S. and British appeals, the Turks and Greeks met in Geneva on August 8 to open negotiations on the status of the island. The Turks, perceiving the Greeks to be weak, were really not in a bargaining mood. In the first place, they were clinging to a precarious position on the ground on Cyprus, and they realized that they could not gain at the conference table what they had not won on the battlefield. Secondly, they feared a settlement that might prevent them from launching a fresh military drive. Their apprehensions were further fueled by the fact that the British had reinforced their bases on the island with a battalion of Gurkhas and a squadron of Phantom jets. Therefore, when the Greeks asked for a thirty-six-hour adjournment of the conference to study their proposals for a federal system in Cyprus, the Turks spurned the request, and instead began a new military offensive that gave their forces nearly half the island. Beyond exhorting them to show flexibility, the United States did nothing to stop the Turks. Now it was Turkey's turn to threaten to withdraw from NATO if American pressure were applied, and Kissinger evidently submitted to the tactic.

Congress, which had been too busy during the summer with the impeachment inquiry to react to the Turkish actions, went off like a time bomb in September. Arguing that the Turks had violated the law by using American military aid beyond their own frontiers, Thomas Eagleton in the Senate, and congressmen of Greek origin such as John Brademas of Indiana and Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, pushed to stop U.S. assistance to Turkey. Kissinger unwittingly helped their case by telling congressional groups that "national security" took precedence over the law. President Ford vetoed two bills designed to penalize the Turks, and Kissinger, who had learned about relations with Capitol Hill under Nixon, reportedly urged him to veto a third. But Ford accepted a compromise that, by giving the Turks until early December to accede to a Cyprus settlement, actually constituted a victory for Congress. It also represented a setback for Kissinger, and it indicated, along with other signs, that he may face increasingly hard times with a new legislature eager to make itself heard in the field of foreign affairs. During this legislative episode, a Greek lobby appeared, which expects to mobilize a significant number among the estimated two million Americans of Greek origin to exert pressure on Congress.

By the end of the year, there seemed to be little cause for optimism about the future of the eastern Mediterranean and the impact of the events of last summer on other parts of the world.

- Cyprus, with a third of its population rendered homeless by the Turkish invasion, had become a human shambles and appeared to be degenerating into a cauldron of communal strife.
- Ancient hatreds had been rekindled between Greece and Turkey, and neither could any longer be regarded as a dependable U.S. ally, especially in the event of another Middle East war.
- Fresh strains had been put on the Western alliance, and this would benefit the Russians, who have been seeking since the days of the czars to extend their influence into the region.
- Secretary of State Kissinger's credibility, which is vital to his role as an international diplomatic magician, has been shaken as a result of his own miscalculations.

In *A World Restored,* originally written as his Harvard doctoral dissertation, Kissinger described the challenge that confronted Metternich and Castlereagh in 1821, when the Greeks suffered atrocious reprisals after revolting against their Turkish overlords. European liberals of the period were shocked, and Czar Alexander of Russia planned action against Turkey. But Metternich and Castlereagh opposed intervention that might jeopardize European stability, insisting, as Kissinger put it, that "human considerations were subordinate to maintaining 'the consecrated structure' of Europe." Greek lives were thus sacrificed for the sake of a larger order. But that policy crumbled with the death of Castlereagh. Greece, with British and Russian support, gained its independence soon afterward.

Although history repeats itself imprecisely, Kissinger's conduct during the summer's Mediterranean crisis strikingly resembles the behavior of Metternich and Castlereagh more than a century ago. Concentrating as he did on the "big picture," he overlooked the fact that the whole is the sum of its parts, and that a tiny island like Cyprus can unhinge a larger power balance. He may also have learned that a strategy predicated mainly on the quest for security is, in the end, insecure.

—STANLEY KARNOW

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
11 February 1975

Fascists 'plotting takeover'

Lisbon, February 10

Southern farmworkers have accused Portugal's large landowners of plotting a Fascist coup, according to a document published by the Communist Party today. The document, a report prepared at a mass meeting of Southern farmworkers yesterday, called for the confiscation of all lands and goods belonging to those who carried out social and economic sabotage.

The farmworkers also urged the elaboration of revolutionary laws for the punishment of saboteurs and said all large holdings whose value had increased at the cost of the people's money should be expropriated.

"The great landowners — discomforted by April 25 (last year's coup) — are deeply involved in the preparation of a coup to make the country return to a Fascist-type regime," the document said.

"The economic sabotage carried out by big farmers since April 25 has a generalised character, which presupposes the existence of an authentic unified plan by the great landowners."

The farmworkers said that unless urgent and energetic measures were taken, 1975 would be a year of hunger

WASHINGTON STAR
18 February 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.: And The Azores, Too?

Concerning the developments in Portugal, a few observations:

The Communists in Portugal are organized, the non-Communists are not. Power generally flows into the hands of the organized, as distinguished from the disorganized, party. Alvaro Cunhal, the leader of the Portuguese Communists, spent nearly 20 years in Prague. He had advantages then he did not have during his exile in Zurich. Cunhal was well looked after by his hosts, and he spent his time creating an organization against the day when a successor dictatorship to Salazar's should fall.

WHEN APRIL came, Cunhal was there, ready to plot the subjugation of the Portuguese people. That is the proper term for it, as the polls show that the Portuguese are not an exception to the rule that the human species will not elect a Communist dictatorship if given a choice. The question isn't: Will the Communists win in Portugal at the general election scheduled for April 12? The question is: Will there be a fair general election? The Communists will not abide by a fair election, any more than Lenin did. Like him, they will simply dissolve the general assembly — in this case the rump parliament set up by the military — and proceed with communization.

What should we do about it? Anything? My guess is that the CIA is too intimidated these days to do anything. How can it do something to help the Portuguese resist enslavement by the Communists, when to do so would involve the risk of antagonizing America's new isolationists?

JAMES BURNHAM, collating the reports of informed journals and commentators in Europe, writes that Moscow is sending sums in excess of $10 million per month to Portugal. And why indeed not? At that rate even over a period of one year you are spending less than a single submarine costs you. But the tactical and strategic value to the Soviet Union of Portugal is worth perhaps 1,000 submarines.

It is a pity that, during the SALT talks when Henry Kissinger and Leonid Brezhnev were balancing off permissible inventories of missiles and submarines and what not, we did not think to include countries. It would have been interesting to see what would have happened if we had insisted that the Soviet Union would have to limit itself to its current quota of slave-satellites. But one supposes that that would have busted up the negotiations.

As to the future, what are we going to do if the Communists take power, which appears likelier than not at this moment? They would, of course, instantly withdraw Portugal from NATO, and boot the United States out of the Azores. Should we accept Cunhal's orders, and abandon our bases in the Azores? Portugal was admitted into NATO in the '40s not because the European NATO powers loved Salazar, and certainly not as a reward for Portugal's neutrality during the war. Portugal was admitted because, on further consideration, the generals gave out the word: We must have the western coastline of the Iberian Peninsula; and, above all, we must have the Azores.

ARE WE prepared, in the event of a coup in Portugal (which is what, in effect, it would be), to dissolve NATO, or to accept it as a military eunuch? Or would we simply say, as we did when France fell, that we do not recognize the legitimacy of the regime? That, indeed, the full powers of NATO are legitimately summoned to resist the colonization of one of their members by the superpower which NATO was sworn to protect Europe against?

It would not be tactful to say it in so many words, but I should think Kissinger could find a suitably elliptical formulation for saying: "You may get away with staging a coup in Lisbon, boys, but if you think the Azores go with it, come on to Washington and talk it over with our admirals."

NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1975

NOVEL ON RED COUP STIRRING ITALIANS

Readers Amused by Caustic Portrayals of Politicians In Anonymous Book

By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Feb. 22—A political novel that cannot yet be bought in any bookstore has already become a political and literary sensation here because of its theme—a Communist take-over in Italy with support from Moscow, Washington and the Vatican—and because of the mystery surrounding its author, "Anonymous."

The title of this book of fiction, which uses actual political figures as characters, is "Berlinguer and the Professor." The first of the title characters is Enrico Berlinguer, the nobleman from Sardinia who is chief of the Italian Communist party. "The professor" is former Premier Amintore Fanfani, leader of the Christian Democratic party.

In the novel no fewer than 27 leading Christian Democrats die in savage infighting among their party's factions before the Communists consolidate their power.

Guessing the Author

Rizzoli, the Milan publishing house, has announced that "Berlinguer and the Professor" will be on sale in a week. But sets of galley proofs and advance copies of the 135-page novel have been circulating for weeks, and Italians who have read the book are chuckling over the sarcastic portrayals of some of the nation's best-known figures and are trying to guess who wrote the book.

The politician who has been suggested most often as the author is former Premier Giulio Andreotti. Mr. Andreotti, who is Budget Minister in the present Government, is the author of works on 19th-century and 20th-century history and has a caustic wit that is not typical of Italian politicians. He also heads a Christian Democratic faction opposed to Mr. Fanfani.

Mr. Andreotti has publicly denied authorship of the book, which promises to become a best seller.

Killed by a 'Cardinal'

In the fictitious events that lead to a Communist take-over, Mr. Andreotti is pictured as seeking refuge in the Vatican, but he is killed by a false cardinal whose hand he "naively" kisses.

Another former Premier, Emilio Colombo, is cast as an exile who is shot down by a hired assassin in Brussels. The present Premier, Aldo Moro, is depicted as escaping the massacre of feuding Christian Democrats with no more than a facial scar from a knifing.

Mayhem ends when Mr. Berlinguer and Mr. Fanfani reach a deal in which the Communist becomes chief of a new authoritarian regime and the Christian Democrat is proclaimed nominal president but retires to a convent. A "Pope John XXIV" blesses both leaders.

The idea clearly behind the farcical fiction is that continued disunity among Christian Democrats, Italy's largest party, would inevitably bring the Communists to power.

Communists Seek Power

The Communist party, Italy's second largest party, has for years offered to become an ally of the Christian Democrats in governing the nation.

Whoever wrote "Berlinguer and the Professor" is surely a member of the Italian establishment, probably a Christian Democrat and no friend of Mr. Fanfani.

The volume is so replete with "in" jokes and detail familiar only in Italian politics that one can hardly imagine translations into other languages.

In one scene, the Italian Government, still controlled by the Christian Democrats, is entertaining the visiting President of the United States in Rome. But the Communists are already so strong that they can dictate what the guest is to be served at a state banquet—spaghetti and sausages. The name of the American President just before the fictional 1980 coup in Italy is Henry Kissinger.

Near East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 February 1975

New chill divides India and U.S.

By Razia Ismail
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor
New Delhi

Whether or not spring comes to America and India in its normal annual season, relations between the two nations seem in for another cold spell.

Washington's decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan has in one stroke frozen New Delhi's attitude toward both the United States and Pakistan into one of stiff formality, which will take time and effort to thaw out again.

New Delhi's reaction to Pakistan Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's arms-seeking visit to America was adverse from the outset. The move was seen as contradictory to the amicable tone of the 1972 Simla agreement signed by Mr. Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to normalize ties weakened by decades of periodic war and suspicion.

New Delhi's adverse reaction to initial reports that President Ford might lift the arms embargo was seen by some as an irrational flap over an imagined threat. But threat or not, India deeply opposes a revival of the doctrine that arms supply should be the basis for a "balance" in the subcontinent.

Reports now reaching here cite the plea by Undersecretary of State Joseph J. Sisco that new weapons to Pakistan are necessary to counterbalance India's nuclear test of last year.

This is taken to indicate that the U.S. does not really believe that India will limit its nuclear energy to peaceful purposes. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had succeeded in leaving a different impression when he visited New Delhi a few months ago and said, "We take seriously India's affirmation that it has no intention to develop nuclear weapons."

Although Washington's latest move is unwelcome, this does not mean it was unexpected. A clear hint came last week when Indian Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan had told Parliament he might have to defer plans to visit Washington for the India-U.S. Joint Commission talks scheduled early in March.

Informed sources also say, however, that New Delhi had hoped the arms supply issue might be discussed in Washington by Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Chavan before any decision was taken.

The fact that the U.S. would not delay its decision for a few weeks until after the scheduled India-U.S. talks, or until after the arrival in New Delhi of new American Ambassador William B. Saxbe, is seen as a clear indication of where U.S. priorities lie.

Meanwhile, Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko landed here Monday for talks with Indian leaders. His visit was planned as a goodwill trip two months ago, but now assumes added significance.

The informal comment in government circles here is that Moscow has always been "very friendly and understanding" about India's defense needs. The steady flow of Chinese arms to Pakistan as well as the new U.S. arms decision will doubtless figure in Mr. Grechko's talks agenda.

Greater Soviet support for India's growing defense production capability may be one outcome of the series of events. But this should not surprise anyone in Washington.

The tragicomic tailpiece to the whole episode is Ambassador Saxbe's failure to arrive in New Delhi on schedule. The American Embassy here first said he was ill in Bangkok, but Mr. Saxbe himself scuttled that excuse by claiming perfect health. He will hardly be able to make that claim about India-American relations, at least for some time.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 February 1975

Why arm Pakistan?

Washington's decision to lift its 10-year arms embargo against Pakistan undoubtedly was a difficult one. It takes little imagination to perceive the danger inherent in an unrestrained arms build-up on the Indian subcontinent, a region bristling with animosities and conflicts.

On the face of it it is utter folly to fuel these conflicts by pouring in more and more weaponry. Indeed, the worldwide trend of escalating arms sales presents dangers that ought to be reckoned with at every point.

But there are no simple solutions to the complex problem of security, and the lifting of the ban on United States arms to Pakistan must be seen within the large context of what is happening next door in India and all around the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. India has a massive, sophisticated military arsenal built up by the Soviet Union. Even now a high-powered Russian mission, including Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, is in New Delhi talking arms supply.

In recent months, too, India has moved vigorously to enhance its dominant political and strategic position. It has consolidated its hold in Sikkim and, most recently, in Kashmir. And, despite its reassurances, it has exploded a nuclear device that leaves no doubt it now has the capability of building an atomic bomb.

None of this is to suggest that India has aggressive intentions or designs on its neighbors. But, from his vantage point in Islamabad, it is understandable why President Bhutto is jittery. In the wake of the breakup of Pakistan his foremost concern has been to keep his truncated country together and to build a viable, independent state. His problems are compounded by separatist strife in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, which he suspects is being fueled by the Russians, among others.

It is hence to provide Pakistan with ample weaponry for its security and self-defense that Washington has reversed course. It, too, views a strong, independent Pakistan as essential to keeping the crucial oil flowing through the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.

There should be no question that the supply of arms to Pakistan must be carefully limited. The State Department promises that military sales will be weighed so as not to intensify an arms race in South Asia and that it will not try to change the strategic balance in the region.

All this said, however, it would appear that the change in U.S. arms policy has been most crudely handled. To have the new American envoy to India sitting in Bangkok making odd statements while an announcement about the embargo was imminent seems a strange way to conduct diplomacy.

It would have been more sensible and tactful to let William Saxbe present his credentials in New Delhi and personally explain the impending U.S. decision to Indian leaders. Then an announcement in Washington could have followed.

In any event, it is now to be hoped that Mr. Saxbe is in a position to assure New Delhi that the lifting of the arms embargo will not be detrimental to its interests in the region or to U.S.-Indian relations.

Africa

LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 February 1975

Should U.S. Resupply Ethiopia?

BY DIAL TORGERSON

ASMARA, Ethiopia—In an Asmara hospital, a doctor pointed out the civilian patients who had lost arms and legs to the high-powered bullets fired by the Ethiopian army.

"Why," he asked, "must the Americans keep supplying bullets to an army which does this sort of thing?"

Times correspondent Dial Torgerson wrote this article after returning to his base in Nairobi from a recent trip to Asmara.

The U.S. government provided the guns and the ammunition with which perhaps 20,000 government troops have been attempting to put down Eritrea's fight for independence.

Now, after more than three weeks of fighting, the Ethiopians admit they need resupplying. A State Department official says the U.S. government "is continuing to study" Ethiopia's request for an airlift of ammunition.

Washington has a lot of factors to study. Among them:

—The Addis Ababa government has used massacre as a technique of subjugation. Last summer, the army killed 126 civilians at the village of Um Hajar. On Feb. 2, approximately 100 were machine gunned to death against a church wall at Woki Deba, and 700 escaping political prisoners were reported killed by paratroopers Feb. 15 near Asmara.

☆

—Military strategists believe that the Ethiopian army is fighting a war it cannot win—against guerrillas well supplied with Communist-bloc arms, backed by the overwhelming support of the civilian populace, and in their own mountainous territory where roads can be easily cut by small-unit attacks.

—The Eritrean liberation movement has an undeniably valid cause. The autonomy of the coastal territory was unilaterally cancelled by Ethiopia when the Addis Ababa government annexed Eritrea as its 14th province in 1962.

—The Ethiopian government has proclaimed itself socialist and is exploring diplomatic links to the Chinese and the Eastern-bloc nations of Europe. Many persons say that the military junta which rules the country, the Provisional Military Administrative Council, is edging closer to the Communist philosophy every day.

If the United States resupplies the Addis Ababa forces, then, it will be aiding a ruthless, left-leaning military junta with dubious chances of military success.

On the other hand, the United States has a stake in Eritrea. The 500-mile strip of Red Sea coastline is among the most strategic areas of the world. It represents a longtime U.S. investment. Among the reasons why:

—If Eritrea wins its independence, the balance of power along the Red Sea will shift heavily to the Arab world. The Eritrean liberation groups are dominated by Moslems and supplied by Arab countries.

—If Eritrea shakes loose from Addis Ababa, only the tiny French enclave called the Territory of the Afars and Issas—and its port, Djibouti—will remain open to the West. And there will then be strong Arab pressure to force the French out of Djibouti.

—The United States probably will lose the use of its Kagnew communications station in Asmara. U.S. spokesmen insist that the base is virtually closed down now, and indeed the 2,000 Americans there have been reduced to 40. But it still performs a vital service, listening in on radio communications from behind the Iron Curtain.

Kagnew, the Eritreans and American military aid are all tied together in recent Ethiopian history. The background goes back to the days of empire building in Africa.

The Amhara of Addis Ababa were among the conquering empires of the late 19th century, adding independent kingdoms to their holdings when the British, Belgians and Germans were taking less warlike lands for their own.

The Italians took Eritrea in the 1890s, tried to invade the rest of Ethiopia, were humiliatingly defeated by the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik, and settled for holding Eritrea until they finally succeeded in taking all Ethiopia in 1935-36.

In 1941, the British chased out the Italians. They ruled Eritrea until 1952, when the United Nations voted that it be federated with Ethiopia, but with considerable autonomy and its own parliament.

In 1953, the United States signed an agreement with the Ethiopians to operate Kagnew, and, that same year, started providing military aid to Ethiopia. Ethiopian forces ably fought alongside U.N. units in the Korean conflict.

U.S. military aid has continued ever since. In 1962, the Addis Ababa government simply took over Eritrea. There was little complaint, except from a small group calling itself the Eritrean Liberation Front which slipped into the mountains and began its guerrilla war against the Ethiopians.

Later, a second group called the Popular (or Peoples) Liberation Front, the PLF, appeared, at first as a marxist-oriented splinter group of the ELF, then in growing strength, especially among the educated classes of Eritrea.

When the present conflict started Jan. 31, it was, surprisingly, the PLF, not the ELF, which was doing the heavy fighting.

The ELF had attracted most of the attention with attacks on vehicles and kidnapings of foreigners, including American nurse Deborah Dortzbach. All were ultimately released after negotiations in which Westerners involved were impressed with how fractionated and ill-organized the ELF seemed to be.

Now the PLF has emerged as the most serious threat to the Addis regime, although the two insurgent groups were said to have thrown in together around the first of the year. There has been talk of the ELF having 15,000 men. Those doing the fighting so far this month have been PLF, according to residents here in Asmara.

More troops are being flown into Asmara by the military government, which vows it will never grant the liberation forces' first unconditional demand: independence. It will be a long fight—and will take a lot of ammunition.

Where will it come from? If the United States declines, will it be Chinese or Russian bullets whistling down the streets of Asmara? It is a question, they say in Washington, on which study is continuing.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 February 1975

U.S. Policy on Africa

By Anthony Lake

WASHINGTON — No area of the world has been viewed by Americans with greater moral disapproval and less attention than southern Africa. Recent events suggest that more attention would be worthwhile.

The area's political map is rapidly changing. The Portuguese empire in Africa is in shreds. White-ruled Rhodesia faces greater physical isolation than ever, with her routes to the sea through Mozambique coming into African hands. She faces diplomatic isolation as well, since the South African Government, an ambivalent ally in the past but still an ally, is leaning on the white leaders to make fundamental concessions to the black majority.

The new political leadership in the United States could adopt a new policy toward the region. President Ford has already shown a willingness to be more flexible on southern Africa than his Congressional record suggested. For example, as President he has favored repeal of the Byrd amendment, which allows the importation of a number of Rhodesian goods in violation of United Nations sanctions, despite his votes in favor of the amendment as a Congressman.

A secret National Security Council study led, in 1970, to a new policy of closer relations with the white regimes in southern Africa. This remains our policy today, despite occasional shifts in marginal emphasis.

The new concept, in brief, was that American policy should emphasize "communications" and "dialogue" with the white regimes while increasing support for black nations in the area. The theory was that more normal relations between the United States and the white regimes could bear fruit in two ways.

First, American investment and trade could help make South African society more prosperous, which would mean more jobs for blacks; this in turn would lead to peaceful social change. This proposition has been much studied, without conclusive proof or disproof.

Second, a calm American voice would help the whites hear reason from abroad. Flinging their racial vices in their faces only strengthened their lonely determination. A neat theory, but it was flawed in principle because it required practices that Washington has, predictably, failed to follow.

It was naive to believe that the business-oriented Nixon Administration would have done more than use the new approach to justify closer cooperation with the whites. And to make the policy work, Secretary of State Kissinger would have had to pay more attention to finely tuning American actions than he has done.

Indeed, if the policy has mattered at all for southern Africa, it has probably hindered more than helped along the current trend of events.

Washington made unnecessary assistance deals with the old regime in Portugal and offered licenses to sell to its colonial authorities such items as helicopters, which could have been used for military purposes despite assurances to the contrary. Thus, with the coup in Portugal the United States simply ended up on the wrong side.

By flirting with, and in some cases allowing, a relaxation of our participation in the sanctions against Rhodesia, as explicitly suggested in the National Security Council study, the United States was disregarding international law and strengthening the spirit of the regime of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith.

Recent White House support for repeal of the Byrd amendment has partly righted this.

Did the new policy cause South Africa's leaders to promise internal changes, as they have, while leaning on Rhodesia to settle her own problems with the black majority? It seems unlikely.

The threat of increased pressure on Rhodesia and South Africa from a black-ruled Mozambique has been the key to these changes in southern Africa. South Africa wants to avoid a mess in Rhodesia; the casualties recently suffered by South Africa's "police" forces there are ominous. And the South Africans do not want a continuing Rhodesian crisis to draw more world attention to their own racial problems.

Leaving aside the past, can "communications" make a difference in the future? And if so, what kind and how?

Our current stance suggests our approval of South Africa's moves on Rhodesia and South Africa's efforts to improve relations with black African states. We should encourage the former and leave the latter to Pretoria and the governments it is wooing.

But we should avoid also supporting a view among white South Africans that their current, relatively enlightened foreign policies may allow them, in the long run, to avoid relinquishing their illegal control of Namibia (South-West Africa) or making basic changes in their racial policies at home. It is not enough that they promise some minor relaxation of apartheid.

On the other hand, it would be harmful to pretend that the United States can bring justice to South Africa by some illusory effort to sever her ties to the outside world.

Some "communications" are inevitable and diplomatic approval of some of South Africa's foreign policies is wise. But the message of recent years, an impending return to normalcy in our relations, goes much too far.

The key point was made by the State Department as it fought against the White House's policy shift in 1970: We must recognize the limits of our influence. Recent years show that a comfortable dialogue with South Africa is not the key to racial justice there. More attention should be paid to avoiding actions that do harm both there and to ourselves.

Let us, therefore, set clear limits on the scope of our relations with South Africa until it becomes clear, probably many years hence, that one way or another her blacks have gained the rights they are now denied.

A distant policy of this sort would not try to force change; we cannot do so. It would serve us well in the event of a racial crisis in South Africa or if black African nations should someday force us to choose between cooperation with them or with Pretoria.

It would better respond to the views of concerned blacks in America.

And there would be an added advantage, for those who still care: Such a policy would bring us a little closer to acting on the principles we still proclaim.

Anthony Lake, director of International Voluntary Services, is completing a book on American policy toward Rhodesia for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 February 1975

Schlesinger and Kissinger See Slight Cambodia Hope

By LESLIE GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 26—Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger believes that Cambodia will fall whether or not Congress approves emergency aid.

Secretary of State Kissinger reasons that even with American aid the Phnom Penh Government's chances for survival waver between zero and 50-50.

Both officials believe that Cambodia's collapse by itself would be a setback but not a disaster for American foreign policy as long as aid has not been terminated, leaving the United States open to blame.

These are known to be the views expressed in private by these two officials. President Ford's views are not similarly known in any detail. But he is said to be deeply committed to continuing aid to Cambodia and South Veitnam.

Publicly, the three men continue to be optimistic about the prospects of Phnom Penh's survival if Congress approves $222-million in emergency aid that has been requested and fearful that other nations will regard Washington as unreliable if Cambodia is denied aid and then falls.

Today, for example, Mr. Schlesinger told a House committee that the probability is "extremely high" that Cambodia could survive, with the supplemental aid.

Why their sentiments reportedly expressed privately contradict their public statements appears to be open to interpretation.

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, suggested today that the Administration was trying to shift the "blame" to Congress for certain failure in Cambodia.

Others maintained that the two senior secretaries were not being cynical but were sincerely trying to cushion the adverse consequences of Cambodia's fall on American foreign policy. In their view, Congressional approval of the $222-million is essential to this cushioning process. For they are said to be convinced that Cambodia's fall must be clearly seen as stemming from the deficiencies of the Phnom Penh regime rather than from Washington's defaulting on aid obligations.

And, of course, as they have said publicly, there is always the slight possibility that the aid could work to sustain the Government of President Lon Nol and to bring about negotiations.

South Vietnam is another matter enirely. Both secretaries are reliably known to feel that the fate of the Saigon regime is still vital to the United States and are trying to make subtle public distinctions between American interests in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

A Distinction Drawn

Yesterday, for example, Mr. Kissinger was asked about the consequences of losing South Vietnam and Cambodia. As an official later pointed out, Mr. Kissinger answered that if South iVetnam fell, this would have "the most serious consequences." He said nothing about Cambodia.

These two officials, however, have different points of view on the advisability of President Ford's recent proposal for ending aid to South Vietnam in three years. Mr. Kissinger is willing to go along with it as politically necessary, and Mr. Schlesinger wants either to go on indefinitely or to pull up stakes right now.

Meanwhile, Administration officials disclosed that experts are filling in the details of Mr. Ford's three-ear proposal on aid for Saigon, and that the total figure now under consideration for military and economic aid is more than $6-billion.

Of perhaps greater importance, it is understood that the President will present the final package to Congress on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As reliably explained, the figure will represent the Administration's best judgment of what will be adequate for Saigon's survival, and the President will accept nothing less.

Issues Discussed

Discussions within the Ford Administration—no one described them as serious disputes—revolve around three issues: Is there any chance that the Phnom Penh regime will survive? What would be the effects of a fall? How is the future aid program for South Vietnam to be continued, given Congressional opposition?

There is no disagreement within the Administration that the Phnom Penh regime will be defeated in a matter of weeks to a few months without a massive American resupply of ammunition.

On the chances of Cambodia's survival even if the aid is provided, the two secretaries react with various shades of pessimism. Mr. Schlesinger is said to believe that the fall of the Phnom Penh Government is in the cards almost no matter what the United States does. Mr. Kissinger's views are variously described as somewhere between the total conviction that Cambodia is gone with nothing to be done about it and, according to one source, that it has a 50-50 chance. The most optimistic private assessment of Mr. Kissinger's opinion is that with the ammunition, Cambodia has a good chance of getting through the coming rainy season.

Neither man is said to have made any flat predictions on how long the Phnom Penh Government would endure with the aid, but the speculation is that it could be another year.

Leadership in Question

The belief of the two secretaries that Cambodia must eventually fall is based on their judgment of the incompetence of President Lon Nol's leadership and the absence of a viable alternative.

Therefore, the main issue for them is not whether Phnom Penh will fall, but how. Both secretaries are known to argue that if Cambodia falls despite the best American efforts, the foreign-policy consequences will be bearable. If, however, she falls as a direct consequence of American aid cutoff, Mr. Kissinger believes the effects in other capitals would be injurious over the long run while Mr. Schlesinger thinks more in terms of a serious setback.

Their reasoning is explained as follows:

If American ammunition shipment are ended, this would blind world perceptions to Phnom Penh's incompetence. If the collapse comes as the aid continues, Washington would still be seen as a loyal ally and the fault would clearly be put on the Cambodians.

But the perceived gap between these private judgments and the Administration's public rhetoric has caused some alarm on Capitol Hill. Some legislatore feel that the Administration is not only worried about foreign reaction but about domestic politics as well.

Humphrey Critical

Senator Humphrey said today that the President and the two secretaries "know that in all likelihood Phnom Penh cannot be saved, even with additional money."

"Thus, it is unfair for the Administration to seek to lay at the feet of the Congress the blame for a rapidly deteriorating situation in Cambodia," he said.

On Monday, Mr. Humphrey criticized the Administration's public claim that the United States had a commitment to Cambodia. He cited a section of the Foreign Assistance Act originally framed in 1971 and signed by the President to the effect that the provision of aid to Cambodia "shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense."

At his news conference yesterday, Mr. Kissinger did not speak of Cambodia as an American commitment, but as "a country which has been associated with us."

In sum, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger are said to feel that the loss of Cambodia would have an irreparable adverse impact on the credibility of American commitments elsewhere if the United States also pulled up stakes in South Vietnam.

Stress on Commitment

Both remain convinced, as they have stated publicly, that the value of the American word around the globe is still tied to aiding the Saigon regime. They further contend that the arguments now being made in Congress for the termination of aid were not seriously advanced at the time the Paris accords were signed in 1973.

Mr. Kissinger, however, made plain yesterdya that he was prepared to accept a three-year phase-out of aid to Saigon as "the best that may be attainable" given Congressional views.

Mr. Schlesinger, on the other hand, is described as feeling that this approach is disingenous, and that if Washington is prepared to let Saigon fall in 1977, why not in 1976 or even 1975?

The Defense Secretary is said to feel that the three-year phase-out would solve the current political problem in Washington, but would leave an even greater moral problem at a later point.

Group Works on Plan

Meanwhile, an interagency group is at work on the plan under the direction of Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib. The President is expected to present the results of their labors after the Cambodia issue is resolved.

The President has asked Congress for $300-million in supplemental military aid and $1.3-bilion in new military aid for Saigon.

The Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, said today that he was "sick and tired of pictures of Indochinese men, women and children being slaughtered by American guns with American ammunition in countries in which we have no vital interests and which are not tied to our security or our welfare."

Asked about the consequences of President Lon Nol's losing, he said, "It would force the Cambodians to face up to their own future with no help or hindrance from us, and that's the way it should be and that's the way it's going to be."

WASHINGTON POST
27 February 1975

Experts Fear Aid Too Late For Cambodia

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Some experienced U.S. defense analysts believe the chances are less than 50-50 that the Cambodian government can hold out long enough for the new aid President Ford is requesting from a reluctant Congress to make a difference on the battlefield.

These officials agree that over the long run the additional $222 million Mr. Ford is seeking would be "critical" for the Cambodians.

But even making the unlikely assumption that Congress will approve the aid request, there is a widespread opinion that it would take several weeks for the impact of such aid to be felt militarily and the crisis for the beleaguered Cambodian army will come before then.

Specifically, a number of experienced analysts believe that the government forces must reopen the vital Mekong River supply line very soon. The river has been blocked in recent weeks by a combination of underwater mines—which, it has been learned, appear to have been provided by China—and well-entrenched Khmer Rouge insurgent forces along the banks.

The surrounded capital of Phnom Penh is being supplied by a chartered American airlift which, while impressive, cannot keep the Cambodians supplied with ammunition, rice and fuel over the long run, analysts say.

Some senior analysts in the Defense Intelligence Agency are already known to view Cambodia as a lost cause.

Elsewhere in government, analysts are watching with alarm reports of anti-Chinese rioting in the Cambodian town of Battambang last week, and riots reportedly starting in the capital city, as a sign of scapegoating, which could signal a more widespread breakdown of order in the cities.

As some defense analysts see it, government forces must reopen the Mekong, at least partially, within the next few weeks. At the moment, however, there is virtually no optimism that government troops can do it.

The United States is known to be urging the Lon Nol government to risk losing some provincial towns outside the capital by moving forces from these areas to join in the crucial battle for the river.

The Cambodian army has at most some 110,000 men, according to the best U.S. estimates. The Khmer insurgents have some 70,000. But only about 45,000 of the government's troops are in the capital area, facing some 25,000 insurgents. The United States wants Lon Nol to bring in at least some of his forces from areas such as Kompong Speu and Kompong Cham, where there are relatively small insurgent forces, to improve the odds around the capital and along the river. Each side now has an estimated 10,000 men along the Mekong.

If this redeployment of forces is carried out, at least some analysts believe it may forestall complete disaster within the next few weeks. Then, it is explained, the new aid from Congress could become critical.

The Pentagon claims Cambodia will run out of ammunition by the end of March without more aid money. Other sources say there is no way to check the Pentagon estimates, but most agree that the estimate is probably right to within a week or two.

Thus, if the Cambodians could reopen the river soon, and keep it open with new aid until July, it is argued that the government might survive long enough to reach a compromise settlement with the Khmer insurgents.

It is in July that the Mekong, swollen by rains that begin in May, overflows its banks and widens considerably until about December. This widening in effect pushes mortars and artillery back from the banks and makes it harder to get mines into the shipping channels, thus making shipping somewhat safer from attack.

It is this potential sequence of events that apparently was behind President Ford's remark yesterday that if the Cambodian government is "able to maintain national integrity until the end of the dry season, there is a possibility of negotiations to end the war in Cambodia."

Mr. Ford once again called the aid request "highly critical." On Capitol Hill, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger claimed the probability was "extremely high" that Cambodia could survive if more aid was forthcoming, but that, of course, "there was no such thing as a guarantee."

But both Schlesinger and the President once more were confronted by congressional leaders who questioned the wisdom of continuing such aid.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said he was "sick and tired" of seeing Cambodians "slaughtered" with American weapons and that administration pleas for more money were "an old story, repeated many times." Mansfield called the new request one for "indefinite participation—indirect as it may be—in the affairs of countries to which we have no commitment."

Rep. George H. Mahon (D-Tex.) chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told Schlesinger that "I think it saddens all responsible Americans to see Cambodia collapse." But, he added: "It is just impossible to convince rank-and-file Americans that there is any end to this, and ultimately Cambodia cannot survive so why spend hundreds of millions of dollars more."

Schlesinger, in a hearing before the committee, said he couldn't predict when Cambodia might be able to reach a political settlement to the war.

Despite the tone of opposition already evident in Congress, senior analysts say they don't believe the Cambodian government as yet fully understands the prospect that no additional aid may be forthcoming and that any more overt rejection by Congress in the next week or so could produce a psychological shock that would contribute to an even more rapid collapse of the Lon Nol government.

This would be especially true if the river remains shut and the city remains isolated.

On the other hand, some officials believe the sizeable airlift now under way provides a visible, immediate morale boost to the Cambodians and maintains at least their hope for continued aid.

If additional aid were allowed, the principal difference it might make from a purely military standpoint would be in the airlift not just of ammunition, but of some artillery and armored personnel carriers that have been lost and not replaced.

These, however, are big items, and only a few at a time could be brought in. That is why analysts say that aside from just keeping the government in ammunition, the increased aid would take quite a while to make any real difference; there is no way to get supplies into Phnom Penh except for the airport, which is also vulnerable to attack.

Sources say the absolute minimum daily requirement for the Cambodian army is

BALTIMORE SUN
27 February 1975

Luns says Cambodia's fall would not disturb U.S. ties

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — The secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Joseph M.A.H. Luns, appeared to take a calmer view yesterday than the Ford administration has been taking of the effects Cambodia's fall would have on United States relations with allies.

If the government at Phnom Penh is toppled for lack of American aid, Mr. Luns said, "it will not increase confidence" in the U.S., but the reaction in Europe "would not be very strong."

Here for conferences, Mr. Luns has been the 15-nation alliance's top administrative officer since 1971, and before that was foreign minister of the Netherlands for 19 years.

President Ford and Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, fighting for a $222 million in emergency aid to Cambodia, have been portraying the possible fall of the Lon Nol government as a development that would have gravest consequences for American foreign policy.

U.S. "security and the integrity of our alliances depend upon our reputation as a reliable partner," Mr. Ford said Tuesday. At the same time, Mr. Kissinger said destruction of the Cambodian—or South Vietnamese—governments because aid was refused would, over the years, "raise the gravest doubts" in many countries associated with the U.S.

Mr. Luns gave the impression—at a luncheon with diplomats, congressional staff members and foreign affairs specialists—that the reaction in Europe probably would be negative in government circles, but muted.

There was no suggestion that European-American relations would be disturbed.

about 500 to 600 tons of ammunition. The airlift in recent days has been beefed-up to provide that much and is expected to increase to almost 800 tons until the money runs out.

The minimum daily rice needs for the Phnom Penh area are estimated at 550 to 600 tons, which the airlift also hopes to meet. Minimum petroleum needs are estimated at 150 to 200 tons.

As the airlift expands, some officials believe the Cambodians can hang on as long as the money holds out.

The more widely held view is that all the amounts being airlifted are still basic minimums, that the estimates of what is needed are poor to begin with, and that any increase in combat or further deterioration in morale could cause a rapid government collapse.

More importantly, officials say that there is simply no support within the U.S. government for a solution that depends on a costly, long-term airlift that shows no sign of ending.

The Mekong, they say, must be reopened fast. But the chances, in the view of one specialist, are 60-40 against the government being able to do it.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 February 1975

Mr. Thieu and The Critics

Opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu have been staging demonstrations against his regime, including one in which his photographs were burned on the steps of the South Vietmanese National Assembly. Mr. Thieu has answered with severity.

Five opposition papers have been closed, leaving only one publishing. Several important journalists have been arrested. And, to the annoyance of the United States mission, Mr. Thieu has returned to power several high-ranking military and police officers ousted for deserved reputations of corruptness.

The demonstration at the National Assembly, the former opera house, was staged by a number of deputies, but it also drew a rare appearance by Duong Van (Big) Minh, the retired general who is an opposition figurehead. This and other protests by Buddhists were quickly subdued.

Sources in Saigon suggests that the military shake-up is pre-emptive—the regime fears demonstrations may intensify if the United States Congress does not grant the $300-million in supplementary aid the Ford Administration seeks for Saigon.

A key figure in the changes is Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Van Toan. Last October, under opposition and American pressure to clean up corruption in the army, Mr. Thieu removed General Toan from a command position, even though the two are close associates. Now the general is back as head of the region that surrounds Saigon.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 February 1975

The Kissinger Doctrine

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Feb. 26—When the Soviet Union crushed Dubcek's Czechoslovakia in 1968, it claimed an inherent right of intervention to keep any "sister socialist state" from slipping out of the Soviet orbit. That was the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Americans were sickened by the brutal cynicism of the Soviet rationalization. But if we open our eyes, we cannot avoid seeing that we now have a doctrine to match. It must be called the Kissinger Doctrine.

It appeared first in relation to the Allende Government of Chile. In that context the doctrine could be stated as follows: *The United States is entitled to conspire against another country's constitutional government if we fear it might slip that country out of our orbit.*

Henry Kissinger put the matter succinctly to the Forty Committee, the secret operations group that he heads, on June 27, 1970. Speaking of Chile, he said: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

The torment of Cambodia shows that the doctrine also takes a second form: *If a government comes to power by a coup and takes its country into the U. S. orbit, Washington will do anything to prevent a change of that government—no matter how little support it has from its own people, no matter how terrible the cost to them.*

Lon Nol overthrew the Sihanouk Government in March 1970. Whatever its role in that coup, the United States intervened quickly thereafter. In April President Nixon sent in American troops. He said the purpose was only to hunt Vietnamese Communists, not to "expand the war into Cambodia." But war has raged ever since in that once so peaceful country, with the United States playing a dominant part.

The Ford Administration is now putting extreme pressure on Congress for more aid to Lon Nol. What is the rationalization? President Ford explained today that American policy is to help "where the government and the people of a country want to protect their country from foreign aggression or a foreign invasion."

That a man as decent as Gerald Ford should accept such stuff from his advisers, and repeat it, is disheartening. For his premise of Cambodia resisting "foreign" attack is the opposite of the truth.

Americans in Phnom Penh concede that the war is a genuine civil war—Cambodians against Cambodians. Nor do they pretend that Lon Nol has much popular support. His corrupt, ineffectual government is totally dependent on the United States.

It is hard for Americans to admit this, given our historic ideals, but we are the alien intruders in Cambodia. That fact, and the feebleness of the side we support, are the reasons for the Khmer Rouge's success. The Vietnamese did play a commanding role in the period after Sihanouk's fall. But outside help to the Cambodian insurgents is now limited, compared to the American support of Lon Nol.

The U.S. has given $1.8 billion to Lon Nol so far. Americans still direct much of his war effort, and supply it entirely. From March 1970 to August 1973, when Congress called a halt, American planes dropped 442,735 tons of bombs on Cambodia. No Chinese or Vietnamese planes have dropped bombs—or been given as aid to the Khmer Rouge.

As a new excuse for more American aid to fuel this hopeless war, Administration spokesmen say there might be negotiations if Lon Nol survives long enough. That is a desperate argument, and disingenuous. When the Khmer Rouge leader, Khieu Samphan, toured eastern Europe in 1974, the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh, John Gunther Dean, urged that contact be made with him. Mr. Kissinger rejected the idea.

ABROAD AT HOME

No. Mr. Kissinger's concern is not for the Cambodians, who want no more war. It is for American credibility, and especially his own, which he thinks would suffer if we "lost" Cambodia. Because the only conceivable settlement now would mean Lon Nol's departure, the war must go on. Mr. Kissinger is prepared to fight to the last Cambodian.

In The New York Times the other day, right next to the story about the latest Ford-Kissinger appeal for more arms to Lon Nol, there was a report from The Times correspondent in Phnom Penh, Sydney H. Schanberg. It told about what had happened to Cambodia in these five years.

"Cambodia before the war," he wrote, was "so rich in her food produce that even the very poor were never hungry. . . . Now it is a country of landless nomads with empty stomachs— human flotsam living amidst damp and filth. . . . The countryside is charred wasteland . . ."

That is the result of the Kissinger Doctrine—of an obsession with order and power at the expense of humanity. Whatever else he accomplishes in office, Henry Kissinger will be associated forever with the destruction of Cambodia. But Gerald Ford, Congress and the rest of us do not have to go on accepting his monstrous values.

WASHINGTON STAR
16 February 1975

NUCLEAR STAKES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Walt W. Rostow

Walt W. Rostow was national security adviser to President Johnson. He now teaches economics and history at the University of Texas, Austin.

From all accounts, a majority in the Congress appears seized of the idea that we should limit our military assistance to Cambodia and South Vietnam in the face of the military offensives they confront, despite the judgment of the executive branch that this may well lead to Communist victory in the area.

Those supporting this limitation are in the position of arguing that it would be better for the people of Southeast Asia to have peace than war, even if peace brings Communist control. They also say that the American people have had enough of Southeast Asia, and a majority of our citizens supports a cut-off of aid to the area.

It is understandable after all that has transpired over the last 30 years that the American political process should generate moods like these; but, as George Kennan wrote in another context: "History does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our domestic politics." What if the destruction of independent non-Communist states in Southeast Asia should irreversibly lead not to "peace" but to greater instability and conflict in the world than we already know?

Specifically, members of Congress ought to consider these four points before casting their votes.

● Whatever moral judgments or domestic political imperatives may move individual members of Congress, the United States will appear to the rest of the world to have knifed in the back an embattled ally. And we will have done so after that ally had successfully held his own over the more than five years since American troop withdrawals began, accepting increased casualties, despite an American-negotiated truce settlement that has not been honored by Hanoi and on whose enforcement Washington has not insisted once our prisoners were home.

A part of that settlement was the understanding that we would supply the South Vietnamese with arms to match those mounted against them. There is no North Vietnamese weapon that does not come from its allies in Moscow and Peking. It is inevitable that an American cut-off of military supplies to Southeast Asia shakes our alliances in every part of the world. Our allies may differ in the weight they attach to events in Southeast Asia; but they are all vitally affected by the record of American reliability in honoring its treaty commitments and other promises.

● A loss of confidence in American reliability could lead to further nuclear proliferation. A good many countries have moved close to the threshhold of nuclear weapons production. One barrier that has thus far prevented their taking this fateful step is the greater advantage of explicit or implicit security ties with the United States than the development of independent nuclear capabilities can provide. An American foreign policy dominated by moods of a Congress prepared to alter unilaterally treaty relations as well as agreements made by the executive branch, is not likely to commend itself as the foundation for national security to a number of important nations in a world they perceive as still potentially dangerous. By several routes, nuclear proliferation increases the chances of nuclear war.

● In Southeast Asia itself, the action of Congress may well lead to a larger war rather than to peace. That action will signal to other powers a definitive American abandonment of interest in Southeast Asia and set off a scramble for power to fill the vacuum.

The situation in the region differs in a number of ways from that in 1965. Thailand and Indonesia, for example, are stronger now, and perhaps some of the other states as well. On the other hand, the long line of the Mekong still renders Thailand vulnerable to a Communist conquest of Indochina; and the fate of Burma runs with that of Thailand, as both parties have long recognized. Since independence, the Indian foreign policy has systematically regarded the independence of Burma (and Malayasia, too) as a direct vital interest. Thus, a congressional cut-off of military aid could set in motion a confrontation between India and China, as well as a Chinese-Russian confrontation. Both confrontations now carry the potentiality of nuclear war.

● Finally, the resources of Southeast Asia, until recently a factor of negligible interest, have increased in importance to Japan and Western Europe as well as to the United States; that is, the oil of Indonesia and the potential deposits of the South China Sea. In a world enmeshed in a long-term energy crisis, the sea routes which Indochina dominates assume increased importance.

This is not the first time in our history that the Congress has exercised intimate control over foreign policy. The first time it happened, in the 1780s, it yielded such dangers to the republic that the nation reluctantly accepted the Constitution under which we have lived successfully for almost 190 years. The last time it happened, between 1918 and 1940, the policy of the United States contributed substantially to the coming of the Second World War.

The voices now dominant in the Congress, echoing their isolationist predecessors, are once again seeking to impose their vision of how the world ought to be, as opposed to the way the world really is. Those who know better are mainly silent; cowed by the media, tired from a long enervating struggle, unwilling to say what they believe after the bruising battles of the past generation. But history is without pity — even for the United States. To quote Kennan again: "A nation which excuses its own failures by the sacred untouchableness of its own habits can excuse itself into complete disaster."

And this time the disaster could be nuclear war.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 February 1975

Saigon Political Cartoonist Is Reported Arrested

By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 7 — Saigon's leading political cartoonist, who pilloried Government figures and the Communists with equal vigor, has been arrested, well-placed sources reported today.

Nguyen Hai Chi, a 29 year-old-sergeant assigned to the Joint General Staff, was arrested by military policemen three days ago, one of those sources said.

The sources said that the cartoonist, known to thousands here by his pen name, Choe, subsequently was turned over to the civilian national police yesterday afternoon. But Mr. Chi's exact whereabouts could not be firmly established. At a news conference yesterday morning, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khac Binh said that the Government had cracked a ring of Communist agents who purportedly had penetrated the Saigon press corps.

Not on List of Accused

General Binh, who commands the national police, gave the names of 18 persons as Communist agents. The cartoonist's name was not among them. When asked about the disappearance of Mr. Chi, the police commander said flatly that he had not been arrested, and that he was not involved in the plot.

A police spokesman said this afternoon that "so far, we have received no further information on cartoonist Choe."

In the space that the English-language Saigon Post usually reserved for Choe's cartoons, the following notice was placed today: "Following the arrest of our cartoonist Choe by the national police, his column is left vacant beginning Thursday.

"We hope that he would be freed soon to resume his work for our readers' service."

The Saigon Post, a conservative, anti-Communist paper, is largely owned by Bui Diem, a former Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington who on occasion undertakes diplomatic missions for President Nguyen Van Thieu.

One of Choe's last published cartoons showed an unmistakably Thieu-like figure confronting the Communists, holding a rifle under his arm. But the rifle was pointed at figures representing the Vietnamese people, not the Communists.

41

NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1975

Heroin Addiction Growing in South Vietnam, Especially at Remote Army Posts

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

PLEIKU, South Vietnam, Feb. 17—In the dingy, dimly lit back room of a house near the Roman Catholic cathedral here, two soldiers lay sprawled on a bed, their eyes closed.

Another soldier, in the mottled green camouflage uniform of a South Vietnamese ranger, entered the room and approached a tired-looking old man squatting in the corner over a water pipe. "Dad, may I borrow the bowl and sword," he asked. These were the code words used to ask for a heroin injection.

This was an example of a growing heroin addiction problem throughout the South Vietnamese armed forces and among some well-to-do young people, especially in Saigon.

According to military investigators in this dusty Central Highlands garrison city, about 30 per cent of the airmen and combat soldiers stationed here now use heroin in some form. At least part of this heroin is said to be sold by South Vietnamese officers.

There have been no known instances of plane crashes or avoidance of combat because of this use of narcotics. But there have been several cases reported here recently of deaths among pilots and soldiers because of overdoses.

The drug problem began, Vietnamese familiar with it say, with the national mood of despair that accompanied the Communists' offensive in 1972 and then the ineffective Paris peace agreement in 1973. The problem is most acute in isolated garrisons such as Pleiku where there has been little actual fighting recently and boredom is almost as big an enemy as the North Vietnamese.

In the view of investigators, the heroin problem is also a direct legacy of the American presence in Vietnam.

"We always had some opium smoking, but we didn't know what heroin was until the G.I.'s brought it," a South Vietnamese official remarked. He was referring to the epidemic of heroin use that spread rapidly among American soldiers here in 1970 and 1971 as United States participation in the war was phased out.

The most commonly used Vietnamese term for heroin, "si ke," does in fact suggest an American origin. It is a corruption of the G.I. slang word "scag."

Moreover, narcotics specialists believe, much of the heroin being sold in Vietnam now is left over from the large stockpiles accumulated in those earlier years to supply American servicemen.

"The smugglers hadn't anticipated a drop in the market so soon," a Western specialist suggested. As evidence of his theory, he added that no heroin was now known to be moving into South Vietnam from Thailand, the usual source.

The wholesale drug business in Vietnam is thought to be carried on by Chinese networks operating from Cholon, the large Chinese section of Saigon. But just who markets it to the troops is murky.

The ranger who bought a dose in the house near the cathedral here said that his former commander, a major, had once sold heroin at their border outpost in Kontum.

Pushers in Area Headquarters

Other knowledgeable Vietnamese and foreigners say they can point out pushers among low-ranking officers in the headquarters of Military Region II in Pleiku.

Lieut. Col. Nguyen Ngoc Thoai, the chief of police in Pleiku, is well aware of the problem.

"As you can see, Pleiku is a city of soldiers," he said, sitting in a small coffee shop. "It is the soldiers who use the drugs, and they themselves protect the pushers. Then what can I do?"

There have been some police efforts at arresting suspected dealers in Pleiku. But heroin can still be purchased easily down dozens of back alleys and in some coffee shops for prices ranging from the equivalent of about 70 cents for the smallest cellophane packet to $10 for a plastic vial.

Because the heroin is of extremely high purity—from 90 to 97 per cent—it is dangerous to inject it directly and most users mix it with tobacco for smoking. Street heroin in New York often is of as low purity as 2 to 3 per cent.

The South Vietnamese Army has established several rehabilitation centers and hospital wards, including one at the Cong Hoa Military Hospital in Saigon, which has treated more than 1,000 patients in two years. But the methods are primitive and the rate of relapse is said to be high.

It also seems difficult for many Vietnamese to treat heroin addiction as a serious problem—there are too many other major problems already.

As the ranger was sticking a needle into his left forearm, in the hour here, two young girls walked into the room carrying the family laundry. They hung it up to dry without even glancing at him.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 February 1975

Cambodian Disaster

By Tom Wicker

Why doesn't Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger go on television and try to sell the Brooklyn Bridge? That would be easier and far more honest than trying to sell the shabby proposition that if Cambodia goes Communist, it will be both a disaster for the United States and the fault of the Democratic Congress.

Mr. Schlesinger said on ABC's "Issues and Answers" that if Congress did not provide $222 million requested by the Ford Administration for military aid to the Lon Nol Government, Cambodia would "absolutely" fall to the Communists.

Maybe so, although scaretalk out of the Pentagon is cheaper than the dollar. What Mr. Schlesinger did not say, although he knows it perfectly well, is that if Congress does put up the $222-million, Mr. Schlesinger and the Administration will be back next year for more, probably much more, since a hundred times $222 million will not bring an anti-Communist victory in Cambodia, anymore than such sums brought an anti-Communist victory in South Vietnam.

There is a great deal more that Mr. Schlesinger did not say, although he probably knows most of that, too. He did not say, for the most egregious example, that the real disaster is that of the gentle and unwarlike Cambodian people, whose country and civilization are being savagely blown apart by a war that the Ford Administration, like the Nixon Administration before it, seems to see only as an instrument of policy. But those are—or were— real Cambodians bleeding and dying and watching their homes and children destroyed.

Mr. Schlesinger did not say that if Cambodia is really about to fall to the Communists, two successive Administrations—which in foreign policy and national security affairs are really the same—have no one to blame but themselves. While it is not as yet clear to what extent the Nixon Administration participated in the overthrow of the Sihanouk Government, there is no doubt that the Lon Nol coup was at least encouraged from Washington. And it was the American invasion of Cambodia from South Vietnam in May, 1970, that brought full-scale war to a country that had been at peace, however uneasy.

That war, and the continuing American backing for Lon Nol, has not rescued Cambodia from the Communists but made it far more likely—if Mr. Schlesinger's warnings have any validity—that Cambodia will be taken over by the Communists. Nor did the Cambodian war have any useful effect on the war in Vietnam, despite the inflated claims made for it by Richard Nixon and other such statesmen. That war has done little but ruin Cambodia, slaughter Cambodians, absorb American resources, and blacken this country's once-good name in a way not even South Vietnam could quite accomplish.

Fortunately, there are numerous members of Congress who know all this and more and who are not likely to be frightened off by the implication that they will be held responsible by an outraged America if Cambodia goes Communist—for example, Vice President Rockefeller's recent warning that "we know where the responsibility will lie" if Congress does not honor what he called a "moral commitment" to further military aid for South Vietnam. (In fact, no one should be surprised, if Congress refuses the aid request, to find that the Pentagon has enough money and material in its pipelines and hiding places and gobbledegook accounts to keep the war going right along in both Cambodia and South Vietnam.)

But even if the Schlesinger-Rockefeller scare tactics don't work, the military-aid struggle discloses a sad and rather ominous state of mind at the top of the Ford Administration—an unwillingness to admit error, a dogmatic anti-Communism, an affinity for military force, a mindless persistence in outmoded or discredited slo-

IN THE NATION

gans, an inverted sense of priority, a myopic perception of domestic political reality, and an utter callousness to the human consequences of lofty policy decisions.

Thus, Indochina policy still seems to be controlled by the single, overriding policy concern that has controlled it at least since the Kennedy Administration—the high-level belief that no American Government can afford to let a country it has undertaken to assist go Communist, for fear of the political reaction of the American people. To prevent that dread reaction, billions of dollars, 50,000 American lives, and untold numbers of Vietnamese and Cambodians have been sacrificed. To stave off that feared accounting, the credibility of the Presidency and the integrity of the Government have been repeatedly breached.

If there ever was any validity to that fear of an outraged and vengeful public, it was when a huge American army was committed to battle and the national honor was loudly proclaimed at stake. No such army is now engaged, and so little American honor can be found amid the wreckage and corpses of Indochina that to invoke it now mocks history and the dead.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 February 1975

The Fear Of Truth

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Feb. 19—A group of Senators and Representatives is scheduled to fly off this weekend, at the State Department's suggestion, for a ten-day visit to South Vietnam and Cambodia. They will be accompanied by high State and Defense officials, and on the scene they will get the usual official guidance.

The scenario calls for this group, like so many others over the last fifteen years, to be persuaded that all will be well in Indochina if only there is a little more American aid, a little more involvement. But an unscheduled drama is developing over the trip. The story well illustrates how the obsession with Indochina has distorted the American official mind.

One Congressman who agreed to go on the trip is a freshman Democrat from Iowa, Tom Harkin. Mr. Harkin happens to know something about Vietnam. He was a Navy pilot there. Later he came back as an aide to the Congressional group that discovered the tiger cages—the loathesome cells, built with U.S. aid, where the Thieu Government kept political prisoners.

Representative Harkin said he would bring along as his staff aide and interpreter Don Luce, who spent ten years in Vietnam and knows it about as well as any American. He would be useful especially, Mr. Harkin said, because ordinary Vietnamese would talk more freely through him than through an official interpreter. But Mr. Luce is critical of the Thieu Government, which heartily dislikes him and forced him out of the country.

The State Department made no formal objection to Mr. Luce, as indeed it could not. But Assistant Secretary Philip Habib made clear his displeasure, and conservative Republicans on the delegation protested. If Don Luce went, they said, they would not. At this writing the issue is unresolved.

That grown men should be so afraid of a voice other than their own may seem ludicrous, but Justice Holmes observed long ago that men naturally try to suppress opposing views. But the Constitution, he said, operates on the theory that free access to all ideas is most likely to lead to the truth. The zealots of American policy on Vietnam want to limit access because they fear the truth.

Truth is not the only casualty of the long official obsession with Indochina. Another is respect for law. Here again an example is at hand. It is much more important, really, than the childish if revealing attempt to tell a Congressman whom he may have as an assistant.

Two years ago Congress wrote into law language designed to end the role of the American military in Indochina. Section 30 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 reads as follows:

"No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended to finance military or para-military operations by the U.S. in or over Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia."

The United States is now running an emergency airlift of ammunition to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. These are some of the characteristics of the operation:

- U.S. Air Force C-130's are being used, with the official insignia painted over.
- The Air Force lends the planes, without charge, to a corporation called Bird Air. It flies what its head, William H. Bird, calls "sorties" from Thailand to Cambodia.
- The Air Force provides fuel for the planes, and all maintenance.
- About half the crews have been recruited from the Air Force active reserve. Mr. Bird says he believes the men are getting reserve credit for making the runs.
- Most of the other crew members are former Air Force men, many of them recently off active duty.

Those details were given in a report from Bangkok by Richard Blystone of The Associated Press. The New York Times correspondent in Phnom Penh, Sydney H. Schanberg, described the airlift as "technically being handled by civilian contractors but actually run from beginning to end by the American military."

A lawsuit filed in the Federal District Court in Boston challenges the Cambodian airlift as a military operation in flat violation of the 1973 statute. But why should it take a lawsuit to make officials of the United States Government comply with the law?

The obsession with Indochina has done terrible things to the standards of official behavior in this country over the years. Men otherwise committed to honor and law have become inured to cheating and suppressing the truth. What is to be thought of an end that requires such means?

Los Angeles Times Sun., Feb. 16, 1975

U.S. Magazines in Australia Hampered

BY DAVID LAMB
Times Staff Writer

SYDNEY—Confronted by an increasingly expensive and inefficient postal system, the two U.S. magazines with the largest circulation here are paying the price for having bucked the traditional buying habits of the Australian public.

Both publications—Reader's Digest (local circulation 800,000 a month) and Time (125,000 a week)—rely primarily on mail subscriptions for their mass circulations, thus facing a problem that other major Australian magazines do not share.

The Australian public traditionally does not buy for the future. Heavy smokers buy their cigarets a pack or two at a time rather than by the carton; readers buy their magazines by the single copy rather than through subscriptions—the largest magazine here, Women's Weekly, sells all its 800,000 copies through news agents.

But Reader's Digest, Time and Newsweek (local circulation 42,000) borrowed from their U.S. experience and built up their distribution through greatly reduced introductory offers for mailed subscriptions. It was a decision that has caused the publishers more than a few headaches during these times of rising mail rates and postal chaos.

The post office, Australia's biggest employer with 250,000 workers, has been hit by an average of one serious strike a month this year, some of which have ended all deliveries for up to nine days.

Saturday mail deliveries have ended and even in the best of times, the Time magazine copy delivered to the post office on Wednesday frequently is not placed in the subscriber's mail box until the following Tuesday because postmen do not have to carry magazines if their bags already are too heavy.

One recent government report shows that of 303 dispatch days last year at the Sydney mail exchange, workers managed a full clearance of ordinary letters on only nine days and never achieved a full parcel clearance. Most of the work stoppages and delays are due to union demands for more pay, shorter hours and better conditions.

On top of that, Canberra has pushed through record postal increases to overcome a $72 million deficit in the post office this year. A copy of Time which cost 5.3 cents to mail a year ago now costs 10.2 cents and will cost 12 cents in March. Reader's Digest, the post office's biggest customer next to the government, pays 14.3 cents for each mailed copy.

Both the Digest and Time have tried to overcome the rising costs and unreliable deliveries by sorting and bagging their copies and delivering them to individual suburban post offices. At one point, the Digest was distributing half its 800,000 sales by its own means, but the government threatened to penalize the magazine with a rate increase if it continued the practice.

Time reacted to postal obstacles this month by reducing the number of cut-rate introductory subscription offers and making plans to change gradually its ratio of subscription sales to newsstand sales from 80-20 to 50-50.

"We were bucking the trend of buying habits for a long time," said Time's South Pacific Managing Director Ed Barnum. "Now we are hoping to fall in line with the trend."

The post office, whose mailing rates are scheduled to increase 30% over two years' time, hopes to improve its service in the new year when a reorganization recommended by a royal commission is adopted.

Under the plan, the telecommunications section (which made a profit of $40 million last year) will be split from the post office. Both agencies thus will be removed from direct government control and will operate as separate independent statutory bodies.

NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1975

A Reluctant Antagonist in Peru

Novelist Critical of Military 'Cannot Remain Ostrich'

By JONATHAN KANDELL
Special to The New York Times

LIMA, Peru, — For centuries, Latin-American writers, artists and intellectuals have traditionally been the political gadflies of their countries, often enjoying a following and influence far greater than their colleagues in Europe and the United States.

In Mexico, Carlos Fuentes, in his novel "The Death of Artemio Cruz," provided one of the most poignant chronicles of the corruption of the leaders of Mexico's revolution over the last six decades.

The jailing of the painter David Alfaro Siqueiros in the nineteen-sixties for his acid comments on the political system exposed the Mexican Government to some of the strongest foreign criticism it has received.

In Chile, the late poet Pablo Neruda often laced his verses with eloquent denunciations of United States domination of the continent, and his posthumous memoirs have haunted the right-wing military junta that now rules Chile almost as much as the attacks of living critics.

In keeping with this tradition, Peru's leading novelist, Mario Vargas Llosa, home after a 16-year absence, has quickly emerged in recent months as the most articulate and important critic of the left-wing military Government here.

"I think it is lamentable that just by the fact that I am a writer I have been conferred political authority," said Mr. Vargas Llosa, who at 38 years of age is uneasy with his new status.

"Maybe it happens because newspapers in Latin America rarely are independent enough to fulfill their role as political watchdogs," he suggested. "Maybe it is because writers are under so much pressure from other intellectuals and university students to enter the political arena.

"I myself do not have even a minimum vocation for politics. I detest people who use literature for political ends. But I cannot remain an ostrich."

Mr. Vargas Llosa has focused his criticism particularly on the Government's decision last July to expropriate all newspapers with a national circulation. His denunciations of the stifling of political dissent here have had a particularly strong impact abroad—in Latin America and in Europe—where intellectuals and leftists have been favorably disposed to the Peruvian military Government.

Newspapers and political commentators in France, Argentina and Brazil gave as much coverage to the novelist's protest against the press takeover as they did to the Peruvian Government's defense of it. Long interviews with Mr. Vargas Llosa have also been published throughout Latin America in recent weeks.

"With the growing lack of freedom of expression, the revolution is in danger of becoming fossilized," said Mr. Vargas Llosa in an interview in his suburban apartment overlooking the Pacific Ocean. "I don't think there was anything remarkable about the newspapers when they were privately owned. They defended minority class interest.

"But now the Government has isolated itself from public debate. Look at the newspapers six months after their expropriations. They carry only the most timid sort of criticism."

Last month, after attacks on Mr. Vargas Llosa by the Government-controlled press, more than 30 Peruvian intellectuals and artists broke their silence to sign a declaration backing the novelist.

Mr. Vargas Llosa, whose own politics lean toward socialism, asserts that he is largely sympathetic to the broad aims of the revolution proclaimed by the armed forces when they took power in 1968.

During the recent rioting in Lima against the military Government, he strongly denounced any attempt by conservative opponents to take advantage of the crisis.

He has applauded the agrarian reform that has displaced the rural oligarchy and distributed land to more than 175,000 impoverished families. He has welcomed Government plans to give industrial workers a large share of ownership in their companies, and Government efforts to bridge the yawning economic, social and racial chasm that has always fragmented Peruvian society.

"Coming from the military, this has all been very surprising," said Mr. Vargas Llosa, whose best-known novel, entitled "Time of the Hero" in the English version, is a scathing social commentary set in a military academy that the author attended for two years.

When the book, whose Spanish title translates as "The City and the Dogs," appeared in 1962, a thousand copies were publicly burned at the school. Several ranking military officers called it the product of a sick mind and denounced the author as a Communist and anti-Peruvian.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 February 1975

Latin America goes it alone

Latin Americans are going to great lengths these days to assert an economic independence from the United States. The groundwork laid recently by Colombia and Venezuela for formation of a hemisphere consultative grouping on economic issues, excluding the U.S., is evidence of this trend.

There is good reason for this Latin-American initiative. For too long, the nations of the hemisphere have depended on Washington in both the political and economic arenas, deferring to the U.S. on many issues affecting their livelihood. Washington's response has often failed to consider their needs and sensitivities.

Moreover, the U.S. has tended to take Latin America for granted — failing often to live up to the good-sounding rhetoric uttered at hemisphere meetings. In recent years, for example, the U.S. has frequently promised to improve the terms of trade with Latin America. But there has been very little concrete effort by the U.S.

All of this contributes to Latin America's present independent streak. The area's leaders, however, know that the road ahead will not be easy — and they are also realists, aware that in an interdependent world they need the U.S. just as the U.S. needs Latin America.

Unfortunately, Washington has shown few signs of being equally aware of these points. Last year, an independent study commission on U.S.-Latin-American relations, chaired by the onetime U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States Sol M. Linowitz, called on Washington to awaken to the need for a new and purposeful Latin-American policy. We can do no better than to echo that call.